diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec')
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/CMakeLists.txt | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec.c | 888 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c | 581 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_key.c | 503 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_montgomery.c | 283 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_test.cc | 188 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/example_mul.c | 133 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/internal.h | 372 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/oct.c | 470 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/p256-64.c | 1931 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/simple.c | 1357 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/util-64.c | 183 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/wnaf.c | 853 |
13 files changed, 7778 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/CMakeLists.txt b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38a91f89b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +include_directories(../../include) + +add_library( + ec + + OBJECT + + ec.c + ec_asn1.c + ec_key.c + ec_montgomery.c + oct.c + p256-64.c + util-64.c + simple.c + wnaf.c +) + +add_executable( + example_mul + + example_mul.c + + $<TARGET_OBJECTS:test_support> +) + +add_executable( + ec_test + + ec_test.cc + + $<TARGET_OBJECTS:test_support> +) + +target_link_libraries(example_mul crypto) +target_link_libraries(ec_test crypto) diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3117f16e43 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec.c @@ -0,0 +1,888 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#include <openssl/ec.h> + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/obj.h> + +#include "internal.h" + + +static const struct curve_data P224 = { + "NIST P-224", + 28, + 1, + {/* p */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + /* a */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, + /* b */ + 0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56, + 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43, + 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4, + /* x */ + 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9, + 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6, + 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21, + /* y */ + 0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6, + 0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99, + 0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34, + /* order */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45, + 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D, + }}; + +static const struct curve_data P256 = { + "NIST P-256", + 32, + 1, + {/* p */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + /* a */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, + /* b */ + 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55, + 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6, + 0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B, + /* x */ + 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, + 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0, + 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96, + /* y */ + 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, + 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, + 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5, + /* order */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, + 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51}}; + +static const struct curve_data P384 = { + "NIST P-384", + 48, + 1, + {/* p */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + /* a */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, + /* b */ + 0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B, + 0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12, + 0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D, + 0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF, + /* x */ + 0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E, + 0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98, + 0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D, + 0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7, + /* y */ + 0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf, + 0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c, + 0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce, + 0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f, + /* order */ + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2, + 0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73}}; + +static const struct curve_data P521 = { + "NIST P-521", + 66, + 1, + {/* p */ + 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + /* a */ + 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, + /* b */ + 0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A, + 0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3, + 0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19, + 0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1, + 0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45, + 0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00, + /* x */ + 0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E, + 0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F, + 0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B, + 0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF, + 0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E, + 0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66, + /* y */ + 0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a, + 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b, + 0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee, + 0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad, + 0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe, + 0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50, + /* order */ + 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86, + 0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09, + 0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F, + 0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09}}; + +const struct built_in_curve OPENSSL_built_in_curves[] = { + {NID_secp224r1, &P224, 0}, + { + NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &P256, + /* MSAN appears to have a bug that causes this P-256 code to be miscompiled + * in opt mode. While that is being looked at, don't run the uint128_t + * P-256 code under MSAN for now. */ +#if defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT) && !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && \ + !defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER) + EC_GFp_nistp256_method, +#else + 0, +#endif + }, + {NID_secp384r1, &P384, 0}, + {NID_secp521r1, &P521, 0}, + {NID_undef, 0, 0}, +}; + +EC_GROUP *ec_group_new(const EC_METHOD *meth) { + EC_GROUP *ret; + + if (meth == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_SLOT_FULL); + return NULL; + } + + if (meth->group_init == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return NULL; + } + + ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_GROUP)); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EC_GROUP)); + + ret->meth = meth; + BN_init(&ret->order); + BN_init(&ret->cofactor); + + if (!meth->group_init(ret)) { + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + + return ret; +} + +EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GFp_mont_method(); + EC_GROUP *ret; + + ret = ec_group_new(meth); + if (ret == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + if (ret->meth->group_set_curve == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (!ret->meth->group_set_curve(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) { + EC_GROUP_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, + const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor) { + if (group->curve_name != NID_undef) { + /* |EC_GROUP_set_generator| should only be used with |EC_GROUP|s returned + * by |EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp|. */ + return 0; + } + + if (group->generator == NULL) { + group->generator = EC_POINT_new(group); + if (group->generator == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + if (!EC_POINT_copy(group->generator, generator)) { + return 0; + } + + if (order != NULL) { + if (!BN_copy(&group->order, order)) { + return 0; + } + } else { + BN_zero(&group->order); + } + + if (cofactor != NULL) { + if (!BN_copy(&group->cofactor, cofactor)) { + return 0; + } + } else { + BN_zero(&group->cofactor); + } + + return 1; +} + +static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const struct built_in_curve *curve) { + EC_GROUP *group = NULL; + EC_POINT *P = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL; + int ok = 0; + unsigned param_len; + const EC_METHOD *meth; + const struct curve_data *data; + const uint8_t *params; + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + data = curve->data; + param_len = data->param_len; + params = data->data; + + if (!(p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) || + !(a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) || + !(b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL))) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (curve->method != 0) { + meth = curve->method(); + if (((group = ec_group_new(meth)) == NULL) || + (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else { + if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (!(x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) || + !(y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL))) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, &group->order) || + !BN_set_word(&group->cofactor, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + group->generator = P; + P = NULL; + ok = 1; + +err: + if (!ok) { + EC_GROUP_free(group); + group = NULL; + } + EC_POINT_free(P); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_free(p); + BN_free(a); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(x); + BN_free(y); + return group; +} + +EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid) { + unsigned i; + const struct built_in_curve *curve; + EC_GROUP *ret = NULL; + + for (i = 0; OPENSSL_built_in_curves[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) { + curve = &OPENSSL_built_in_curves[i]; + if (curve->nid == nid) { + ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve); + break; + } + } + + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP); + return NULL; + } + + ret->curve_name = nid; + return ret; +} + +void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group) { + if (!group) { + return; + } + + if (group->meth->group_finish != 0) { + group->meth->group_finish(group); + } + + ec_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp); + + EC_POINT_free(group->generator); + BN_free(&group->order); + BN_free(&group->cofactor); + + OPENSSL_free(group); +} + +int ec_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { + if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (dest->meth != src->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + if (dest == src) { + return 1; + } + + ec_pre_comp_free(dest->pre_comp); + dest->pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp); + + if (src->generator != NULL) { + if (dest->generator == NULL) { + dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest); + if (dest->generator == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator)) { + return 0; + } + } else { + /* src->generator == NULL */ + if (dest->generator != NULL) { + EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator); + dest->generator = NULL; + } + } + + if (!BN_copy(&dest->order, &src->order) || + !BN_copy(&dest->cofactor, &src->cofactor)) { + return 0; + } + + dest->curve_name = src->curve_name; + + return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src); +} + +EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *a) { + EC_GROUP *t = NULL; + int ok = 0; + + if (a == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + t = ec_group_new(a->meth); + if (t == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + if (!ec_group_copy(t, a)) { + goto err; + } + + ok = 1; + +err: + if (!ok) { + EC_GROUP_free(t); + return NULL; + } else { + return t; + } +} + +int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ignored) { + return a->curve_name == NID_undef || + b->curve_name == NID_undef || + a->curve_name != b->curve_name; +} + +const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group) { + return group->generator; +} + +int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (!BN_copy(order, &group->order)) { + return 0; + } + + return !BN_is_zero(order); +} + +int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (!BN_copy(cofactor, &group->cofactor)) { + return 0; + } + + return !BN_is_zero(&group->cofactor); +} + +int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *out_p, BIGNUM *out_a, + BIGNUM *out_b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->group_get_curve == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->group_get_curve(group, out_p, out_a, out_b, ctx); +} + +int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group) { return group->curve_name; } + +int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) { + if (group->meth->group_get_degree == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->group_get_degree(group); +} + +int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->mul == 0) { + /* use default */ + return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx); + } + + if (group->meth->precompute_mult != 0) { + return group->meth->precompute_mult(group, ctx); + } + + return 1; /* nothing to do, so report success */ +} + +int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { + if (group->meth->mul == 0) { + /* use default */ + return ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(group); + } + + if (group->meth->have_precompute_mult != 0) { + return group->meth->have_precompute_mult(group); + } + + return 0; /* cannot tell whether precomputation has been performed */ +} + +EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group) { + EC_POINT *ret; + + if (group == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return NULL; + } + if (group->meth->point_init == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return NULL; + } + + ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + ret->meth = group->meth; + + if (!ret->meth->point_init(ret)) { + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + + return ret; +} + +void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point) { + if (!point) { + return; + } + + if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) { + point->meth->point_finish(point); + } + OPENSSL_free(point); +} + +void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point) { + if (!point) { + return; + } + + if (point->meth->point_clear_finish != 0) { + point->meth->point_clear_finish(point); + } else if (point->meth->point_finish != 0) { + point->meth->point_finish(point); + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(point, sizeof *point); + OPENSSL_free(point); +} + +int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) { + if (dest->meth->point_copy == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (dest->meth != src->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + if (dest == src) { + return 1; + } + return dest->meth->point_copy(dest, src); +} + +EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *a, const EC_GROUP *group) { + EC_POINT *t; + int r; + + if (a == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + t = EC_POINT_new(group); + if (t == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + r = EC_POINT_copy(t, a); + if (!r) { + EC_POINT_free(t); + return NULL; + } else { + return t; + } +} + +int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point) { + if (group->meth->point_set_to_infinity == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->point_set_to_infinity(group, point); +} + +int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { + if (group->meth->is_at_infinity == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point); +} + +int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->is_on_curve == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->is_on_curve(group, point, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return -1; + } + if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return -1; + } + return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->make_affine == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->make_affine(group, point, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], + BN_CTX *ctx) { + size_t i; + + if (group->meth->points_make_affine == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + } + return group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, + const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, + BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, + const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->point_set_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, + const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->add == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth) || + (a->meth != b->meth)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->add(group, r, a, b, ctx); +} + + +int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->dbl == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->dbl(group, r, a, ctx); +} + + +int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->invert == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != a->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->invert(group, a, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar, + const EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx) { + /* just a convenient interface to EC_POINTs_mul() */ + + const EC_POINT *points[1]; + const BIGNUM *scalars[1]; + + points[0] = point; + scalars[0] = p_scalar; + + return EC_POINTs_mul(group, r, g_scalar, (point != NULL && p_scalar != NULL), + points, scalars, ctx); +} + +int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, + size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->mul == 0) { + /* use default. Warning, not constant-time. */ + return ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); + } + + return group->meth->mul(group, r, scalar, num, points, scalars, ctx); +} + +int ec_point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, + const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, + const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + return group->meth->point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, + z, ctx); +} + +void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag) {} + +const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group) { + return NULL; +} + +int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth) { + return NID_X9_62_prime_field; +} + +void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, + point_conversion_form_t form) { + if (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { + abort(); + } +} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f540256364 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ +/* Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project. */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ + +#include <openssl/ec.h> + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/asn1.h> +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/obj.h> + +#include "internal.h" + + +typedef struct x9_62_fieldid_st { + ASN1_OBJECT *fieldType; + union { + char *ptr; + /* NID_X9_62_prime_field */ + ASN1_INTEGER *prime; + /* anything else */ + ASN1_TYPE *other; + } p; +} X9_62_FIELDID; + +ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(fieldID_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.other, ASN1_ANY); + +ASN1_ADB(X9_62_FIELDID) = { + ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_prime_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.prime, ASN1_INTEGER)), +} ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_FIELDID, 0, fieldType, 0, &fieldID_def_tt, NULL); + +ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_FIELDID) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, fieldType, ASN1_OBJECT), + ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_FIELDID) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_FIELDID); + +typedef struct x9_62_curve_st { + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b; + ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed; +} X9_62_CURVE; + +ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CURVE) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, b, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), + ASN1_OPT(X9_62_CURVE, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CURVE); + +typedef struct ec_parameters_st { + long version; + X9_62_FIELDID *fieldID; + X9_62_CURVE *curve; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base; + ASN1_INTEGER *order; + ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor; +} ECPARAMETERS; + +DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS); + +ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECPARAMETERS) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, version, LONG), + ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, fieldID, X9_62_FIELDID), + ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, curve, X9_62_CURVE), + ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, base, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), + ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, order, ASN1_INTEGER), + ASN1_OPT(ECPARAMETERS, cofactor, ASN1_INTEGER) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECPARAMETERS); + +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS); + +typedef struct ecpk_parameters_st { + int type; + union { + ASN1_OBJECT *named_curve; + ECPARAMETERS *parameters; + } value; +} ECPKPARAMETERS; + +/* SEC1 ECPrivateKey */ +typedef struct ec_privatekey_st { + long version; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey; + ECPKPARAMETERS *parameters; + ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey; +} EC_PRIVATEKEY; + +DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS); +DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS, ECPKPARAMETERS); + +ASN1_CHOICE(ECPKPARAMETERS) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.named_curve, ASN1_OBJECT), + ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.parameters, ECPARAMETERS), +} ASN1_CHOICE_END(ECPKPARAMETERS); + +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS); + +DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY); +DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY, EC_PRIVATEKEY); + +ASN1_SEQUENCE(EC_PRIVATEKEY) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, version, LONG), + ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), + ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, parameters, ECPKPARAMETERS, 0), + ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1), +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EC_PRIVATEKEY); + +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY); + + +ECPKPARAMETERS *ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, + ECPKPARAMETERS *params) { + int ok = 0, nid; + ECPKPARAMETERS *ret = params; + + if (ret == NULL) { + ret = ECPKPARAMETERS_new(); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } else { + ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve); + } + + /* use the ASN.1 OID to describe the the elliptic curve parameters. */ + nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); + if (nid) { + ret->type = 0; + ret->value.named_curve = (ASN1_OBJECT*) OBJ_nid2obj(nid); + ok = ret->value.named_curve != NULL; + } + + if (!ok) { + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + + return ret; +} + +EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params) { + EC_GROUP *ret = NULL; + int nid = NID_undef; + + if (params == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); + return NULL; + } + + if (params->type == 0) { + nid = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve); + } else if (params->type == 1) { + /* We don't support arbitary curves so we attempt to recognise it from the + * group order. */ + const ECPARAMETERS *ecparams = params->value.parameters; + unsigned i; + const struct built_in_curve *curve; + + for (i = 0; OPENSSL_built_in_curves[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) { + curve = &OPENSSL_built_in_curves[i]; + const unsigned param_len = curve->data->param_len; + if (ecparams->order->length == param_len && + memcmp(ecparams->order->data, &curve->data->data[param_len * 5], + param_len) == 0) { + nid = curve->nid; + break; + } + } + } + + if (nid == NID_undef) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_NON_NAMED_CURVE); + return NULL; + } + + ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + return ret; +} + +static EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **groupp, const uint8_t **inp, + long len) { + EC_GROUP *group = NULL; + ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL; + const uint8_t *in = *inp; + + params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &in, len); + if (params == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); + return NULL; + } + + group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(params); + if (group == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE); + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); + return NULL; + } + + if (groupp) { + EC_GROUP_free(*groupp); + *groupp = group; + } + + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); + *inp = in; + return group; +} + +static int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t **outp) { + int ret = 0; + ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(group, NULL); + if (tmp == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, outp); + if (ret == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp); + return 0; + } + ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp); + return ret; +} + +EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const uint8_t **inp, long len) { + int ok = 0; + EC_KEY *ret = NULL; + EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; + + const uint8_t *in = *inp; + priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &in, len); + if (priv_key == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + return NULL; + } + + if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) { + ret = EC_KEY_new(); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + ret = *a; + } + + if (priv_key->parameters) { + EC_GROUP_free(ret->group); + ret->group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(priv_key->parameters); + } + + if (ret->group == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + ret->version = priv_key->version; + + if (priv_key->privateKey) { + ret->priv_key = + BN_bin2bn(M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->privateKey), + M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->privateKey), ret->priv_key); + if (ret->priv_key == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY); + goto err; + } + + EC_POINT_free(ret->pub_key); + ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group); + if (ret->pub_key == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (priv_key->publicKey) { + const uint8_t *pub_oct; + int pub_oct_len; + + pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey); + pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey); + /* The first byte (the point conversion form) must be present. */ + if (pub_oct_len <= 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } + /* Save the point conversion form. */ + ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(pub_oct[0] & ~0x01); + if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key, pub_oct, pub_oct_len, + NULL)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!EC_POINT_mul(ret->group, ret->pub_key, ret->priv_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + /* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */ + ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY; + } + + if (a) { + *a = ret; + } + *inp = in; + ok = 1; + +err: + if (!ok) { + if (a == NULL || *a != ret) { + EC_KEY_free(ret); + } + ret = NULL; + } + + EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); + + return ret; +} + +int i2d_ECPrivateKey(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t **outp) { + int ret = 0, ok = 0; + uint8_t *buffer = NULL; + size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len; + EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || key->priv_key == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + goto err; + } + + priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new(); + if (priv_key == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + priv_key->version = key->version; + + buf_len = BN_num_bytes(&key->group->order); + buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len); + if (buffer == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buffer, buf_len, key->priv_key)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(priv_key->privateKey, buffer, buf_len)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* TODO(fork): replace this flexibility with key sensible default? */ + if (!(key->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS)) { + if ((priv_key->parameters = ec_asn1_group2pkparameters( + key->group, priv_key->parameters)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + /* TODO(fork): replace this flexibility with key sensible default? */ + if (!(key->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && key->pub_key != NULL) { + priv_key->publicKey = M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new(); + if (priv_key->publicKey == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + tmp_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(key->group, key->pub_key, key->conv_form, NULL, + 0, NULL); + + if (tmp_len > buf_len) { + uint8_t *tmp_buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(buffer, tmp_len); + if (!tmp_buffer) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + buffer = tmp_buffer; + buf_len = tmp_len; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(key->group, key->pub_key, key->conv_form, buffer, + buf_len, NULL)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + priv_key->publicKey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); + priv_key->publicKey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; + if (!M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(priv_key->publicKey, buffer, buf_len)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + ret = i2d_EC_PRIVATEKEY(priv_key, outp); + if (ret == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + ok = 1; + +err: + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); + return (ok ? ret : 0); +} + +int i2d_ECParameters(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t **outp) { + if (key == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + return i2d_ECPKParameters(key->group, outp); +} + +EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **key, const uint8_t **inp, long len) { + EC_KEY *ret; + + if (inp == NULL || *inp == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return NULL; + } + + if (key == NULL || *key == NULL) { + ret = EC_KEY_new(); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } else { + ret = *key; + } + + if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, inp, len)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + if (key == NULL || *key == NULL) { + EC_KEY_free(ret); + } + return NULL; + } + + if (key) { + *key = ret; + } + return ret; +} + +EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **keyp, const uint8_t **inp, long len) { + EC_KEY *ret = NULL; + + if (keyp == NULL || *keyp == NULL || (*keyp)->group == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + ret = *keyp; + if (ret->pub_key == NULL && + (ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key, *inp, len, NULL)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + return 0; + } + /* save the point conversion form */ + ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(*inp[0] & ~0x01); + *inp += len; + return ret; +} + +int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t **outp) { + size_t buf_len = 0; + int new_buffer = 0; + + if (key == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + + buf_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(key->group, key->pub_key, key->conv_form, NULL, + 0, NULL); + + if (outp == NULL || buf_len == 0) { + /* out == NULL => just return the length of the octet string */ + return buf_len; + } + + if (*outp == NULL) { + *outp = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len); + if (*outp == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + new_buffer = 1; + } + if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(key->group, key->pub_key, key->conv_form, *outp, + buf_len, NULL)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + if (new_buffer) { + OPENSSL_free(*outp); + *outp = NULL; + } + return 0; + } + + if (!new_buffer) { + *outp += buf_len; + } + return buf_len; +} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0defa98ab9 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#include <openssl/ec_key.h> + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/ec.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/ex_data.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/thread.h> + +#include "internal.h" +#include "../internal.h" + + +static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; + +EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL); } + +EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) { + EC_KEY *ret = (EC_KEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_KEY)); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EC_KEY)); + + if (engine) { + ret->ecdsa_meth = ENGINE_get_ECDSA_method(engine); + } + if (ret->ecdsa_meth) { + METHOD_ref(ret->ecdsa_meth); + } + + ret->version = 1; + ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; + ret->references = 1; + + if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { + goto err1; + } + + if (ret->ecdsa_meth && ret->ecdsa_meth->init && !ret->ecdsa_meth->init(ret)) { + goto err2; + } + + return ret; + +err2: + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ret, &ret->ex_data); +err1: + if (ret->ecdsa_meth) { + METHOD_unref(ret->ecdsa_meth); + } + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + +EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) { + EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new(); + if (ret == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid); + if (ret->group == NULL) { + EC_KEY_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) { + if (r == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&r->references)) { + return; + } + + if (r->ecdsa_meth) { + if (r->ecdsa_meth->finish) { + r->ecdsa_meth->finish(r); + } + METHOD_unref(r->ecdsa_meth); + } + + EC_GROUP_free(r->group); + EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key); + BN_clear_free(r->priv_key); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, r, &r->ex_data); + + OPENSSL_cleanse((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY)); + OPENSSL_free(r); +} + +EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src) { + if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return NULL; + } + /* Copy the parameters. */ + if (src->group) { + /* TODO(fork): duplicating the group seems wasteful. */ + EC_GROUP_free(dest->group); + dest->group = EC_GROUP_dup(src->group); + if (dest->group == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + } + + /* Copy the public key. */ + if (src->pub_key && src->group) { + EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key); + dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(src->pub_key, src->group); + if (dest->pub_key == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + } + + /* copy the private key */ + if (src->priv_key) { + if (dest->priv_key == NULL) { + dest->priv_key = BN_new(); + if (dest->priv_key == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + } + if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key)) { + return NULL; + } + } + /* copy method/extra data */ + if (src->ecdsa_meth) { + METHOD_unref(dest->ecdsa_meth); + dest->ecdsa_meth = src->ecdsa_meth; + METHOD_ref(dest->ecdsa_meth); + } + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dest, &dest->ex_data); + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, &dest->ex_data, + &src->ex_data)) { + return NULL; + } + + /* copy the rest */ + dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag; + dest->conv_form = src->conv_form; + dest->version = src->version; + dest->flags = src->flags; + + return dest; +} + +EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key) { + EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new(); + if (ret == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) { + EC_KEY_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r) { + CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&r->references); + return 1; +} + +int EC_KEY_is_opaque(const EC_KEY *key) { + return key->ecdsa_meth && (key->ecdsa_meth->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_OPAQUE); +} + +const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->group; } + +int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group) { + EC_GROUP_free(key->group); + /* TODO(fork): duplicating the group seems wasteful but see + * |EC_KEY_set_conv_form|. */ + key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group); + return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1; +} + +const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) { + return key->priv_key; +} + +int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) { + BN_clear_free(key->priv_key); + key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key); + return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; +} + +const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) { + return key->pub_key; +} + +int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key) { + EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key); + key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group); + return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; +} + +unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->enc_flag; } + +void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags) { + key->enc_flag = flags; +} + +point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key) { + return key->conv_form; +} + +void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) { + key->conv_form = cform; +} + +int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (key->group == NULL) { + return 0; + } + return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx); +} + +int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) { + int ok = 0; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + const BIGNUM *order = NULL; + EC_POINT *point = NULL; + + if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); + goto err; + } + + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group); + + if (ctx == NULL || + point == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */ + if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); + goto err; + } + /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */ + /* TODO(fork): can this be skipped if the cofactor is one or if we're about + * to check the private key, below? */ + order = &eckey->group->order; + if (BN_is_zero(order)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); + goto err; + } + if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); + goto err; + } + /* in case the priv_key is present : + * check if generator * priv_key == pub_key + */ + if (eckey->priv_key) { + if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); + goto err; + } + if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); + goto err; + } + } + ok = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + EC_POINT_free(point); + return ok; +} + +int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, + BIGNUM *y) { + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *tx, *ty; + EC_POINT *point = NULL; + int ok = 0; + + if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + point = EC_POINT_new(key->group); + + if (ctx == NULL || + point == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + + if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, x, y, ctx) || + !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + /* Check if retrieved coordinates match originals: if not values + * are out of range. */ + if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) { + goto err; + } + + if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0) { + goto err; + } + + ok = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + EC_POINT_free(point); + return ok; +} + +int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) { + int ok = 0; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL, *order = NULL; + EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL; + + if (!eckey || !eckey->group) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + + order = BN_new(); + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + + if (order == NULL || + ctx == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { + priv_key = BN_new(); + if (priv_key == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } else { + priv_key = eckey->priv_key; + } + + if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(eckey->group, order, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + do { + if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order)) { + goto err; + } + } while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)); + + if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) { + pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group); + if (pub_key == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } else { + pub_key = eckey->pub_key; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + eckey->priv_key = priv_key; + eckey->pub_key = pub_key; + + ok = 1; + +err: + BN_free(order); + if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) { + EC_POINT_free(pub_key); + } + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { + BN_free(priv_key); + } + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + return ok; +} + +int EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, + CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, + CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { + int index; + if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, new_func, + dup_func, free_func)) { + return -1; + } + return index; +} + +int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx, void *arg) { + return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg); +} + +void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *d, int idx) { + return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx); +} + +void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) {} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_montgomery.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_montgomery.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b897000b64 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_montgomery.c @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#include <openssl/ec.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> + +#include "internal.h" + + +const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void) { + static const EC_METHOD ret = {EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, + ec_GFp_mont_group_init, + ec_GFp_mont_group_finish, + ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish, + ec_GFp_mont_group_copy, + ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve, + ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, + ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, + ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, + ec_GFp_simple_point_init, + ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, + ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, + ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, + ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates, + 0, + 0, + 0, + ec_GFp_simple_add, + ec_GFp_simple_dbl, + ec_GFp_simple_invert, + ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, + ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, + ec_GFp_simple_cmp, + ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, + ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, + 0 /* mul */, + 0 /* precompute_mult */, + 0 /* have_precompute_mult */, + ec_GFp_mont_field_mul, + ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr, + 0 /* field_div */, + ec_GFp_mont_field_encode, + ec_GFp_mont_field_decode, + ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one}; + + return &ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { + int ok; + + ok = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group); + group->mont = NULL; + group->one = NULL; + return ok; +} + +void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { + BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont); + group->mont = NULL; + BN_free(group->one); + group->one = NULL; + ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(group); +} + +void ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { + BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont); + group->mont = NULL; + BN_clear_free(group->one); + group->one = NULL; + ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(group); +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { + BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont); + dest->mont = NULL; + BN_clear_free(dest->one); + dest->one = NULL; + + if (!ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(dest, src)) { + return 0; + } + + if (src->mont != NULL) { + dest->mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); + if (dest->mont == NULL) { + return 0; + } + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->mont, src->mont)) { + goto err; + } + } + if (src->one != NULL) { + dest->one = BN_dup(src->one); + if (dest->one == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } + + return 1; + +err: + BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont); + dest->mont = NULL; + return 0; +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; + BIGNUM *one = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont); + group->mont = NULL; + BN_free(group->one); + group->one = NULL; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new(); + if (mont == NULL) { + goto err; + } + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, p, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + one = BN_new(); + if (one == NULL || !BN_to_montgomery(one, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + group->mont = mont; + mont = NULL; + group->one = one; + one = NULL; + + ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); + + if (!ret) { + BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont); + group->mont = NULL; + BN_free(group->one); + group->one = NULL; + } + +err: + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); + BN_free(one); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->mont == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return 0; + } + + return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, b, group->mont, ctx); +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->mont == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return 0; + } + + return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, a, group->mont, ctx); +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->mont == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return 0; + } + + return BN_to_montgomery(r, a, group->mont, ctx); +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->mont == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return 0; + } + + return BN_from_montgomery(r, a, group->mont, ctx); +} + +int ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->one == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return 0; + } + + if (!BN_copy(r, group->one)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_test.cc b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_test.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5af42d5fe7 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/ec_test.cc @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <vector> + +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/ec_key.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> + +#include "../test/scoped_types.h" +#include "../test/stl_compat.h" + + +// kECKeyWithoutPublic is an ECPrivateKey with the optional publicKey field +// omitted. +static const uint8_t kECKeyWithoutPublic[] = { + 0x30, 0x31, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xc6, 0xc1, 0xaa, 0xda, 0x15, 0xb0, + 0x76, 0x61, 0xf8, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x6c, 0xaf, 0x0f, 0xdb, 0x24, 0x1a, 0xff, 0x2e, + 0xfe, 0x46, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x8b, 0x74, 0xf2, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x52, 0xb0, 0x77, + 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, +}; + +// kECKeyMissingZeros is an ECPrivateKey containing a degenerate P-256 key where +// the private key is one. The private key is incorrectly encoded without zero +// padding. +static const uint8_t kECKeyMissingZeros[] = { + 0x30, 0x58, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, + 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, + 0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x63, + 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0, 0xf4, 0xa1, + 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96, 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, + 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, + 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5, +}; + +// kECKeyMissingZeros is an ECPrivateKey containing a degenerate P-256 key where +// the private key is one. The private key is encoded with the required zero +// padding. +static const uint8_t kECKeyWithZeros[] = { + 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, + 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, + 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x63, 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, 0x2d, + 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0, 0xf4, 0xa1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96, 0x4f, 0xe3, + 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, + 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, + 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5, +}; + +// DecodeECPrivateKey decodes |in| as an ECPrivateKey structure and returns the +// result or nullptr on error. +static ScopedEC_KEY DecodeECPrivateKey(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) { + const uint8_t *inp = in; + ScopedEC_KEY ret(d2i_ECPrivateKey(NULL, &inp, in_len)); + if (!ret || inp != in + in_len) { + return nullptr; + } + return ret; +} + +// EncodeECPrivateKey encodes |key| as an ECPrivateKey structure into |*out|. It +// returns true on success or false on error. +static bool EncodeECPrivateKey(std::vector<uint8_t> *out, EC_KEY *key) { + int len = i2d_ECPrivateKey(key, NULL); + out->resize(len); + uint8_t *outp = bssl::vector_data(out); + return i2d_ECPrivateKey(key, &outp) == len; +} + +bool Testd2i_ECPrivateKey() { + ScopedEC_KEY key = DecodeECPrivateKey(kECKeyWithoutPublic, + sizeof(kECKeyWithoutPublic)); + if (!key) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to parse private key.\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return false; + } + + std::vector<uint8_t> out; + if (!EncodeECPrivateKey(&out, key.get())) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to serialize private key.\n"); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return false; + } + + if (std::vector<uint8_t>(kECKeyWithoutPublic, + kECKeyWithoutPublic + sizeof(kECKeyWithoutPublic)) != + out) { + fprintf(stderr, "Serialisation of key doesn't match original.\n"); + return false; + } + + const EC_POINT *pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key.get()); + if (pub_key == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Public key missing.\n"); + return false; + } + + ScopedBIGNUM x(BN_new()); + ScopedBIGNUM y(BN_new()); + if (!x || !y) { + return false; + } + if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(key.get()), + pub_key, x.get(), y.get(), NULL)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get public key in affine coordinates.\n"); + return false; + } + ScopedOpenSSLString x_hex(BN_bn2hex(x.get())); + ScopedOpenSSLString y_hex(BN_bn2hex(y.get())); + if (!x_hex || !y_hex) { + return false; + } + if (0 != strcmp( + x_hex.get(), + "c81561ecf2e54edefe6617db1c7a34a70744ddb261f269b83dacfcd2ade5a681") || + 0 != strcmp( + y_hex.get(), + "e0e2afa3f9b6abe4c698ef6495f1be49a3196c5056acb3763fe4507eec596e88")) { + fprintf(stderr, "Incorrect public key: %s %s\n", x_hex.get(), y_hex.get()); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool TestZeroPadding() { + // Check that the correct encoding round-trips. + ScopedEC_KEY key = DecodeECPrivateKey(kECKeyWithZeros, + sizeof(kECKeyWithZeros)); + std::vector<uint8_t> out; + if (!key || !EncodeECPrivateKey(&out, key.get())) { + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return false; + } + + if (std::vector<uint8_t>(kECKeyWithZeros, + kECKeyWithZeros + sizeof(kECKeyWithZeros)) != out) { + fprintf(stderr, "Serialisation of key was incorrect.\n"); + return false; + } + + // Keys without leading zeros also parse, but they encode correctly. + key = DecodeECPrivateKey(kECKeyMissingZeros, sizeof(kECKeyMissingZeros)); + if (!key || !EncodeECPrivateKey(&out, key.get())) { + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + return false; + } + + if (std::vector<uint8_t>(kECKeyWithZeros, + kECKeyWithZeros + sizeof(kECKeyWithZeros)) != out) { + fprintf(stderr, "Serialisation of key was incorrect.\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +int main(void) { + CRYPTO_library_init(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + + if (!Testd2i_ECPrivateKey() || + !TestZeroPadding()) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + printf("PASS\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/example_mul.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/example_mul.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ebb724faf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/example_mul.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#include <stdio.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/ec.h> +#include <openssl/obj.h> + + +int example_EC_POINT_mul(void) { + /* This example ensures that 10×∞ + G = G, in P-256. */ + EC_GROUP *group = NULL; + EC_POINT *p = NULL, *result = NULL; + BIGNUM *n = NULL; + int ret = 0; + const EC_POINT *generator; + + group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + p = EC_POINT_new(group); + result = EC_POINT_new(group); + n = BN_new(); + + if (p == NULL || + result == NULL || + group == NULL || + n == NULL || + !EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, p) || + !BN_set_word(n, 10)) { + goto err; + } + + /* First check that 10×∞ = ∞. */ + if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, result, NULL, p, n, NULL) || + !EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, result)) { + goto err; + } + + generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); + + /* Now check that 10×∞ + G = G. */ + if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, result, BN_value_one(), p, n, NULL) || + EC_POINT_cmp(group, result, generator, NULL) != 0) { + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_free(n); + EC_POINT_free(result); + EC_POINT_free(p); + EC_GROUP_free(group); + + return ret; +} + +int main(void) { + CRYPTO_library_init(); + + if (!example_EC_POINT_mul()) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + printf("PASS\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/internal.h b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71062c1615 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H +#define OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H + +#include <openssl/base.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/ex_data.h> +#include <openssl/thread.h> + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/* Use default functions for poin2oct, oct2point and compressed coordinates */ +#define EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT 0x1 + +struct ec_method_st { + /* Various method flags */ + int flags; + + /* used by EC_GROUP_new, EC_GROUP_free, EC_GROUP_clear_free, EC_GROUP_copy: */ + int (*group_init)(EC_GROUP *); + void (*group_finish)(EC_GROUP *); + void (*group_clear_finish)(EC_GROUP *); + int (*group_copy)(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); + + /* used by EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp, EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp, */ + /* EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m, and EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m: */ + int (*group_set_curve)(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); + int (*group_get_curve)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, + BN_CTX *); + + /* used by EC_GROUP_get_degree: */ + int (*group_get_degree)(const EC_GROUP *); + + /* used by EC_GROUP_check: */ + int (*group_check_discriminant)(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); + + /* used by EC_POINT_new, EC_POINT_free, EC_POINT_clear_free, EC_POINT_copy: */ + int (*point_init)(EC_POINT *); + void (*point_finish)(EC_POINT *); + void (*point_clear_finish)(EC_POINT *); + int (*point_copy)(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); + + /* used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity, + * EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + * EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m, + * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m, + * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m: + */ + int (*point_set_to_infinity)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); + int (*point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, + const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, + const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); + int (*point_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp)(const EC_GROUP *, + const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, + BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); + int (*point_set_affine_coordinates)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, + const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, + BN_CTX *); + int (*point_get_affine_coordinates)(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, + BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); + int (*point_set_compressed_coordinates)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, + const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *); + + /* used by EC_POINT_point2oct, EC_POINT_oct2point: */ + size_t (*point2oct)(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, + point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, BN_CTX *); + int (*oct2point)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, BN_CTX *); + + /* used by EC_POINT_add, EC_POINT_dbl, ECP_POINT_invert: */ + int (*add)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, + const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); + int (*dbl)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *); + int (*invert)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); + + /* used by EC_POINT_is_at_infinity, EC_POINT_is_on_curve, EC_POINT_cmp: */ + int (*is_at_infinity)(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); + int (*is_on_curve)(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); + int (*point_cmp)(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, + BN_CTX *); + + /* used by EC_POINT_make_affine, EC_POINTs_make_affine: */ + int (*make_affine)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); + int (*points_make_affine)(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT * [], + BN_CTX *); + + /* used by EC_POINTs_mul, EC_POINT_mul, EC_POINT_precompute_mult, + * EC_POINT_have_precompute_mult + * (default implementations are used if the 'mul' pointer is 0): */ + int (*mul)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, + size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], + BN_CTX *); + int (*precompute_mult)(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *); + int (*have_precompute_mult)(const EC_GROUP *group); + + + /* internal functions */ + + /* 'field_mul', 'field_sqr', and 'field_div' can be used by 'add' and 'dbl' + * so that the same implementations of point operations can be used with + * different optimized implementations of expensive field operations: */ + int (*field_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); + int (*field_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *); + int (*field_div)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); + + int (*field_encode)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *); /* e.g. to Montgomery */ + int (*field_decode)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *); /* e.g. from Montgomery */ + int (*field_set_to_one)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *); +} /* EC_METHOD */; + +const EC_METHOD* EC_GFp_mont_method(void); + +struct ec_pre_comp_st; +void ec_pre_comp_free(struct ec_pre_comp_st *pre_comp); +void *ec_pre_comp_dup(struct ec_pre_comp_st *pre_comp); + +struct ec_group_st { + const EC_METHOD *meth; + + EC_POINT *generator; /* optional */ + BIGNUM order, cofactor; + + int curve_name; /* optional NID for named curve */ + + struct ec_pre_comp_st *pre_comp; + + /* The following members are handled by the method functions, + * even if they appear generic */ + + BIGNUM field; /* For curves over GF(p), this is the modulus. */ + + BIGNUM a, b; /* Curve coefficients. */ + + int a_is_minus3; /* enable optimized point arithmetics for special case */ + + BN_MONT_CTX *mont; /* Montgomery structure. */ + BIGNUM *one; /* The value one */ +} /* EC_GROUP */; + +struct ec_point_st { + const EC_METHOD *meth; + + /* All members except 'meth' are handled by the method functions, + * even if they appear generic */ + + BIGNUM X; + BIGNUM Y; + BIGNUM Z; /* Jacobian projective coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) represents (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) if Z != 0 */ + int Z_is_one; /* enable optimized point arithmetics for special case */ +} /* EC_POINT */; + +EC_GROUP *ec_group_new(const EC_METHOD *meth); +int ec_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src); + +int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, + size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], + BN_CTX *); +int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *); +int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); + +/* method functions in simple.c */ +int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *); +void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); +void ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); +int ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); +int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, + BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *); +int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *); +void ec_GFp_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *); +void ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *); +int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); +int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); +int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, + const BIGNUM *x, + const BIGNUM *y, + const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *, + const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, + BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, + const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, + const EC_POINT *, BIGNUM *x, + BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, + const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, + const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); +int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, + EC_POINT * [], BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *); + +/* method functions in montgomery.c */ +int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *); +int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); +void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *); +void ec_GFp_mont_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *); +int ec_GFp_mont_group_copy(EC_GROUP *, const EC_GROUP *); +int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *); +int ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *); + +int ec_point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, + EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, + const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, + BN_CTX *ctx); + +void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal( + size_t num, void *point_array, size_t felem_size, void *tmp_felems, + void (*felem_one)(void *out), int (*felem_is_zero)(const void *in), + void (*felem_assign)(void *out, const void *in), + void (*felem_square)(void *out, const void *in), + void (*felem_mul)(void *out, const void *in1, const void *in2), + void (*felem_inv)(void *out, const void *in), + void (*felem_contract)(void *out, const void *in)); + +void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(uint8_t *sign, uint8_t *digit, uint8_t in); + +const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void); + +struct ec_key_st { + int version; + + EC_GROUP *group; + + EC_POINT *pub_key; + BIGNUM *priv_key; + + unsigned int enc_flag; + point_conversion_form_t conv_form; + + CRYPTO_refcount_t references; + int flags; + + ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth; + + CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; +} /* EC_KEY */; + +/* curve_data contains data about a built-in elliptic curve. */ +struct curve_data { + /* comment is a human-readable string describing the curve. */ + const char *comment; + /* param_len is the number of bytes needed to store a field element. */ + uint8_t param_len; + /* cofactor is the cofactor of the group (i.e. the number of elements in the + * group divided by the size of the main subgroup. */ + uint8_t cofactor; /* promoted to BN_ULONG */ + /* data points to an array of 6*|param_len| bytes which hold the field + * elements of the following (in big-endian order): prime, a, b, generator x, + * generator y, order. */ + const uint8_t data[]; +}; + +struct built_in_curve { + int nid; + const struct curve_data *data; + const EC_METHOD *(*method)(void); +}; + +/* OPENSSL_built_in_curves is terminated with an entry where |nid| is + * |NID_undef|. */ +extern const struct built_in_curve OPENSSL_built_in_curves[]; + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +} /* extern C */ +#endif + +#endif /* OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/oct.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/oct.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb50e17229 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/oct.c @@ -0,0 +1,470 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#include <openssl/ec.