From a091af71fc8161427f8d9553042d0bc41507fff7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joey Hess Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2017 19:54:36 -0400 Subject: SHA1 collisions in key names was more exploitable than I thought Yesterday's SHA1 collision attack could be used to generate eg: SHA256-sfoo--whatever.good SHA256-sfoo--whatever.bad Such that they collide. A repository with the good one could have the bad one swapped in and signed commits would still verify. I've already mitigated this. --- CHANGELOG | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'CHANGELOG') diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG index 9f3c22414..459937cfd 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG +++ b/CHANGELOG @@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ git-annex (6.20170215) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium to wget, since curl is able to display only errors to stderr, unlike wget. * status: Pass --ignore-submodules=when option on to git status. - * Tighten key parser to mitigate against hypothetical SHA1 chosen-prefix - attacks. This ensures that signed git commits of annexed files + * Tighten key parser to prevent SHA1 collision attacks generating + two keys that have the same SHA1. (Only done for keys that contain + a hash). This ensures that signed git commits of annexed files will remain secure, as long as git-annex is using a secure hashing backend. -- cgit v1.2.3