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| author |  Joey Hess <joeyh@joeyh.name> | 2017-02-24 19:54:36 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Joey Hess <joeyh@joeyh.name> | 2017-02-24 19:54:36 -0400 |
| commit | a091af71fc8161427f8d9553042d0bc41507fff7 (patch) | |
| tree | 69cf2785559ef7600ce4402abdaee4a6071fae36 /CHANGELOG | |
| parent | 1630f299751d4e8b186cd176c8219f11257586d8 (diff) | |
SHA1 collisions in key names was more exploitable than I thought
Yesterday's SHA1 collision attack could be used to generate eg:
SHA256-sfoo--whatever.good
SHA256-sfoo--whatever.bad
Such that they collide. A repository with the good one could have the
bad one swapped in and signed commits would still verify.
I've already mitigated this.
Diffstat (limited to 'CHANGELOG')
| -rw-r--r-- | CHANGELOG | 5 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ git-annex (6.20170215) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium to wget, since curl is able to display only errors to stderr, unlike wget. * status: Pass --ignore-submodules=when option on to git status. - * Tighten key parser to mitigate against hypothetical SHA1 chosen-prefix - attacks. This ensures that signed git commits of annexed files + * Tighten key parser to prevent SHA1 collision attacks generating + two keys that have the same SHA1. (Only done for keys that contain + a hash). This ensures that signed git commits of annexed files will remain secure, as long as git-annex is using a secure hashing backend. |