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> + +#include "internal.h" + + +static size_t ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, + const EC_POINT *point, + point_conversion_form_t form, + uint8_t *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { + size_t ret; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + int used_ctx = 0; + BIGNUM *x, *y; + size_t field_len, i; + + if ((form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) && + (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_FORM); + goto err; + } + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { + /* encodes to a single 0 octet */ + if (buf != NULL) { + if (len < 1) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + buf[0] = 0; + } + return 1; + } + + + /* ret := required output buffer length */ + field_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field); + ret = + (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len; + + /* if 'buf' is NULL, just return required length */ + if (buf != NULL) { + if (len < ret) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + used_ctx = 1; + x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (y == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + if ((form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) && + BN_is_odd(y)) { + buf[0] = form + 1; + } else { + buf[0] = form; + } + i = 1; + + if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf + i, field_len, x)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + i += field_len; + + if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { + if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf + i, field_len, y)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + i += field_len; + } + + if (i != ret) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (used_ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + } + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; + +err: + if (used_ctx) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + } + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return 0; +} + + +static int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, + const uint8_t *buf, size_t len, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + point_conversion_form_t form; + int y_bit; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *x, *y; + size_t field_len, enc_len; + int ret = 0; + + if (len == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + form = buf[0]; + y_bit = form & 1; + form = form & ~1U; + if ((form != 0) && (form != POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) && + (form != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); + return 0; + } + if ((form == 0 || form == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) && y_bit) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); + return 0; + } + + if (form == 0) { + if (len != 1) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); + return 0; + } + + return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, point); + } + + field_len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field); + enc_len = + (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) ? 1 + field_len : 1 + 2 * field_len; + + if (len != enc_len) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); + return 0; + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (x == NULL || y == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1, field_len, x)) { + goto err; + } + if (BN_ucmp(x, &group->field) >= 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); + goto err; + } + + if (form == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { + if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y_bit, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!BN_bin2bn(buf + 1 + field_len, field_len, y)) { + goto err; + } + if (BN_ucmp(y, &group->field) >= 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_ENCODING); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* test required by X9.62 */ + if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, + const uint8_t *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->oct2point == 0 && + !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) { + return ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx); + } + + return group->meth->oct2point(group, point, buf, len, ctx); +} + +size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, + point_conversion_form_t form, uint8_t *buf, + size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->point2oct == 0 && + !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) { + return ec_GFp_simple_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx); + } + + return group->meth->point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx); +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, + EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x_, + int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *x, *y; + int ret = 0; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + y_bit = (y_bit != 0); + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (y == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* Recover y. We have a Weierstrass equation + * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b, + * so y is one of the square roots of x^3 + a*x + b. */ + + /* tmp1 := x^3 */ + if (!BN_nnmod(x, x_, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + if (group->meth->field_decode == 0) { + /* field_{sqr,mul} work on standard representation */ + if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp2, x_, ctx) || + !group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp2, x_, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp2, x_, &group->field, ctx) || + !BN_mod_mul(tmp1, tmp2, x_, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* tmp1 := tmp1 + a*x */ + if (group->a_is_minus3) { + if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(tmp2, x, &group->field) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(tmp2, tmp2, x, &group->field) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, &group->field)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (group->meth->field_decode) { + if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, tmp2, &group->a, ctx) || + !BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp2, x, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + /* field_mul works on standard representation */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp2, &group->a, x, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, &group->field)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* tmp1 := tmp1 + b */ + if (group->meth->field_decode) { + if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, tmp2, &group->b, ctx) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, tmp2, &group->field)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!BN_mod_add_quick(tmp1, tmp1, &group->b, &group->field)) { + goto err; + } + } + + if (!BN_mod_sqrt(y, tmp1, &group->field, ctx)) { + unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error(); + + if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_BN && + ERR_GET_REASON(err) == BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE) { + ERR_clear_error(); + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT); + } else { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + } + goto err; + } + + if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) { + if (BN_is_zero(y)) { + int kron; + + kron = BN_kronecker(x, &group->field, ctx); + if (kron == -2) { + goto err; + } + + if (kron == 1) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT); + } else { + /* BN_mod_sqrt() should have cought this error (not a square) */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT); + } + goto err; + } + if (!BN_usub(y, &group->field, y)) { + goto err; + } + } + if (y_bit != BN_is_odd(y)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, + EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, + int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates == 0 && + !(group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth != point->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + if (group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT) { + return ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, + ctx); + } + return group->meth->point_set_compressed_coordinates(group, point, x, y_bit, + ctx); +} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/p256-64.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/p256-64.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3946b298e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/p256-64.c @@ -0,0 +1,1931 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ + +/* A 64-bit implementation of the NIST P-256 elliptic curve point + * multiplication + * + * OpenSSL integration was taken from Emilia Kasper's work in ecp_nistp224.c. + * Otherwise based on Emilia's P224 work, which was inspired by my curve25519 + * work which got its smarts from Daniel J. Bernstein's work on the same. */ + +#include <openssl/base.h> + +#if defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT) && !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/ec.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/obj.h> + +#include <string.h> + +#include "internal.h" + + +typedef uint8_t u8; +typedef uint64_t u64; +typedef int64_t s64; +typedef __uint128_t uint128_t; +typedef __int128_t int128_t; + +/* The underlying field. P256 operates over GF(2^256-2^224+2^192+2^96-1). We + * can serialise an element of this field into 32 bytes. We call this an + * felem_bytearray. */ +typedef u8 felem_bytearray[32]; + +/* These are the parameters of P256, taken from FIPS 186-3, page 86. These + * values are big-endian. */ +static const felem_bytearray nistp256_curve_params[5] = { + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* p */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, + {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a = -3 */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xfc}, /* b */ + {0x5a, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0x93, 0xe7, 0xb3, 0xeb, 0xbd, 0x55, + 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x1d, 0x06, 0xb0, 0xcc, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xf6, + 0x3b, 0xce, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x27, 0xd2, 0x60, 0x4b}, + {0x6b, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xe1, 0x2c, 0x42, 0x47, /* x */ + 0xf8, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe5, 0x63, 0xa4, 0x40, 0xf2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7d, 0x81, + 0x2d, 0xeb, 0x33, 0xa0, 0xf4, 0xa1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x98, 0xc2, 0x96}, + {0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, /* y */ + 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, + 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5}}; + +/* The representation of field elements. + * ------------------------------------ + * + * We represent field elements with either four 128-bit values, eight 128-bit + * values, or four 64-bit values. The field element represented is: + * v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^64 + v[2]*2^128 + v[3]*2^192 (mod p) + * or: + * v[0]*2^0 + v[1]*2^64 + v[2]*2^128 + ... + v[8]*2^512 (mod p) + * + * 128-bit values are called 'limbs'. Since the limbs are spaced only 64 bits + * apart, but are 128-bits wide, the most significant bits of each limb overlap + * with the least significant bits of the next. + * + * A field element with four limbs is an 'felem'. One with eight limbs is a + * 'longfelem' + * + * A field element with four, 64-bit values is called a 'smallfelem'. Small + * values are used as intermediate values before multiplication. */ + +#define NLIMBS 4 + +typedef uint128_t limb; +typedef limb felem[NLIMBS]; +typedef limb longfelem[NLIMBS * 2]; +typedef u64 smallfelem[NLIMBS]; + +/* This is the value of the prime as four 64-bit words, little-endian. */ +static const u64 kPrime[4] = {0xfffffffffffffffful, 0xffffffff, 0, + 0xffffffff00000001ul}; +static const u64 bottom63bits = 0x7ffffffffffffffful; + +/* bin32_to_felem takes a little-endian byte array and converts it into felem + * form. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian. */ +static void bin32_to_felem(felem out, const u8 in[32]) { + out[0] = *((u64 *)&in[0]); + out[1] = *((u64 *)&in[8]); + out[2] = *((u64 *)&in[16]); + out[3] = *((u64 *)&in[24]); +} + +/* smallfelem_to_bin32 takes a smallfelem and serialises into a little endian, + * 32 byte array. This assumes that the CPU is little-endian. */ +static void smallfelem_to_bin32(u8 out[32], const smallfelem in) { + *((u64 *)&out[0]) = in[0]; + *((u64 *)&out[8]) = in[1]; + *((u64 *)&out[16]) = in[2]; + *((u64 *)&out[24]) = in[3]; +} + +/* To preserve endianness when using BN_bn2bin and BN_bin2bn. */ +static void flip_endian(u8 *out, const u8 *in, unsigned len) { + unsigned i; + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + out[i] = in[len - 1 - i]; + } +} + +/* BN_to_felem converts an OpenSSL BIGNUM into an felem. */ +static int BN_to_felem(felem out, const BIGNUM *bn) { + if (BN_is_negative(bn)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); + return 0; + } + + felem_bytearray b_out; + /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */ + memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out)); + unsigned num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); + if (num_bytes > sizeof(b_out)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); + return 0; + } + + felem_bytearray b_in; + num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(bn, b_in); + flip_endian(b_out, b_in, num_bytes); + bin32_to_felem(out, b_out); + return 1; +} + +/* felem_to_BN converts an felem into an OpenSSL BIGNUM. */ +static BIGNUM *smallfelem_to_BN(BIGNUM *out, const smallfelem in) { + felem_bytearray b_in, b_out; + smallfelem_to_bin32(b_in, in); + flip_endian(b_out, b_in, sizeof(b_out)); + return BN_bin2bn(b_out, sizeof(b_out), out); +} + +/* Field operations. */ + +static void smallfelem_one(smallfelem out) { + out[0] = 1; + out[1] = 0; + out[2] = 0; + out[3] = 0; +} + +static void smallfelem_assign(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in) { + out[0] = in[0]; + out[1] = in[1]; + out[2] = in[2]; + out[3] = in[3]; +} + +static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) { + out[0] = in[0]; + out[1] = in[1]; + out[2] = in[2]; + out[3] = in[3]; +} + +/* felem_sum sets out = out + in. */ +static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in) { + out[0] += in[0]; + out[1] += in[1]; + out[2] += in[2]; + out[3] += in[3]; +} + +/* felem_small_sum sets out = out + in. */ +static void felem_small_sum(felem out, const smallfelem in) { + out[0] += in[0]; + out[1] += in[1]; + out[2] += in[2]; + out[3] += in[3]; +} + +/* felem_scalar sets out = out * scalar */ +static void felem_scalar(felem out, const u64 scalar) { + out[0] *= scalar; + out[1] *= scalar; + out[2] *= scalar; + out[3] *= scalar; +} + +/* longfelem_scalar sets out = out * scalar */ +static void longfelem_scalar(longfelem out, const u64 scalar) { + out[0] *= scalar; + out[1] *= scalar; + out[2] *= scalar; + out[3] *= scalar; + out[4] *= scalar; + out[5] *= scalar; + out[6] *= scalar; + out[7] *= scalar; +} + +#define two105m41m9 (((limb)1) << 105) - (((limb)1) << 41) - (((limb)1) << 9) +#define two105 (((limb)1) << 105) +#define two105m41p9 (((limb)1) << 105) - (((limb)1) << 41) + (((limb)1) << 9) + +/* zero105 is 0 mod p */ +static const felem zero105 = {two105m41m9, two105, two105m41p9, two105m41p9}; + +/* smallfelem_neg sets |out| to |-small| + * On exit: + * out[i] < out[i] + 2^105 */ +static void smallfelem_neg(felem out, const smallfelem small) { + /* In order to prevent underflow, we subtract from 0 mod p. */ + out[0] = zero105[0] - small[0]; + out[1] = zero105[1] - small[1]; + out[2] = zero105[2] - small[2]; + out[3] = zero105[3] - small[3]; +} + +/* felem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| + * On entry: + * in[i] < 2^104 + * On exit: + * out[i] < out[i] + 2^105. */ +static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in) { + /* In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting. */ + out[0] += zero105[0]; + out[1] += zero105[1]; + out[2] += zero105[2]; + out[3] += zero105[3]; + + out[0] -= in[0]; + out[1] -= in[1]; + out[2] -= in[2]; + out[3] -= in[3]; +} + +#define two107m43m11 (((limb)1) << 107) - (((limb)1) << 43) - (((limb)1) << 11) +#define two107 (((limb)1) << 107) +#define two107m43p11 (((limb)1) << 107) - (((limb)1) << 43) + (((limb)1) << 11) + +/* zero107 is 0 mod p */ +static const felem zero107 = {two107m43m11, two107, two107m43p11, two107m43p11}; + +/* An alternative felem_diff for larger inputs |in| + * felem_diff_zero107 subtracts |in| from |out| + * On entry: + * in[i] < 2^106 + * On exit: + * out[i] < out[i] + 2^107. */ +static void felem_diff_zero107(felem out, const felem in) { + /* In order to prevent underflow, we add 0 mod p before subtracting. */ + out[0] += zero107[0]; + out[1] += zero107[1]; + out[2] += zero107[2]; + out[3] += zero107[3]; + + out[0] -= in[0]; + out[1] -= in[1]; + out[2] -= in[2]; + out[3] -= in[3]; +} + +/* longfelem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| + * On entry: + * in[i] < 7*2^67 + * On exit: + * out[i] < out[i] + 2^70 + 2^40. */ +static void longfelem_diff(longfelem out, const longfelem in) { + static const limb two70m8p6 = + (((limb)1) << 70) - (((limb)1) << 8) + (((limb)1) << 6); + static const limb two70p40 = (((limb)1) << 70) + (((limb)1) << 40); + static const limb two70 = (((limb)1) << 70); + static const limb two70m40m38p6 = (((limb)1) << 70) - (((limb)1) << 40) - + (((limb)1) << 38) + (((limb)1) << 6); + static const limb two70m6 = (((limb)1) << 70) - (((limb)1) << 6); + + /* add 0 mod p to avoid underflow */ + out[0] += two70m8p6; + out[1] += two70p40; + out[2] += two70; + out[3] += two70m40m38p6; + out[4] += two70m6; + out[5] += two70m6; + out[6] += two70m6; + out[7] += two70m6; + + /* in[i] < 7*2^67 < 2^70 - 2^40 - 2^38 + 2^6 */ + out[0] -= in[0]; + out[1] -= in[1]; + out[2] -= in[2]; + out[3] -= in[3]; + out[4] -= in[4]; + out[5] -= in[5]; + out[6] -= in[6]; + out[7] -= in[7]; +} + +#define two64m0 (((limb)1) << 64) - 1 +#define two110p32m0 (((limb)1) << 110) + (((limb)1) << 32) - 1 +#define two64m46 (((limb)1) << 64) - (((limb)1) << 46) +#define two64m32 (((limb)1) << 64) - (((limb)1) << 32) + +/* zero110 is 0 mod p. */ +static const felem zero110 = {two64m0, two110p32m0, two64m46, two64m32}; + +/* felem_shrink converts an felem into a smallfelem. The result isn't quite + * minimal as the value may be greater than p. + * + * On entry: + * in[i] < 2^109 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 2^64. */ +static void felem_shrink(smallfelem out, const felem in) { + felem tmp; + u64 a, b, mask; + s64 high, low; + static const u64 kPrime3Test = 0x7fffffff00000001ul; /* 2^63 - 2^32 + 1 */ + + /* Carry 2->3 */ + tmp[3] = zero110[3] + in[3] + ((u64)(in[2] >> 64)); + /* tmp[3] < 2^110 */ + + tmp[2] = zero110[2] + (u64)in[2]; + tmp[0] = zero110[0] + in[0]; + tmp[1] = zero110[1] + in[1]; + /* tmp[0] < 2**110, tmp[1] < 2^111, tmp[2] < 2**65 */ + + /* We perform two partial reductions where we eliminate the high-word of + * tmp[3]. We don't update the other words till the end. */ + a = tmp[3] >> 64; /* a < 2^46 */ + tmp[3] = (u64)tmp[3]; + tmp[3] -= a; + tmp[3] += ((limb)a) << 32; + /* tmp[3] < 2^79 */ + + b = a; + a = tmp[3] >> 64; /* a < 2^15 */ + b += a; /* b < 2^46 + 2^15 < 2^47 */ + tmp[3] = (u64)tmp[3]; + tmp[3] -= a; + tmp[3] += ((limb)a) << 32; + /* tmp[3] < 2^64 + 2^47 */ + + /* This adjusts the other two words to complete the two partial + * reductions. */ + tmp[0] += b; + tmp[1] -= (((limb)b) << 32); + + /* In order to make space in tmp[3] for the carry from 2 -> 3, we + * conditionally subtract kPrime if tmp[3] is large enough. */ + high = tmp[3] >> 64; + /* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */ + high <<= 63; + high >>= 63; + /* high is: + * all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1 + * all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */ + low = tmp[3]; + mask = low >> 63; + /* mask is: + * all ones if the MSB of low is 1 + * all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */ + low &= bottom63bits; + low -= kPrime3Test; + /* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */ + low = ~low; + low >>= 63; + /* low is: + * all ones if low was > kPrime3Test + * all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */ + mask = (mask & low) | high; + tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0]; + tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1]; + /* kPrime[2] is zero, so omitted */ + tmp[3] -= mask & kPrime[3]; + /* tmp[3] < 2**64 - 2**32 + 1 */ + + tmp[1] += ((u64)(tmp[0] >> 64)); + tmp[0] = (u64)tmp[0]; + tmp[2] += ((u64)(tmp[1] >> 64)); + tmp[1] = (u64)tmp[1]; + tmp[3] += ((u64)(tmp[2] >> 64)); + tmp[2] = (u64)tmp[2]; + /* tmp[i] < 2^64 */ + + out[0] = tmp[0]; + out[1] = tmp[1]; + out[2] = tmp[2]; + out[3] = tmp[3]; +} + +/* smallfelem_expand converts a smallfelem to an felem */ +static void smallfelem_expand(felem out, const smallfelem in) { + out[0] = in[0]; + out[1] = in[1]; + out[2] = in[2]; + out[3] = in[3]; +} + +/* smallfelem_square sets |out| = |small|^2 + * On entry: + * small[i] < 2^64 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ +static void smallfelem_square(longfelem out, const smallfelem small) { + limb a; + u64 high, low; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[0]) * small[0]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[0] = low; + out[1] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[0]) * small[1]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[1] += low; + out[1] += low; + out[2] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[0]) * small[2]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[2] += low; + out[2] *= 2; + out[3] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[0]) * small[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[3] += low; + out[4] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[1]) * small[2]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[3] += low; + out[3] *= 2; + out[4] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[1]) * small[1]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[2] += low; + out[3] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[1]) * small[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[4] += low; + out[4] *= 2; + out[5] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[2]) * small[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[5] += low; + out[5] *= 2; + out[6] = high; + out[6] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[2]) * small[2]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[4] += low; + out[5] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small[3]) * small[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[6] += low; + out[7] = high; +} + +/*felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2 + * On entry: + * in[i] < 2^109 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67. */ +static void felem_square(longfelem out, const felem in) { + u64 small[4]; + felem_shrink(small, in); + smallfelem_square(out, small); +} + +/* smallfelem_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |small2| + * On entry: + * small1[i] < 2^64 + * small2[i] < 2^64 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67. */ +static void smallfelem_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1, + const smallfelem small2) { + limb a; + u64 high, low; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[0]) * small2[0]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[0] = low; + out[1] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[0]) * small2[1]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[1] += low; + out[2] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[1]) * small2[0]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[1] += low; + out[2] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[0]) * small2[2]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[2] += low; + out[3] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[1]) * small2[1]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[2] += low; + out[3] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[2]) * small2[0]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[2] += low; + out[3] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[0]) * small2[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[3] += low; + out[4] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[1]) * small2[2]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[3] += low; + out[4] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[2]) * small2[1]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[3] += low; + out[4] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[3]) * small2[0]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[3] += low; + out[4] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[1]) * small2[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[4] += low; + out[5] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[2]) * small2[2]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[4] += low; + out[5] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[3]) * small2[1]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[4] += low; + out[5] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[2]) * small2[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[5] += low; + out[6] = high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[3]) * small2[2]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[5] += low; + out[6] += high; + + a = ((uint128_t)small1[3]) * small2[3]; + low = a; + high = a >> 64; + out[6] += low; + out[7] = high; +} + +/* felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2| + * On entry: + * in1[i] < 2^109 + * in2[i] < 2^109 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ +static void felem_mul(longfelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) { + smallfelem small1, small2; + felem_shrink(small1, in1); + felem_shrink(small2, in2); + smallfelem_mul(out, small1, small2); +} + +/* felem_small_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |in2| + * On entry: + * small1[i] < 2^64 + * in2[i] < 2^109 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ +static void felem_small_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1, + const felem in2) { + smallfelem small2; + felem_shrink(small2, in2); + smallfelem_mul(out, small1, small2); +} + +#define two100m36m4 (((limb)1) << 100) - (((limb)1) << 36) - (((limb)1) << 4) +#define two100 (((limb)1) << 100) +#define two100m36p4 (((limb)1) << 100) - (((limb)1) << 36) + (((limb)1) << 4) + +/* zero100 is 0 mod p */ +static const felem zero100 = {two100m36m4, two100, two100m36p4, two100m36p4}; + +/* Internal function for the different flavours of felem_reduce. + * felem_reduce_ reduces the higher coefficients in[4]-in[7]. + * On entry: + * out[0] >= in[6] + 2^32*in[6] + in[7] + 2^32*in[7] + * out[1] >= in[7] + 2^32*in[4] + * out[2] >= in[5] + 2^32*in[5] + * out[3] >= in[4] + 2^32*in[5] + 2^32*in[6] + * On exit: + * out[0] <= out[0] + in[4] + 2^32*in[5] + * out[1] <= out[1] + in[5] + 2^33*in[6] + * out[2] <= out[2] + in[7] + 2*in[6] + 2^33*in[7] + * out[3] <= out[3] + 2^32*in[4] + 3*in[7] */ +static void felem_reduce_(felem out, const longfelem in) { + int128_t c; + /* combine common terms from below */ + c = in[4] + (in[5] << 32); + out[0] += c; + out[3] -= c; + + c = in[5] - in[7]; + out[1] += c; + out[2] -= c; + + /* the remaining terms */ + /* 256: [(0,1),(96,-1),(192,-1),(224,1)] */ + out[1] -= (in[4] << 32); + out[3] += (in[4] << 32); + + /* 320: [(32,1),(64,1),(128,-1),(160,-1),(224,-1)] */ + out[2] -= (in[5] << 32); + + /* 384: [(0,-1),(32,-1),(96,2),(128,2),(224,-1)] */ + out[0] -= in[6]; + out[0] -= (in[6] << 32); + out[1] += (in[6] << 33); + out[2] += (in[6] * 2); + out[3] -= (in[6] << 32); + + /* 448: [(0,-1),(32,-1),(64,-1),(128,1),(160,2),(192,3)] */ + out[0] -= in[7]; + out[0] -= (in[7] << 32); + out[2] += (in[7] << 33); + out[3] += (in[7] * 3); +} + +/* felem_reduce converts a longfelem into an felem. + * To be called directly after felem_square or felem_mul. + * On entry: + * in[0] < 2^64, in[1] < 3*2^64, in[2] < 5*2^64, in[3] < 7*2^64 + * in[4] < 7*2^64, in[5] < 5*2^64, in[6] < 3*2^64, in[7] < 2*64 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 2^101 */ +static void felem_reduce(felem out, const longfelem in) { + out[0] = zero100[0] + in[0]; + out[1] = zero100[1] + in[1]; + out[2] = zero100[2] + in[2]; + out[3] = zero100[3] + in[3]; + + felem_reduce_(out, in); + + /* out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0 + * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0 + * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0 + * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0 + * + * out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101 + * out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101 + * out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101 + * out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101 */ +} + +/* felem_reduce_zero105 converts a larger longfelem into an felem. + * On entry: + * in[0] < 2^71 + * On exit: + * out[i] < 2^106 */ +static void felem_reduce_zero105(felem out, const longfelem in) { + out[0] = zero105[0] + in[0]; + out[1] = zero105[1] + in[1]; + out[2] = zero105[2] + in[2]; + out[3] = zero105[3] + in[3]; + + felem_reduce_(out, in); + + /* out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 + * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 + * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 + * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0 + * + * out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106 + * out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106 + * out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106 + * out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106 */ +} + +/* subtract_u64 sets *result = *result - v and *carry to one if the + * subtraction underflowed. */ +static void subtract_u64(u64 *result, u64 *carry, u64 v) { + uint128_t r = *result; + r -= v; + *carry = (r >> 64) & 1; + *result = (u64)r; +} + +/* felem_contract converts |in| to its unique, minimal representation. On + * entry: in[i] < 2^109. */ +static void felem_contract(smallfelem out, const felem in) { + u64 all_equal_so_far = 0, result = 0; + + felem_shrink(out, in); + /* small is minimal except that the value might be > p */ + + all_equal_so_far--; + /* We are doing a constant time test if out >= kPrime. We need to compare + * each u64, from most-significant to least significant. For each one, if + * all words so far have been equal (m is all ones) then a non-equal + * result is the answer. Otherwise we continue. */ + unsigned i; + for (i = 3; i < 4; i--) { + u64 equal; + uint128_t a = ((uint128_t)kPrime[i]) - out[i]; + /* if out[i] > kPrime[i] then a will underflow and the high 64-bits + * will all be set. */ + result |= all_equal_so_far & ((u64)(a >> 64)); + + /* if kPrime[i] == out[i] then |equal| will be all zeros and the + * decrement will make it all ones. */ + equal = kPrime[i] ^ out[i]; + equal--; + equal &= equal << 32; + equal &= equal << 16; + equal &= equal << 8; + equal &= equal << 4; + equal &= equal << 2; + equal &= equal << 1; + equal = ((s64)equal) >> 63; + + all_equal_so_far &= equal; + } + + /* if all_equal_so_far is still all ones then the two values are equal + * and so out >= kPrime is true. */ + result |= all_equal_so_far; + + /* if out >= kPrime then we subtract kPrime. */ + u64 carry; + subtract_u64(&out[0], &carry, result & kPrime[0]); + subtract_u64(&out[1], &carry, carry); + subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, carry); + subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry); + + subtract_u64(&out[1], &carry, result & kPrime[1]); + subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, carry); + subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry); + + subtract_u64(&out[2], &carry, result & kPrime[2]); + subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, carry); + + subtract_u64(&out[3], &carry, result & kPrime[3]); +} + +static void smallfelem_square_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in) { + longfelem longtmp; + felem tmp; + + smallfelem_square(longtmp, in); + felem_reduce(tmp, longtmp); + felem_contract(out, tmp); +} + +static void smallfelem_mul_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in1, + const smallfelem in2) { + longfelem longtmp; + felem tmp; + + smallfelem_mul(longtmp, in1, in2); + felem_reduce(tmp, longtmp); + felem_contract(out, tmp); +} + +/* felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0 + * otherwise. + * On entry: + * small[i] < 2^64 */ +static limb smallfelem_is_zero(const smallfelem small) { + limb result; + u64 is_p; + + u64 is_zero = small[0] | small[1] | small[2] | small[3]; + is_zero--; + is_zero &= is_zero << 32; + is_zero &= is_zero << 16; + is_zero &= is_zero << 8; + is_zero &= is_zero << 4; + is_zero &= is_zero << 2; + is_zero &= is_zero << 1; + is_zero = ((s64)is_zero) >> 63; + + is_p = (small[0] ^ kPrime[0]) | (small[1] ^ kPrime[1]) | + (small[2] ^ kPrime[2]) | (small[3] ^ kPrime[3]); + is_p--; + is_p &= is_p << 32; + is_p &= is_p << 16; + is_p &= is_p << 8; + is_p &= is_p << 4; + is_p &= is_p << 2; + is_p &= is_p << 1; + is_p = ((s64)is_p) >> 63; + + is_zero |= is_p; + + result = is_zero; + result |= ((limb)is_zero) << 64; + return result; +} + +static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const smallfelem small) { + return (int)(smallfelem_is_zero(small) & ((limb)1)); +} + +/* felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} + * + * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem: + * a^p = a (mod p) + * a^{p-1} = 1 (mod p) + * a^{p-2} = a^{-1} (mod p) */ +static void felem_inv(felem out, const felem in) { + felem ftmp, ftmp2; + /* each e_I will hold |in|^{2^I - 1} */ + felem e2, e4, e8, e16, e32, e64; + longfelem tmp; + unsigned i; + + felem_square(tmp, in); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^1 */ + felem_mul(tmp, in, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^2 - 2^0 */ + felem_assign(e2, ftmp); + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^3 - 2^1 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2^2 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e2); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^4 - 2^0 */ + felem_assign(e4, ftmp); + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^5 - 2^1 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^6 - 2^2 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^7 - 2^3 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^8 - 2^4 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e4); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^8 - 2^0 */ + felem_assign(e8, ftmp); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); + } /* 2^16 - 2^8 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e8); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^16 - 2^0 */ + felem_assign(e16, ftmp); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); + } /* 2^32 - 2^16 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, e16); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^32 - 2^0 */ + felem_assign(e32, ftmp); + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); + } /* 2^64 - 2^32 */ + felem_assign(e64, ftmp); + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, in); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); /* 2^64 - 2^32 + 2^0 */ + for (i = 0; i < 192; i++) { + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); + } /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 */ + + felem_mul(tmp, e64, e32); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^64 - 2^0 */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); + } /* 2^80 - 2^16 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e16); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^80 - 2^0 */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); + } /* 2^88 - 2^8 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e8); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^88 - 2^0 */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); + } /* 2^92 - 2^4 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e4); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^92 - 2^0 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^93 - 2^1 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^94 - 2^2 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, e2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^94 - 2^0 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^95 - 2^1 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^96 - 2^2 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, in); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); /* 2^96 - 3 */ + + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp2, ftmp); + felem_reduce(out, tmp); /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 3 */ +} + +static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in) { + felem tmp; + + smallfelem_expand(tmp, in); + felem_inv(tmp, tmp); + felem_contract(out, tmp); +} + +/* Group operations + * ---------------- + * + * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the + * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian + * coordinates. */ + +/* point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in) + * + * The method is taken from: + * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b + * + * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed. + * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */ +static void point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, + const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in) { + longfelem tmp, tmp2; + felem delta, gamma, beta, alpha, ftmp, ftmp2; + smallfelem small1, small2; + + felem_assign(ftmp, x_in); + /* ftmp[i] < 2^106 */ + felem_assign(ftmp2, x_in); + /* ftmp2[i] < 2^106 */ + + /* delta = z^2 */ + felem_square(tmp, z_in); + felem_reduce(delta, tmp); + /* delta[i] < 2^101 */ + + /* gamma = y^2 */ + felem_square(tmp, y_in); + felem_reduce(gamma, tmp); + /* gamma[i] < 2^101 */ + felem_shrink(small1, gamma); + + /* beta = x*gamma */ + felem_small_mul(tmp, small1, x_in); + felem_reduce(beta, tmp); + /* beta[i] < 2^101 */ + + /* alpha = 3*(x-delta)*(x+delta) */ + felem_diff(ftmp, delta); + /* ftmp[i] < 2^105 + 2^106 < 2^107 */ + felem_sum(ftmp2, delta); + /* ftmp2[i] < 2^105 + 2^106 < 2^107 */ + felem_scalar(ftmp2, 3); + /* ftmp2[i] < 3 * 2^107 < 2^109 */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(alpha, tmp); + /* alpha[i] < 2^101 */ + felem_shrink(small2, alpha); + + /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */ + smallfelem_square(tmp, small2); + felem_reduce(x_out, tmp); + felem_assign(ftmp, beta); + felem_scalar(ftmp, 8); + /* ftmp[i] < 8 * 2^101 = 2^104 */ + felem_diff(x_out, ftmp); + /* x_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */ + + /* z' = (y + z)^2 - gamma - delta */ + felem_sum(delta, gamma); + /* delta[i] < 2^101 + 2^101 = 2^102 */ + felem_assign(ftmp, y_in); + felem_sum(ftmp, z_in); + /* ftmp[i] < 2^106 + 2^106 = 2^107 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); + felem_diff(z_out, delta); + /* z_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */ + + /* y' = alpha*(4*beta - x') - 8*gamma^2 */ + felem_scalar(beta, 4); + /* beta[i] < 4 * 2^101 = 2^103 */ + felem_diff_zero107(beta, x_out); + /* beta[i] < 2^107 + 2^103 < 2^108 */ + felem_small_mul(tmp, small2, beta); + /* tmp[i] < 7 * 2^64 < 2^67 */ + smallfelem_square(tmp2, small1); + /* tmp2[i] < 7 * 2^64 */ + longfelem_scalar(tmp2, 8); + /* tmp2[i] < 8 * 7 * 2^64 = 7 * 2^67 */ + longfelem_diff(tmp, tmp2); + /* tmp[i] < 2^67 + 2^70 + 2^40 < 2^71 */ + felem_reduce_zero105(y_out, tmp); + /* y_out[i] < 2^106 */ +} + +/* point_double_small is the same as point_double, except that it operates on + * smallfelems. */ +static void point_double_small(smallfelem x_out, smallfelem y_out, + smallfelem z_out, const smallfelem x_in, + const smallfelem y_in, const smallfelem z_in) { + felem felem_x_out, felem_y_out, felem_z_out; + felem felem_x_in, felem_y_in, felem_z_in; + + smallfelem_expand(felem_x_in, x_in); + smallfelem_expand(felem_y_in, y_in); + smallfelem_expand(felem_z_in, z_in); + point_double(felem_x_out, felem_y_out, felem_z_out, felem_x_in, felem_y_in, + felem_z_in); + felem_shrink(x_out, felem_x_out); + felem_shrink(y_out, felem_y_out); + felem_shrink(z_out, felem_z_out); +} + +/* copy_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */ +static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask) { + unsigned i; + for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) { + const limb tmp = mask & (in[i] ^ out[i]); + out[i] ^= tmp; + } +} + +/* copy_small_conditional copies in to out iff mask is all ones. */ +static void copy_small_conditional(felem out, const smallfelem in, limb mask) { + unsigned i; + const u64 mask64 = mask; + for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; ++i) { + out[i] = ((limb)(in[i] & mask64)) | (out[i] & ~mask); + } +} + +/* point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) + * + * The method is taken from: + * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl, + * adapted for mixed addition (z2 = 1, or z2 = 0 for the point at infinity). + * + * This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points + * are equal, (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never + * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for + * ECDH or ECDSA signing. */ +static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, const felem x1, + const felem y1, const felem z1, const int mixed, + const smallfelem x2, const smallfelem y2, + const smallfelem z2) { + felem ftmp, ftmp2, ftmp3, ftmp4, ftmp5, ftmp6, x_out, y_out, z_out; + longfelem tmp, tmp2; + smallfelem small1, small2, small3, small4, small5; + limb x_equal, y_equal, z1_is_zero, z2_is_zero; + + felem_shrink(small3, z1); + + z1_is_zero = smallfelem_is_zero(small3); + z2_is_zero = smallfelem_is_zero(z2); + + /* ftmp = z1z1 = z1**2 */ + smallfelem_square(tmp, small3); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); + /* ftmp[i] < 2^101 */ + felem_shrink(small1, ftmp); + + if (!mixed) { + /* ftmp2 = z2z2 = z2**2 */ + smallfelem_square(tmp, z2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); + /* ftmp2[i] < 2^101 */ + felem_shrink(small2, ftmp2); + + felem_shrink(small5, x1); + + /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */ + smallfelem_mul(tmp, small5, small2); + felem_reduce(ftmp3, tmp); + /* ftmp3[i] < 2^101 */ + + /* ftmp5 = z1 + z2 */ + felem_assign(ftmp5, z1); + felem_small_sum(ftmp5, z2); + /* ftmp5[i] < 2^107 */ + + /* ftmp5 = (z1 + z2)**2 - (z1z1 + z2z2) = 2z1z2 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp5); + felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); + /* ftmp2 = z2z2 + z1z1 */ + felem_sum(ftmp2, ftmp); + /* ftmp2[i] < 2^101 + 2^101 = 2^102 */ + felem_diff(ftmp5, ftmp2); + /* ftmp5[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 < 2^106 */ + + /* ftmp2 = z2 * z2z2 */ + smallfelem_mul(tmp, small2, z2); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); + + /* s1 = ftmp2 = y1 * z2**3 */ + felem_mul(tmp, y1, ftmp2); + felem_reduce(ftmp6, tmp); + /* ftmp6[i] < 2^101 */ + } else { + /* We'll assume z2 = 1 (special case z2 = 0 is handled later). */ + + /* u1 = ftmp3 = x1*z2z2 */ + felem_assign(ftmp3, x1); + /* ftmp3[i] < 2^106 */ + + /* ftmp5 = 2z1z2 */ + felem_assign(ftmp5, z1); + felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2); + /* ftmp5[i] < 2*2^106 = 2^107 */ + + /* s1 = ftmp2 = y1 * z2**3 */ + felem_assign(ftmp6, y1); + /* ftmp6[i] < 2^106 */ + } + + /* u2 = x2*z1z1 */ + smallfelem_mul(tmp, x2, small1); + felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); + + /* h = ftmp4 = u2 - u1 */ + felem_diff_zero107(ftmp4, ftmp3); + /* ftmp4[i] < 2^107 + 2^101 < 2^108 */ + felem_shrink(small4, ftmp4); + + x_equal = smallfelem_is_zero(small4); + + /* z_out = ftmp5 * h */ + felem_small_mul(tmp, small4, ftmp5); + felem_reduce(z_out, tmp); + /* z_out[i] < 2^101 */ + + /* ftmp = z1 * z1z1 */ + smallfelem_mul(tmp, small1, small3); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); + + /* s2 = tmp = y2 * z1**3 */ + felem_small_mul(tmp, y2, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp5, tmp); + + /* r = ftmp5 = (s2 - s1)*2 */ + felem_diff_zero107(ftmp5, ftmp6); + /* ftmp5[i] < 2^107 + 2^107 = 2^108 */ + felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2); + /* ftmp5[i] < 2^109 */ + felem_shrink(small1, ftmp5); + y_equal = smallfelem_is_zero(small1); + + if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) { + point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1); + return; + } + + /* I = ftmp = (2h)**2 */ + felem_assign(ftmp, ftmp4); + felem_scalar(ftmp, 2); + /* ftmp[i] < 2*2^108 = 2^109 */ + felem_square(tmp, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp, tmp); + + /* J = ftmp2 = h * I */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp4, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp2, tmp); + + /* V = ftmp4 = U1 * I */ + felem_mul(tmp, ftmp3, ftmp); + felem_reduce(ftmp4, tmp); + + /* x_out = r**2 - J - 2V */ + smallfelem_square(tmp, small1); + felem_reduce(x_out, tmp); + felem_assign(ftmp3, ftmp4); + felem_scalar(ftmp4, 2); + felem_sum(ftmp4, ftmp2); + /* ftmp4[i] < 2*2^101 + 2^101 < 2^103 */ + felem_diff(x_out, ftmp4); + /* x_out[i] < 2^105 + 2^101 */ + + /* y_out = r(V-x_out) - 2 * s1 * J */ + felem_diff_zero107(ftmp3, x_out); + /* ftmp3[i] < 2^107 + 2^101 < 2^108 */ + felem_small_mul(tmp, small1, ftmp3); + felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp6, ftmp2); + longfelem_scalar(tmp2, 2); + /* tmp2[i] < 2*2^67 = 2^68 */ + longfelem_diff(tmp, tmp2); + /* tmp[i] < 2^67 + 2^70 + 2^40 < 2^71 */ + felem_reduce_zero105(y_out, tmp); + /* y_out[i] < 2^106 */ + + copy_small_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero); + copy_conditional(x_out, x1, z2_is_zero); + copy_small_conditional(y_out, y2, z1_is_zero); + copy_conditional(y_out, y1, z2_is_zero); + copy_small_conditional(z_out, z2, z1_is_zero); + copy_conditional(z_out, z1, z2_is_zero); + felem_assign(x3, x_out); + felem_assign(y3, y_out); + felem_assign(z3, z_out); +} + +/* point_add_small is the same as point_add, except that it operates on + * smallfelems. */ +static void point_add_small(smallfelem x3, smallfelem y3, smallfelem z3, + smallfelem x1, smallfelem y1, smallfelem z1, + smallfelem x2, smallfelem y2, smallfelem z2) { + felem felem_x3, felem_y3, felem_z3; + felem felem_x1, felem_y1, felem_z1; + smallfelem_expand(felem_x1, x1); + smallfelem_expand(felem_y1, y1); + smallfelem_expand(felem_z1, z1); + point_add(felem_x3, felem_y3, felem_z3, felem_x1, felem_y1, felem_z1, 0, x2, + y2, z2); + felem_shrink(x3, felem_x3); + felem_shrink(y3, felem_y3); + felem_shrink(z3, felem_z3); +} + +/* Base point pre computation + * -------------------------- + * + * Two different sorts of precomputed tables are used in the following code. + * Each contain various points on the curve, where each point is three field + * elements (x, y, z). + * + * For the base point table, z is usually 1 (0 for the point at infinity). + * This table has 2 * 16 elements, starting with the following: + * index | bits | point + * ------+---------+------------------------------ + * 0 | 0 0 0 0 | 0G + * 1 | 0 0 0 1 | 1G + * 2 | 0 0 1 0 | 2^64G + * 3 | 0 0 1 1 | (2^64 + 1)G + * 4 | 0 1 0 0 | 2^128G + * 5 | 0 1 0 1 | (2^128 + 1)G + * 6 | 0 1 1 0 | (2^128 + 2^64)G + * 7 | 0 1 1 1 | (2^128 + 2^64 + 1)G + * 8 | 1 0 0 0 | 2^192G + * 9 | 1 0 0 1 | (2^192 + 1)G + * 10 | 1 0 1 0 | (2^192 + 2^64)G + * 11 | 1 0 1 1 | (2^192 + 2^64 + 1)G + * 12 | 1 1 0 0 | (2^192 + 2^128)G + * 13 | 1 1 0 1 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 1)G + * 14 | 1 1 1 0 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 2^64)G + * 15 | 1 1 1 1 | (2^192 + 2^128 + 2^64 + 1)G + * followed by a copy of this with each element multiplied by 2^32. + * + * The reason for this is so that we can clock bits into four different + * locations when doing simple scalar multiplies against the base point, + * and then another four locations using the second 16 elements. + * + * Tables for other points have table[i] = iG for i in 0 .. 16. */ + +/* gmul is the table of precomputed base points */ +static const smallfelem gmul[2][16][3] = { + {{{0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xf4a13945d898c296, 0x77037d812deb33a0, 0xf8bce6e563a440f2, + 0x6b17d1f2e12c4247}, + {0xcbb6406837bf51f5, 0x2bce33576b315ece, 0x8ee7eb4a7c0f9e16, + 0x4fe342e2fe1a7f9b}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x90e75cb48e14db63, 0x29493baaad651f7e, 0x8492592e326e25de, + 0x0fa822bc2811aaa5}, + {0xe41124545f462ee7, 0x34b1a65050fe82f5, 0x6f4ad4bcb3df188b, + 0xbff44ae8f5dba80d}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x93391ce2097992af, 0xe96c98fd0d35f1fa, 0xb257c0de95e02789, + 0x300a4bbc89d6726f}, + {0xaa54a291c08127a0, 0x5bb1eeada9d806a5, 0x7f1ddb25ff1e3c6f, + 0x72aac7e0d09b4644}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x57c84fc9d789bd85, 0xfc35ff7dc297eac3, 0xfb982fd588c6766e, + 0x447d739beedb5e67}, + {0x0c7e33c972e25b32, 0x3d349b95a7fae500, 0xe12e9d953a4aaff7, + 0x2d4825ab834131ee}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x13949c932a1d367f, 0xef7fbd2b1a0a11b7, 0xddc6068bb91dfc60, + 0xef9519328a9c72ff}, + {0x196035a77376d8a8, 0x23183b0895ca1740, 0xc1ee9807022c219c, + 0x611e9fc37dbb2c9b}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xcae2b1920b57f4bc, 0x2936df5ec6c9bc36, 0x7dea6482e11238bf, + 0x550663797b51f5d8}, + {0x44ffe216348a964c, 0x9fb3d576dbdefbe1, 0x0afa40018d9d50e5, + 0x157164848aecb851}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xe48ecafffc5cde01, 0x7ccd84e70d715f26, 0xa2e8f483f43e4391, + 0xeb5d7745b21141ea}, + {0xcac917e2731a3479, 0x85f22cfe2844b645, 0x0990e6a158006cee, + 0xeafd72ebdbecc17b}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x6cf20ffb313728be, 0x96439591a3c6b94a, 0x2736ff8344315fc5, + 0xa6d39677a7849276}, + {0xf2bab833c357f5f4, 0x824a920c2284059b, 0x66b8babd2d27ecdf, + 0x674f84749b0b8816}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x2df48c04677c8a3e, 0x74e02f080203a56b, 0x31855f7db8c7fedb, + 0x4e769e7672c9ddad}, + {0xa4c36165b824bbb0, 0xfb9ae16f3b9122a5, 0x1ec0057206947281, + 0x42b99082de830663}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x6ef95150dda868b9, 0xd1f89e799c0ce131, 0x7fdc1ca008a1c478, + 0x78878ef61c6ce04d}, + {0x9c62b9121fe0d976, 0x6ace570ebde08d4f, 0xde53142c12309def, + 0xb6cb3f5d7b72c321}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x7f991ed2c31a3573, 0x5b82dd5bd54fb496, 0x595c5220812ffcae, + 0x0c88bc4d716b1287}, + {0x3a57bf635f48aca8, 0x7c8181f4df2564f3, 0x18d1b5b39c04e6aa, + 0xdd5ddea3f3901dc6}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xe96a79fb3e72ad0c, 0x43a0a28c42ba792f, 0xefe0a423083e49f3, + 0x68f344af6b317466}, + {0xcdfe17db3fb24d4a, 0x668bfc2271f5c626, 0x604ed93c24d67ff3, + 0x31b9c405f8540a20}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xd36b4789a2582e7f, 0x0d1a10144ec39c28, 0x663c62c3edbad7a0, + 0x4052bf4b6f461db9}, + {0x235a27c3188d25eb, 0xe724f33999bfcc5b, 0x862be6bd71d70cc8, + 0xfecf4d5190b0fc61}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x74346c10a1d4cfac, 0xafdf5cc08526a7a4, 0x123202a8f62bff7a, + 0x1eddbae2c802e41a}, + {0x8fa0af2dd603f844, 0x36e06b7e4c701917, 0x0c45f45273db33a0, + 0x43104d86560ebcfc}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x9615b5110d1d78e5, 0x66b0de3225c4744b, 0x0a4a46fb6aaf363a, + 0xb48e26b484f7a21c}, + {0x06ebb0f621a01b2d, 0xc004e4048b7b0f98, 0x64131bcdfed6f668, + 0xfac015404d4d3dab}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}}, + {{{0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x3a5a9e22185a5943, 0x1ab919365c65dfb6, 0x21656b32262c71da, + 0x7fe36b40af22af89}, + {0xd50d152c699ca101, 0x74b3d5867b8af212, 0x9f09f40407dca6f1, + 0xe697d45825b63624}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xa84aa9397512218e, 0xe9a521b074ca0141, 0x57880b3a18a2e902, + 0x4a5b506612a677a6}, + {0x0beada7a4c4f3840, 0x626db15419e26d9d, 0xc42604fbe1627d40, + 0xeb13461ceac089f1}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xf9faed0927a43281, 0x5e52c4144103ecbc, 0xc342967aa815c857, + 0x0781b8291c6a220a}, + {0x5a8343ceeac55f80, 0x88f80eeee54a05e3, 0x97b2a14f12916434, + 0x690cde8df0151593}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xaee9c75df7f82f2a, 0x9e4c35874afdf43a, 0xf5622df437371326, + 0x8a535f566ec73617}, + {0xc5f9a0ac223094b7, 0xcde533864c8c7669, 0x37e02819085a92bf, + 0x0455c08468b08bd7}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x0c0a6e2c9477b5d9, 0xf9a4bf62876dc444, 0x5050a949b6cdc279, + 0x06bada7ab77f8276}, + {0xc8b4aed1ea48dac9, 0xdebd8a4b7ea1070f, 0x427d49101366eb70, + 0x5b476dfd0e6cb18a}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x7c5c3e44278c340a, 0x4d54606812d66f3b, 0x29a751b1ae23c5d8, + 0x3e29864e8a2ec908}, + {0x142d2a6626dbb850, 0xad1744c4765bd780, 0x1f150e68e322d1ed, + 0x239b90ea3dc31e7e}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x78c416527a53322a, 0x305dde6709776f8e, 0xdbcab759f8862ed4, + 0x820f4dd949f72ff7}, + {0x6cc544a62b5debd4, 0x75be5d937b4e8cc4, 0x1b481b1b215c14d3, + 0x140406ec783a05ec}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x6a703f10e895df07, 0xfd75f3fa01876bd8, 0xeb5b06e70ce08ffe, + 0x68f6b8542783dfee}, + {0x90c76f8a78712655, 0xcf5293d2f310bf7f, 0xfbc8044dfda45028, + 0xcbe1feba92e40ce6}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xe998ceea4396e4c1, 0xfc82ef0b6acea274, 0x230f729f2250e927, + 0xd0b2f94d2f420109}, + {0x4305adddb38d4966, 0x10b838f8624c3b45, 0x7db2636658954e7a, + 0x971459828b0719e5}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x4bd6b72623369fc9, 0x57f2929e53d0b876, 0xc2d5cba4f2340687, + 0x961610004a866aba}, + {0x49997bcd2e407a5e, 0x69ab197d92ddcb24, 0x2cf1f2438fe5131c, + 0x7acb9fadcee75e44}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x254e839423d2d4c0, 0xf57f0c917aea685b, 0xa60d880f6f75aaea, + 0x24eb9acca333bf5b}, + {0xe3de4ccb1cda5dea, 0xfeef9341c51a6b4f, 0x743125f88bac4c4d, + 0x69f891c5acd079cc}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xeee44b35702476b5, 0x7ed031a0e45c2258, 0xb422d1e7bd6f8514, + 0xe51f547c5972a107}, + {0xa25bcd6fc9cf343d, 0x8ca922ee097c184e, 0xa62f98b3a9fe9a06, + 0x1c309a2b25bb1387}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x9295dbeb1967c459, 0xb00148833472c98e, 0xc504977708011828, + 0x20b87b8aa2c4e503}, + {0x3063175de057c277, 0x1bd539338fe582dd, 0x0d11adef5f69a044, + 0xf5c6fa49919776be}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0x8c944e760fd59e11, 0x3876cba1102fad5f, 0xa454c3fad83faa56, + 0x1ed7d1b9332010b9}, + {0xa1011a270024b889, 0x05e4d0dcac0cd344, 0x52b520f0eb6a2a24, + 0x3a2b03f03217257a}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}, + {{0xf20fc2afdf1d043d, 0xf330240db58d5a62, 0xfc7d229ca0058c3b, + 0x15fee545c78dd9f6}, + {0x501e82885bc98cda, 0x41ef80e5d046ac04, 0x557d9f49461210fb, + 0x4ab5b6b2b8753f81}, + {1, 0, 0, 0}}}}; + +/* select_point selects the |idx|th point from a precomputation table and + * copies it to out. */ +static void select_point(const u64 idx, unsigned int size, + const smallfelem pre_comp[16][3], smallfelem out[3]) { + unsigned i, j; + u64 *outlimbs = &out[0][0]; + memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(smallfelem)); + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + const u64 *inlimbs = (u64 *)&pre_comp[i][0][0]; + u64 mask = i ^ idx; + mask |= mask >> 4; + mask |= mask >> 2; + mask |= mask >> 1; + mask &= 1; + mask--; + for (j = 0; j < NLIMBS * 3; j++) { + outlimbs[j] |= inlimbs[j] & mask; + } + } +} + +/* get_bit returns the |i|th bit in |in| */ +static char get_bit(const felem_bytearray in, int i) { + if (i < 0 || i >= 256) { + return 0; + } + return (in[i >> 3] >> (i & 7)) & 1; +} + +/* Interleaved point multiplication using precomputed point multiples: The + * small point multiples 0*P, 1*P, ..., 17*P are in pre_comp[], the scalars + * in scalars[]. If g_scalar is non-NULL, we also add this multiple of the + * generator, using certain (large) precomputed multiples in g_pre_comp. + * Output point (X, Y, Z) is stored in x_out, y_out, z_out. */ +static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, + const felem_bytearray scalars[], + const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar, + const int mixed, const smallfelem pre_comp[][17][3], + const smallfelem g_pre_comp[2][16][3]) { + int i, skip; + unsigned num, gen_mul = (g_scalar != NULL); + felem nq[3], ftmp; + smallfelem tmp[3]; + u64 bits; + u8 sign, digit; + + /* set nq to the point at infinity */ + memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem)); + + /* Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples + * of the generator (two in each of the last 32 rounds) and additions of + * other points multiples (every 5th round). */ + + skip = 1; /* save two point operations in the first + * round */ + for (i = (num_points ? 255 : 31); i >= 0; --i) { + /* double */ + if (!skip) { + point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]); + } + + /* add multiples of the generator */ + if (gen_mul && i <= 31) { + /* first, look 32 bits upwards */ + bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 224) << 3; + bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 160) << 2; + bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 96) << 1; + bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 32); + /* select the point to add, in constant time */ + select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[1], tmp); + + if (!skip) { + /* Arg 1 below is for "mixed" */ + point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], + tmp[2]); + } else { + smallfelem_expand(nq[0], tmp[0]); + smallfelem_expand(nq[1], tmp[1]); + smallfelem_expand(nq[2], tmp[2]); + skip = 0; + } + + /* second, look at the current position */ + bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 192) << 3; + bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 128) << 2; + bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 64) << 1; + bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i); + /* select the point to add, in constant time */ + select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp[0], tmp); + /* Arg 1 below is for "mixed" */ + point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], 1, tmp[0], tmp[1], + tmp[2]); + } + + /* do other additions every 5 doublings */ + if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0)) { + /* loop over all scalars */ + for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num) { + bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5; + bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4; + bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3; + bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2; + bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1; + bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1); + ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits); + + /* select the point to add or subtract, in constant time. */ + select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp); + smallfelem_neg(ftmp, tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative + * point */ + copy_small_conditional(ftmp, tmp[1], (((limb)sign) - 1)); + felem_contract(tmp[1], ftmp); + + if (!skip) { + point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], mixed, tmp[0], + tmp[1], tmp[2]); + } else { + smallfelem_expand(nq[0], tmp[0]); + smallfelem_expand(nq[1], tmp[1]); + smallfelem_expand(nq[2], tmp[2]); + skip = 0; + } + } + } + } + felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]); + felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]); + felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]); +} + +/* Precomputation for the group generator. */ +typedef struct { + smallfelem g_pre_comp[2][16][3]; +} NISTP256_PRE_COMP; + +/******************************************************************************/ +/* + * OPENSSL EC_METHOD FUNCTIONS + */ + +int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { + int ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_init(group); + group->a_is_minus3 = 1; + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = 0; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *curve_p, *curve_a, *curve_b; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + if (((curve_p = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || + ((curve_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || + ((curve_b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { + goto err; + } + BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[0], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_p); + BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[1], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_a); + BN_bin2bn(nistp256_curve_params[2], sizeof(felem_bytearray), curve_b); + if (BN_cmp(curve_p, p) || + BN_cmp(curve_a, a) || + BN_cmp(curve_b, b)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_CURVE_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx); + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +/* Takes the Jacobian coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point and returns (X', Y') = + * (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3). */ +int ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, + const EC_POINT *point, + BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + felem z1, z2, x_in, y_in; + smallfelem x_out, y_out; + longfelem tmp; + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); + return 0; + } + if (!BN_to_felem(x_in, &point->X) || + !BN_to_felem(y_in, &point->Y) || + !BN_to_felem(z1, &point->Z)) { + return 0; + } + felem_inv(z2, z1); + felem_square(tmp, z2); + felem_reduce(z1, tmp); + felem_mul(tmp, x_in, z1); + felem_reduce(x_in, tmp); + felem_contract(x_out, x_in); + if (x != NULL && !smallfelem_to_BN(x, x_out)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + return 0; + } + felem_mul(tmp, z1, z2); + felem_reduce(z1, tmp); + felem_mul(tmp, y_in, z1); + felem_reduce(y_in, tmp); + felem_contract(y_out, y_in); + if (y != NULL && !smallfelem_to_BN(y, y_out)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/* points below is of size |num|, and tmp_smallfelems is of size |num+1| */ +static void make_points_affine(size_t num, smallfelem points[][3], + smallfelem tmp_smallfelems[]) { + /* Runs in constant time, unless an input is the point at infinity (which + * normally shouldn't happen). */ + ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal( + num, points, sizeof(smallfelem), tmp_smallfelems, + (void (*)(void *))smallfelem_one, + (int (*)(const void *))smallfelem_is_zero_int, + (void (*)(void *, const void *))smallfelem_assign, + (void (*)(void *, const void *))smallfelem_square_contract, + (void (*)(void *, const void *, const void *))smallfelem_mul_contract, + (void (*)(void *, const void *))smallfelem_inv_contract, + /* nothing to contract */ + (void (*)(void *, const void *))smallfelem_assign); +} + +/* Computes scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i], ignoring NULL + * values Result is stored in r (r can equal one of the inputs). */ +int ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, + const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num, + const EC_POINT *points[], + const BIGNUM *scalars[], BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = 0; + int j; + int mixed = 0; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar; + felem_bytearray g_secret; + felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL; + smallfelem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; + smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL; + felem_bytearray tmp; + unsigned i, num_bytes; + int have_pre_comp = 0; + size_t num_points = num; + smallfelem x_in, y_in, z_in; + felem x_out, y_out, z_out; + const smallfelem(*g_pre_comp)[16][3] = NULL; + EC_POINT *generator = NULL; + const EC_POINT *p = NULL; + const BIGNUM *p_scalar = NULL; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + if ((x = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL || + (y = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL || + (z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL || + (tmp_scalar = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + if (scalar != NULL) { + /* try to use the standard precomputation */ + g_pre_comp = &gmul[0]; + generator = EC_POINT_new(group); + if (generator == NULL) { + goto err; + } + /* get the generator from precomputation */ + if (!smallfelem_to_BN(x, g_pre_comp[0][1][0]) || + !smallfelem_to_BN(y, g_pre_comp[0][1][1]) || + !smallfelem_to_BN(z, g_pre_comp[0][1][2])) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!ec_point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, generator, x, y, z, + ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) { + /* precomputation matches generator */ + have_pre_comp = 1; + } else { + /* we don't have valid precomputation: treat the generator as a + * random point. */ + num_points++; + } + } + + if (num_points > 0) { + if (num_points >= 3) { + /* unless we precompute multiples for just one or two points, + * converting those into affine form is time well spent */ + mixed = 1; + } + secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); + pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem)); + if (mixed) { + tmp_smallfelems = + OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(smallfelem)); + } + if (secrets == NULL || pre_comp == NULL || + (mixed && tmp_smallfelems == NULL)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity, + * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination. */ + memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); + memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem)); + for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) { + if (i == num) { + /* we didn't have a valid precomputation, so we pick the generator. */ + p = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); + p_scalar = scalar; + } else { + /* the i^th point */ + p = points[i]; + p_scalar = scalars[i]; + } + if (p_scalar != NULL && p != NULL) { + /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^256 */ + if (BN_num_bits(p_scalar) > 256 || BN_is_negative(p_scalar)) { + /* this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee + * constant-timeness. */ + if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, p_scalar, &group->order, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); + } else { + num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(p_scalar, tmp); + } + flip_endian(secrets[i], tmp, num_bytes); + /* precompute multiples */ + if (!BN_to_felem(x_out, &p->X) || + !BN_to_felem(y_out, &p->Y) || + !BN_to_felem(z_out, &p->Z)) { + goto err; + } + felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][0], x_out); + felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][1], y_out); + felem_shrink(pre_comp[i][1][2], z_out); + for (j = 2; j <= 16; ++j) { + if (j & 1) { + point_add_small(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], + pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][1][0], + pre_comp[i][1][1], pre_comp[i][1][2], + pre_comp[i][j - 1][0], pre_comp[i][j - 1][1], + pre_comp[i][j - 1][2]); + } else { + point_double_small(pre_comp[i][j][0], pre_comp[i][j][1], + pre_comp[i][j][2], pre_comp[i][j / 2][0], + pre_comp[i][j / 2][1], pre_comp[i][j / 2][2]); + } + } + } + } + if (mixed) { + make_points_affine(num_points * 17, pre_comp[0], tmp_smallfelems); + } + } + + /* the scalar for the generator */ + if (scalar != NULL && have_pre_comp) { + memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret)); + /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^256 */ + if (BN_num_bits(scalar) > 256 || BN_is_negative(scalar)) { + /* this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee + * constant-timeness. */ + if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_scalar, scalar, &group->order, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(tmp_scalar, tmp); + } else { + num_bytes = BN_bn2bin(scalar, tmp); + } + flip_endian(g_secret, tmp, num_bytes); + /* do the multiplication with generator precomputation */ + batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, + num_points, g_secret, mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, + g_pre_comp); + } else { + /* do the multiplication without generator precomputation */ + batch_mul(x_out, y_out, z_out, (const felem_bytearray(*))secrets, + num_points, NULL, mixed, (const smallfelem(*)[17][3])pre_comp, + NULL); + } + + /* reduce the output to its unique minimal representation */ + felem_contract(x_in, x_out); + felem_contract(y_in, y_out); + felem_contract(z_in, z_out); + if (!smallfelem_to_BN(x, x_in) || + !smallfelem_to_BN(y, y_in) || + !smallfelem_to_BN(z, z_in)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + ret = ec_point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, r, x, y, z, ctx); + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + EC_POINT_free(generator); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(secrets); + OPENSSL_free(pre_comp); + OPENSSL_free(tmp_smallfelems); + return ret; +} + +const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void) { + static const EC_METHOD ret = { + EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, + ec_GFp_nistp256_group_init, + ec_GFp_simple_group_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_group_copy, ec_GFp_nistp256_group_set_curve, + ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, + ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, ec_GFp_simple_point_init, + ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, + ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, + ec_GFp_nistp256_point_get_affine_coordinates, + 0 /* point_set_compressed_coordinates */, 0 /* point2oct */, + 0 /* oct2point */, ec_GFp_simple_add, ec_GFp_simple_dbl, + ec_GFp_simple_invert, ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, + ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, ec_GFp_simple_cmp, ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, + ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, ec_GFp_nistp256_points_mul, + 0 /* precompute_mult */, 0 /* have_precompute_mult */, + ec_GFp_simple_field_mul, ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr, 0 /* field_div */, + 0 /* field_encode */, 0 /* field_decode */, 0 /* field_set_to_one */ + }; + + return &ret; +} + +#endif /* 64_BIT && !WINDOWS */ diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/simple.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/simple.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c62199c145 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/simple.c @@ -0,0 +1,1357 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#include <openssl/ec.h> + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> + +#include "internal.h" + + +const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void) { + static const EC_METHOD ret = {EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT, + ec_GFp_simple_group_init, + ec_GFp_simple_group_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_group_copy, + ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve, + ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve, + ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree, + ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant, + ec_GFp_simple_point_init, + ec_GFp_simple_point_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish, + ec_GFp_simple_point_copy, + ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity, + ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, + ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates, + ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates, + 0, + 0, + 0, + ec_GFp_simple_add, + ec_GFp_simple_dbl, + ec_GFp_simple_invert, + ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity, + ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve, + ec_GFp_simple_cmp, + ec_GFp_simple_make_affine, + ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine, + 0 /* mul */, + 0 /* precompute_mult */, + 0 /* have_precompute_mult */, + ec_GFp_simple_field_mul, + ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr, + 0 /* field_div */, + 0 /* field_encode */, + 0 /* field_decode */, + 0 /* field_set_to_one */}; + + return &ret; +} + + +/* Most method functions in this file are designed to work with non-trivial + * representations of field elements if necessary (see ecp_mont.c): while + * standard modular addition and subtraction are used, the field_mul and + * field_sqr methods will be used for multiplication, and field_encode and + * field_decode (if defined) will be used for converting between + * representations. + + * Functions ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine() and + * ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates() specifically assume that if a + * non-trivial representation is used, it is a Montgomery representation (i.e. + * 'encoding' means multiplying by some factor R). */ + +int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *group) { + BN_init(&group->field); + BN_init(&group->a); + BN_init(&group->b); + group->a_is_minus3 = 0; + return 1; +} + +void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { + BN_free(&group->field); + BN_free(&group->a); + BN_free(&group->b); +} + +void ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish(EC_GROUP *group) { + BN_clear_free(&group->field); + BN_clear_free(&group->a); + BN_clear_free(&group->b); +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) { + if (!BN_copy(&dest->field, &src->field) || + !BN_copy(&dest->a, &src->a) || + !BN_copy(&dest->b, &src->b)) { + return 0; + } + + dest->a_is_minus3 = src->a_is_minus3; + return 1; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = 0; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp_a; + + /* p must be a prime > 3 */ + if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD); + return 0; + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + tmp_a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (tmp_a == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* group->field */ + if (!BN_copy(&group->field, p)) { + goto err; + } + BN_set_negative(&group->field, 0); + + /* group->a */ + if (!BN_nnmod(tmp_a, a, p, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (group->meth->field_encode) { + if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->a, tmp_a, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!BN_copy(&group->a, tmp_a)) { + goto err; + } + + /* group->b */ + if (!BN_nnmod(&group->b, b, p, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (group->meth->field_encode && + !group->meth->field_encode(group, &group->b, &group->b, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + /* group->a_is_minus3 */ + if (!BN_add_word(tmp_a, 3)) { + goto err; + } + group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp_a, &group->field)); + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, + BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = 0; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + + if (p != NULL && !BN_copy(p, &group->field)) { + return 0; + } + + if (a != NULL || b != NULL) { + if (group->meth->field_decode) { + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + if (a != NULL && !group->meth->field_decode(group, a, &group->a, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (b != NULL && !group->meth->field_decode(group, b, &group->b, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (a != NULL && !BN_copy(a, &group->a)) { + goto err; + } + if (b != NULL && !BN_copy(b, &group->b)) { + goto err; + } + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group) { + return BN_num_bits(&group->field); +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { + int ret = 0; + BIGNUM *a, *b, *order, *tmp_1, *tmp_2; + const BIGNUM *p = &group->field; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (order == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + if (group->meth->field_decode) { + if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, a, &group->a, ctx) || + !group->meth->field_decode(group, b, &group->b, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!BN_copy(a, &group->a) || !BN_copy(b, &group->b)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* check the discriminant: + * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p) + * 0 =< a, b < p */ + if (BN_is_zero(a)) { + if (BN_is_zero(b)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!BN_is_zero(b)) { + if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp_1, a, p, ctx) || + !BN_mod_mul(tmp_2, tmp_1, a, p, ctx) || + !BN_lshift(tmp_1, tmp_2, 2)) { + goto err; + } + /* tmp_1 = 4*a^3 */ + + if (!BN_mod_sqr(tmp_2, b, p, ctx) || + !BN_mul_word(tmp_2, 27)) { + goto err; + } + /* tmp_2 = 27*b^2 */ + + if (!BN_mod_add(a, tmp_1, tmp_2, p, ctx) || + BN_is_zero(a)) { + goto err; + } + } + ret = 1; + +err: + if (ctx != NULL) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + } + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_POINT *point) { + BN_init(&point->X); + BN_init(&point->Y); + BN_init(&point->Z); + point->Z_is_one = 0; + + return 1; +} + +void ec_GFp_simple_point_finish(EC_POINT *point) { + BN_free(&point->X); + BN_free(&point->Y); + BN_free(&point->Z); +} + +void ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish(EC_POINT *point) { + BN_clear_free(&point->X); + BN_clear_free(&point->Y); + BN_clear_free(&point->Z); + point->Z_is_one = 0; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src) { + if (!BN_copy(&dest->X, &src->X) || + !BN_copy(&dest->Y, &src->Y) || + !BN_copy(&dest->Z, &src->Z)) { + return 0; + } + dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one; + + return 1; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, + EC_POINT *point) { + point->Z_is_one = 0; + BN_zero(&point->Z); + return 1; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp( + const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, + const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + if (x != NULL) { + if (!BN_nnmod(&point->X, x, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (group->meth->field_encode && + !group->meth->field_encode(group, &point->X, &point->X, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + if (y != NULL) { + if (!BN_nnmod(&point->Y, y, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (group->meth->field_encode && + !group->meth->field_encode(group, &point->Y, &point->Y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + if (z != NULL) { + int Z_is_one; + + if (!BN_nnmod(&point->Z, z, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + Z_is_one = BN_is_one(&point->Z); + if (group->meth->field_encode) { + if (Z_is_one && (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)) { + if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &point->Z, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, &point->Z, &point->Z, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + point->Z_is_one = Z_is_one; + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, + const EC_POINT *point, + BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, + BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (group->meth->field_decode != 0) { + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + if (x != NULL && !group->meth->field_decode(group, x, &point->X, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (y != NULL && !group->meth->field_decode(group, y, &point->Y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (z != NULL && !group->meth->field_decode(group, z, &point->Z, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (x != NULL && !BN_copy(x, &point->X)) { + goto err; + } + if (y != NULL && !BN_copy(y, &point->Y)) { + goto err; + } + if (z != NULL && !BN_copy(z, &point->Z)) { + goto err; + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, + EC_POINT *point, const BIGNUM *x, + const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (x == NULL || y == NULL) { + /* unlike for projective coordinates, we do not tolerate this */ + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + + return ec_point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, + BN_value_one(), ctx); +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, + const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x, + BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *Z, *Z_1, *Z_2, *Z_3; + const BIGNUM *Z_; + int ret = 0; + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); + return 0; + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Z_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Z_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Z_3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (Z == NULL || Z_1 == NULL || Z_2 == NULL || Z_3 == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* transform (X, Y, Z) into (x, y) := (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */ + + if (group->meth->field_decode) { + if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, Z, &point->Z, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + Z_ = Z; + } else { + Z_ = &point->Z; + } + + if (BN_is_one(Z_)) { + if (group->meth->field_decode) { + if (x != NULL && !group->meth->field_decode(group, x, &point->X, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (y != NULL && !group->meth->field_decode(group, y, &point->Y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (x != NULL && !BN_copy(x, &point->X)) { + goto err; + } + if (y != NULL && !BN_copy(y, &point->Y)) { + goto err; + } + } + } else { + if (!BN_mod_inverse(Z_1, Z_, &group->field, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) { + /* field_sqr works on standard representation */ + if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, Z_2, Z_1, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!BN_mod_sqr(Z_2, Z_1, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + /* in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out Montgomery factor in + * X: */ + if (x != NULL && !group->meth->field_mul(group, x, &point->X, Z_2, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + if (y != NULL) { + if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) { + /* field_mul works on standard representation */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!BN_mod_mul(Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, &group->field, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + /* in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out Montgomery factor in + * Y: */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y, &point->Y, Z_3, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, + const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + int (*field_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, + BN_CTX *); + int (*field_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); + const BIGNUM *p; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3, *n4, *n5, *n6; + int ret = 0; + + if (a == b) { + return EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, a, ctx); + } + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) { + return EC_POINT_copy(r, b); + } + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) { + return EC_POINT_copy(r, a); + } + + field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; + field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; + p = &group->field; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (n6 == NULL) { + goto end; + } + + /* Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a' or 'b' + * once we have written the corresponding components of 'r'. + * ('r' might be one of 'a' or 'b'.) + */ + + /* n1, n2 */ + if (b->Z_is_one) { + if (!BN_copy(n1, &a->X) || !BN_copy(n2, &a->Y)) { + goto end; + } + /* n1 = X_a */ + /* n2 = Y_a */ + } else { + if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &b->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n1, &a->X, n0, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + /* n1 = X_a * Z_b^2 */ + + if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, &b->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n2, &a->Y, n0, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + /* n2 = Y_a * Z_b^3 */ + } + + /* n3, n4 */ + if (a->Z_is_one) { + if (!BN_copy(n3, &b->X) || !BN_copy(n4, &b->Y)) { + goto end; + } + /* n3 = X_b */ + /* n4 = Y_b */ + } else { + if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n3, &b->X, n0, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + /* n3 = X_b * Z_a^2 */ + + if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, &a->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n4, &b->Y, n0, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + /* n4 = Y_b * Z_a^3 */ + } + + /* n5, n6 */ + if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n5, n1, n3, p) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(n6, n2, n4, p)) { + goto end; + } + /* n5 = n1 - n3 */ + /* n6 = n2 - n4 */ + + if (BN_is_zero(n5)) { + if (BN_is_zero(n6)) { + /* a is the same point as b */ + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + ret = EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, a, ctx); + ctx = NULL; + goto end; + } else { + /* a is the inverse of b */ + BN_zero(&r->Z); + r->Z_is_one = 0; + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + } + + /* 'n7', 'n8' */ + if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n3, p) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(n2, n2, n4, p)) { + goto end; + } + /* 'n7' = n1 + n3 */ + /* 'n8' = n2 + n4 */ + + /* Z_r */ + if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) { + if (!BN_copy(&r->Z, n5)) { + goto end; + } + } else { + if (a->Z_is_one) { + if (!BN_copy(n0, &b->Z)) { + goto end; + } + } else if (b->Z_is_one) { + if (!BN_copy(n0, &a->Z)) { + goto end; + } + } else if (!field_mul(group, n0, &a->Z, &b->Z, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + if (!field_mul(group, &r->Z, n0, n5, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + } + r->Z_is_one = 0; + /* Z_r = Z_a * Z_b * n5 */ + + /* X_r */ + if (!field_sqr(group, n0, n6, ctx) || + !field_sqr(group, n4, n5, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n3, n1, n4, ctx) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(&r->X, n0, n3, p)) { + goto end; + } + /* X_r = n6^2 - n5^2 * 'n7' */ + + /* 'n9' */ + if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, &r->X, p) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n3, n0, p)) { + goto end; + } + /* n9 = n5^2 * 'n7' - 2 * X_r */ + + /* Y_r */ + if (!field_mul(group, n0, n0, n6, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n5, n4, n5, ctx)) { + goto end; /* now n5 is n5^3 */ + } + if (!field_mul(group, n1, n2, n5, ctx) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n0, n1, p)) { + goto end; + } + if (BN_is_odd(n0) && !BN_add(n0, n0, p)) { + goto end; + } + /* now 0 <= n0 < 2*p, and n0 is even */ + if (!BN_rshift1(&r->Y, n0)) { + goto end; + } + /* Y_r = (n6 * 'n9' - 'n8' * 'n5^3') / 2 */ + + ret = 1; + +end: + if (ctx) { + /* otherwise we already called BN_CTX_end */ + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + } + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + int (*field_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, + BN_CTX *); + int (*field_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); + const BIGNUM *p; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3; + int ret = 0; + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) { + BN_zero(&r->Z); + r->Z_is_one = 0; + return 1; + } + + field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; + field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; + p = &group->field; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (n3 == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a' + * once we have written the corresponding components of 'r'. + * ('r' might the same as 'a'.) + */ + + /* n1 */ + if (a->Z_is_one) { + if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx) || + !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, &group->a, p)) { + goto err; + } + /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve */ + } else if (group->a_is_minus3) { + if (!field_sqr(group, n1, &a->Z, ctx) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(n0, &a->X, n1, p) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(n2, &a->X, n1, p) || + !field_mul(group, n1, n0, n2, ctx) || + !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n1, p) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p)) { + goto err; + } + /* n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2) + * = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4 */ + } else { + if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx) || + !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p) || + !field_sqr(group, n1, &a->Z, ctx) || + !field_sqr(group, n1, n1, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n1, n1, &group->a, ctx) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n0, p)) { + goto err; + } + /* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve * Z_a^4 */ + } + + /* Z_r */ + if (a->Z_is_one) { + if (!BN_copy(n0, &a->Y)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!field_mul(group, n0, &a->Y, &a->Z, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(&r->Z, n0, p)) { + goto err; + } + r->Z_is_one = 0; + /* Z_r = 2 * Y_a * Z_a */ + + /* n2 */ + if (!field_sqr(group, n3, &a->Y, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, n2, &a->X, n3, ctx) || + !BN_mod_lshift_quick(n2, n2, 2, p)) { + goto err; + } + /* n2 = 4 * X_a * Y_a^2 */ + + /* X_r */ + if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n2, p) || + !field_sqr(group, &r->X, n1, ctx) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(&r->X, &r->X, n0, p)) { + goto err; + } + /* X_r = n1^2 - 2 * n2 */ + + /* n3 */ + if (!field_sqr(group, n0, n3, ctx) || + !BN_mod_lshift_quick(n3, n0, 3, p)) { + goto err; + } + /* n3 = 8 * Y_a^4 */ + + /* Y_r */ + if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n0, n2, &r->X, p) || + !field_mul(group, n0, n1, n0, ctx) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(&r->Y, n0, n3, p)) { + goto err; + } + /* Y_r = n1 * (n2 - X_r) - n3 */ + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) || BN_is_zero(&point->Y)) { + /* point is its own inverse */ + return 1; + } + + return BN_usub(&point->Y, &group->field, &point->Y); +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { + return !point->Z_is_one && BN_is_zero(&point->Z); +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + int (*field_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, + BN_CTX *); + int (*field_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); + const BIGNUM *p; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *rh, *tmp, *Z4, *Z6; + int ret = -1; + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { + return 1; + } + + field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; + field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; + p = &group->field; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return -1; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + rh = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Z4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Z6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (Z6 == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation + * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b. + * The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates + * where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3). + * Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation + * into + * Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6. + * To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'. + */ + + /* rh := X^2 */ + if (!field_sqr(group, rh, &point->X, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + if (!point->Z_is_one) { + if (!field_sqr(group, tmp, &point->Z, ctx) || + !field_sqr(group, Z4, tmp, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, Z6, Z4, tmp, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + /* rh := (rh + a*Z^4)*X */ + if (group->a_is_minus3) { + if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(tmp, Z4, p) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(tmp, tmp, Z4, p) || + !BN_mod_sub_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p) || + !field_mul(group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!field_mul(group, tmp, Z4, &group->a, ctx) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p) || + !field_mul(group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* rh := rh + b*Z^6 */ + if (!field_mul(group, tmp, &group->b, Z6, ctx) || + !BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, tmp, p)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + /* point->Z_is_one */ + + /* rh := (rh + a)*X */ + if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, &group->a, p) || + !field_mul(group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + /* rh := rh + b */ + if (!BN_mod_add_quick(rh, rh, &group->b, p)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* 'lh' := Y^2 */ + if (!field_sqr(group, tmp, &point->Y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + ret = (0 == BN_ucmp(tmp, rh)); + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, + const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + /* return values: + * -1 error + * 0 equal (in affine coordinates) + * 1 not equal + */ + + int (*field_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, + BN_CTX *); + int (*field_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *Za23, *Zb23; + const BIGNUM *tmp1_, *tmp2_; + int ret = -1; + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a)) { + return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1; + } + + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b)) { + return 1; + } + + if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) { + return ((BN_cmp(&a->X, &b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp(&a->Y, &b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1; + } + + field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; + field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return -1; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Za23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + Zb23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (Zb23 == NULL) { + goto end; + } + + /* We have to decide whether + * (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3), + * or equivalently, whether + * (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3). + */ + + if (!b->Z_is_one) { + if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, tmp1, &a->X, Zb23, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + tmp1_ = tmp1; + } else { + tmp1_ = &a->X; + } + if (!a->Z_is_one) { + if (!field_sqr(group, Za23, &a->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, tmp2, &b->X, Za23, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + tmp2_ = tmp2; + } else { + tmp2_ = &b->X; + } + + /* compare X_a*Z_b^2 with X_b*Z_a^2 */ + if (BN_cmp(tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) { + ret = 1; /* points differ */ + goto end; + } + + + if (!b->Z_is_one) { + if (!field_mul(group, Zb23, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, tmp1, &a->Y, Zb23, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + /* tmp1_ = tmp1 */ + } else { + tmp1_ = &a->Y; + } + if (!a->Z_is_one) { + if (!field_mul(group, Za23, Za23, &a->Z, ctx) || + !field_mul(group, tmp2, &b->Y, Za23, ctx)) { + goto end; + } + /* tmp2_ = tmp2 */ + } else { + tmp2_ = &b->Y; + } + + /* compare Y_a*Z_b^3 with Y_b*Z_a^3 */ + if (BN_cmp(tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) { + ret = 1; /* points differ */ + goto end; + } + + /* points are equal */ + ret = 0; + +end: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *x, *y; + int ret = 0; + + if (point->Z_is_one || EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) { + return 1; + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (y == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx) || + !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (!point->Z_is_one) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, + EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z; + BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL; + size_t i; + int ret = 0; + + if (num == 0) { + return 1; + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return 0; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof(prod_Z[0])); + if (prod_Z == NULL) { + goto err; + } + memset(prod_Z, 0, num * sizeof(prod_Z[0])); + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + prod_Z[i] = BN_new(); + if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z, + * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */ + + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z)) { + if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { + if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) { + goto err; + } + } + } + + for (i = 1; i < num; i++) { + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z)) { + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], + &points[i]->Z, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) { + goto err; + } + } + } + + /* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every + * non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ + + if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (group->meth->field_encode != NULL) { + /* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) + * into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H); + * i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */ + if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx) || + !group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i) { + /* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of + * points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */ + if (BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z)) { + continue; + } + + /* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product + * of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx) || + /* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */ + !group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx) || + /* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ + !BN_copy(&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) { + goto err; + } + } + + /* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */ + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z) && !BN_copy(&points[0]->Z, tmp)) { + goto err; + } + + /* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */ + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + EC_POINT *p = points[i]; + + if (!BN_is_zero(&p->Z)) { + /* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1). */ + if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx) || + !group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx) || + !group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx) || + !group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != NULL) { + if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &p->Z, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!BN_one(&p->Z)) { + goto err; + } + } + p->Z_is_one = 1; + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + if (prod_Z != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) { + break; + } + BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]); + } + OPENSSL_free(prod_Z); + } + + return ret; +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { + return BN_mod_mul(r, a, b, &group->field, ctx); +} + +int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + BN_CTX *ctx) { + return BN_mod_sqr(r, a, &group->field, ctx); +} diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/util-64.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/util-64.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..171b0631b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/util-64.c @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ + +#include <openssl/base.h> + + +#if defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT) && !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) + +#include <openssl/ec.h> + +#include "internal.h" + +/* Convert an array of points into affine coordinates. (If the point at + * infinity is found (Z = 0), it remains unchanged.) This function is + * essentially an equivalent to EC_POINTs_make_affine(), but works with the + * internal representation of points as used by ecp_nistp###.c rather than + * with (BIGNUM-based) EC_POINT data structures. point_array is the + * input/output buffer ('num' points in projective form, i.e. three + * coordinates each), based on an internal representation of field elements + * of size 'felem_size'. tmp_felems needs to point to a temporary array of + * 'num'+1 field elements for storage of intermediate values. */ +void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal( + size_t num, void *point_array, size_t felem_size, void *tmp_felems, + void (*felem_one)(void *out), int (*felem_is_zero)(const void *in), + void (*felem_assign)(void *out, const void *in), + void (*felem_square)(void *out, const void *in), + void (*felem_mul)(void *out, const void *in1, const void *in2), + void (*felem_inv)(void *out, const void *in), + void (*felem_contract)(void *out, const void *in)) { + int i = 0; + +#define tmp_felem(I) (&((char *)tmp_felems)[(I)*felem_size]) +#define X(I) (&((char *)point_array)[3 * (I)*felem_size]) +#define Y(I) (&((char *)point_array)[(3 * (I) + 1) * felem_size]) +#define Z(I) (&((char *)point_array)[(3 * (I) + 2) * felem_size]) + + if (!felem_is_zero(Z(0))) { + felem_assign(tmp_felem(0), Z(0)); + } else { + felem_one(tmp_felem(0)); + } + + for (i = 1; i < (int)num; i++) { + if (!felem_is_zero(Z(i))) { + felem_mul(tmp_felem(i), tmp_felem(i - 1), Z(i)); + } else { + felem_assign(tmp_felem(i), tmp_felem(i - 1)); + } + } + /* Now each tmp_felem(i) is the product of Z(0) .. Z(i), skipping any + * zero-valued factors: if Z(i) = 0, we essentially pretend that Z(i) = 1. */ + + felem_inv(tmp_felem(num - 1), tmp_felem(num - 1)); + for (i = num - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + if (i > 0) { + /* tmp_felem(i-1) is the product of Z(0) .. Z(i-1), tmp_felem(i) + * is the inverse of the product of Z(0) .. Z(i). */ + /* 1/Z(i) */ + felem_mul(tmp_felem(num), tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i)); + } else { + felem_assign(tmp_felem(num), tmp_felem(0)); /* 1/Z(0) */ + } + + if (!felem_is_zero(Z(i))) { + if (i > 0) { + /* For next iteration, replace tmp_felem(i-1) by its inverse. */ + felem_mul(tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i), Z(i)); + } + + /* Convert point (X, Y, Z) into affine form (X/(Z^2), Y/(Z^3), 1). */ + felem_square(Z(i), tmp_felem(num)); /* 1/(Z^2) */ + felem_mul(X(i), X(i), Z(i)); /* X/(Z^2) */ + felem_mul(Z(i), Z(i), tmp_felem(num)); /* 1/(Z^3) */ + felem_mul(Y(i), Y(i), Z(i)); /* Y/(Z^3) */ + felem_contract(X(i), X(i)); + felem_contract(Y(i), Y(i)); + felem_one(Z(i)); + } else { + if (i > 0) { + /* For next iteration, replace tmp_felem(i-1) by its inverse. */ + felem_assign(tmp_felem(i - 1), tmp_felem(i)); + } + } + } +} + +/* This function looks at 5+1 scalar bits (5 current, 1 adjacent less + * significant bit), and recodes them into a signed digit for use in fast point + * multiplication: the use of signed rather than unsigned digits means that + * fewer points need to be precomputed, given that point inversion is easy (a + * precomputed point dP makes -dP available as well). + * + * BACKGROUND: + * + * Signed digits for multiplication were introduced by Booth ("A signed binary + * multiplication technique", Quart. Journ. Mech. and Applied Math., vol. IV, + * pt. 2 (1951), pp. 236-240), in that case for multiplication of integers. + * Booth's original encoding did not generally improve the density of nonzero + * digits over the binary representation, and was merely meant to simplify the + * handling of signed factors given in two's complement; but it has since been + * shown to be the basis of various signed-digit representations that do have + * further advantages, including the wNAF, using the following general + * approach: + * + * (1) Given a binary representation + * + * b_k ... b_2 b_1 b_0, + * + * of a nonnegative integer (b_k in {0, 1}), rewrite it in digits 0, 1, -1 + * by using bit-wise subtraction as follows: + * + * b_k b_(k-1) ... b_2 b_1 b_0 + * - b_k ... b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 + * ------------------------------------- + * s_k b_(k-1) ... s_3 s_2 s_1 s_0 + * + * A left-shift followed by subtraction of the original value yields a new + * representation of the same value, using signed bits s_i = b_(i+1) - b_i. + * This representation from Booth's paper has since appeared in the + * literature under a variety of different names including "reversed binary + * form", "alternating greedy expansion", "mutual opposite form", and + * "sign-alternating {+-1}-representation". + * + * An interesting property is that among the nonzero bits, values 1 and -1 + * strictly alternate. + * + * (2) Various window schemes can be applied to the Booth representation of + * integers: for example, right-to-left sliding windows yield the wNAF + * (a signed-digit encoding independently discovered by various researchers + * in the 1990s), and left-to-right sliding windows yield a left-to-right + * equivalent of the wNAF (independently discovered by various researchers + * around 2004). + * + * To prevent leaking information through side channels in point multiplication, + * we need to recode the given integer into a regular pattern: sliding windows + * as in wNAFs won't do, we need their fixed-window equivalent -- which is a few + * decades older: we'll be using the so-called "modified Booth encoding" due to + * MacSorley ("High-speed arithmetic in binary computers", Proc. IRE, vol. 49 + * (1961), pp. 67-91), in a radix-2^5 setting. That is, we always combine five + * signed bits into a signed digit: + * + * s_(4j + 4) s_(4j + 3) s_(4j + 2) s_(4j + 1) s_(4j) + * + * The sign-alternating property implies that the resulting digit values are + * integers from -16 to 16. + * + * Of course, we don't actually need to compute the signed digits s_i as an + * intermediate step (that's just a nice way to see how this scheme relates + * to the wNAF): a direct computation obtains the recoded digit from the + * six bits b_(4j + 4) ... b_(4j - 1). + * + * This function takes those five bits as an integer (0 .. 63), writing the + * recoded digit to *sign (0 for positive, 1 for negative) and *digit (absolute + * value, in the range 0 .. 8). Note that this integer essentially provides the + * input bits "shifted to the left" by one position: for example, the input to + * compute the least significant recoded digit, given that there's no bit b_-1, + * has to be b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 0. */ +void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(uint8_t *sign, uint8_t *digit, + uint8_t in) { + uint8_t s, d; + + s = ~((in >> 5) - 1); /* sets all bits to MSB(in), 'in' seen as + * 6-bit value */ + d = (1 << 6) - in - 1; + d = (d & s) | (in & ~s); + d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1); + + *sign = s & 1; + *digit = d; +} + +#endif /* 64_BIT && !WINDOWS */ diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/wnaf.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/wnaf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7fa0e1bfba --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/ec/wnaf.c @@ -0,0 +1,853 @@ +/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project. + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by + * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems + * Laboratories. */ + +#include <openssl/ec.h> + +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/mem.h> +#include <openssl/thread.h> + +#include "internal.h" +#include "../internal.h" + + +/* This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentation method + * (<URL:http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp>); + * for multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting + * (<URL:http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp>). + * */ + +/* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */ +typedef struct ec_pre_comp_st { + size_t blocksize; /* block size for wNAF splitting */ + size_t numblocks; /* max. number of blocks for which we have precomputation */ + size_t w; /* window size */ + EC_POINT **points; /* array with pre-calculated multiples of generator: + * 'num' pointers to EC_POINT objects followed by a NULL */ + size_t num; /* numblocks * 2^(w-1) */ + CRYPTO_refcount_t references; +} EC_PRE_COMP; + +static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(void) { + EC_PRE_COMP *ret = NULL; + + ret = (EC_PRE_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PRE_COMP)); + if (!ret) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + ret->blocksize = 8; /* default */ + ret->numblocks = 0; + ret->w = 4; /* default */ + ret->points = NULL; + ret->num = 0; + ret->references = 1; + return ret; +} + +void *ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp) { + if (pre_comp == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&pre_comp->references); + return pre_comp; +} + +void ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp) { + if (pre_comp == NULL || + !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&pre_comp->references)) { + return; + } + + if (pre_comp->points) { + EC_POINT **p; + + for (p = pre_comp->points; *p != NULL; p++) { + EC_POINT_free(*p); + } + OPENSSL_free(pre_comp->points); + } + OPENSSL_free(pre_comp); +} + + +/* Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'. + * This is an array r[] of values that are either zero or odd with an + * absolute value less than 2^w satisfying + * scalar = \sum_j r[j]*2^j + * where at most one of any w+1 consecutive digits is non-zero + * with the exception that the most significant digit may be only + * w-1 zeros away from that next non-zero digit. + */ +static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len) { + int window_val; + int ok = 0; + signed char *r = NULL; + int sign = 1; + int bit, next_bit, mask; + size_t len = 0, j; + + if (BN_is_zero(scalar)) { + r = OPENSSL_malloc(1); + if (!r) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + r[0] = 0; + *ret_len = 1; + return r; + } + + if (w <= 0 || w > 7) /* 'signed char' can represent integers with absolute + values less than 2^7 */ + { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + bit = 1 << w; /* at most 128 */ + next_bit = bit << 1; /* at most 256 */ + mask = next_bit - 1; /* at most 255 */ + + if (BN_is_negative(scalar)) { + sign = -1; + } + + if (scalar->d == NULL || scalar->top == 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + len = BN_num_bits(scalar); + r = OPENSSL_malloc( + len + + 1); /* modified wNAF may be one digit longer than binary representation + * (*ret_len will be set to the actual length, i.e. at most + * BN_num_bits(scalar) + 1) */ + if (r == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + window_val = scalar->d[0] & mask; + j = 0; + while ((window_val != 0) || + (j + w + 1 < len)) /* if j+w+1 >= len, window_val will not increase */ + { + int digit = 0; + + /* 0 <= window_val <= 2^(w+1) */ + + if (window_val & 1) { + /* 0 < window_val < 2^(w+1) */ + + if (window_val & bit) { + digit = window_val - next_bit; /* -2^w < digit < 0 */ + +#if 1 /* modified wNAF */ + if (j + w + 1 >= len) { + /* special case for generating modified wNAFs: + * no new bits will be added into window_val, + * so using a positive digit here will decrease + * the total length of the representation */ + + digit = window_val & (mask >> 1); /* 0 < digit < 2^w */ + } +#endif + } else { + digit = window_val; /* 0 < digit < 2^w */ + } + + if (digit <= -bit || digit >= bit || !(digit & 1)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + window_val -= digit; + + /* now window_val is 0 or 2^(w+1) in standard wNAF generation; + * for modified window NAFs, it may also be 2^w + */ + if (window_val != 0 && window_val != next_bit && window_val != bit) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + r[j++] = sign * digit; + + window_val >>= 1; + window_val += bit * BN_is_bit_set(scalar, j + w); + + if (window_val > next_bit) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (j > len + 1) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + len = j; + ok = 1; + +err: + if (!ok) { + OPENSSL_free(r); + r = NULL; + } + if (ok) { + *ret_len = len; + } + return r; +} + + +/* TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation, + * sometimes smaller windows will give better performance + * (thus the boundaries should be increased) + */ +#define EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(b) \ + ((size_t)((b) >= 2000 ? 6 : (b) >= 800 ? 5 : (b) >= 300 \ + ? 4 \ + : (b) >= 70 ? 3 : (b) >= 20 \ + ? 2 \ + : 1)) + +/* Compute + * \sum scalars[i]*points[i], + * also including + * scalar*generator + * in the addition if scalar != NULL + */ +int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, + size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[], + BN_CTX *ctx) { + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; + EC_POINT *tmp = NULL; + size_t totalnum; + size_t blocksize = 0, numblocks = 0; /* for wNAF splitting */ + size_t pre_points_per_block = 0; + size_t i, j; + int k; + int r_is_inverted = 0; + int r_is_at_infinity = 1; + size_t *wsize = NULL; /* individual window sizes */ + signed char **wNAF = NULL; /* individual wNAFs */ + size_t *wNAF_len = NULL; + size_t max_len = 0; + size_t num_val; + EC_POINT **val = NULL; /* precomputation */ + EC_POINT **v; + EC_POINT ***val_sub = + NULL; /* pointers to sub-arrays of 'val' or 'pre_comp->points' */ + const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL; + int num_scalar = 0; /* flag: will be set to 1 if 'scalar' must be treated like + * other scalars, + * i.e. precomputation is not available */ + int ret = 0; + + if (group->meth != r->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + + if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) { + return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); + } + + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); + return 0; + } + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } + + if (scalar != NULL) { + generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); + if (generator == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); + goto err; + } + + /* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */ + + pre_comp = group->pre_comp; + + if (pre_comp && pre_comp->numblocks && + (EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp->points[0], ctx) == 0)) { + blocksize = pre_comp->blocksize; + + /* determine maximum number of blocks that wNAF splitting may yield + * (NB: maximum wNAF length is bit length plus one) */ + numblocks = (BN_num_bits(scalar) / blocksize) + 1; + + /* we cannot use more blocks than we have precomputation for */ + if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) { + numblocks = pre_comp->numblocks; + } + + pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (pre_comp->w - 1); + + /* check that pre_comp looks sane */ + if (pre_comp->num != (pre_comp->numblocks * pre_points_per_block)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* can't use precomputation */ + pre_comp = NULL; + numblocks = 1; + num_scalar = 1; /* treat 'scalar' like 'num'-th element of 'scalars' */ + } + } + + totalnum = num + numblocks; + + wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wsize[0]); + wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wNAF_len[0]); + wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * + sizeof wNAF[0]); /* includes space for pivot */ + val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof val_sub[0]); + + /* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err. */ + if (wNAF) { + wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */ + } + + if (!wsize || !wNAF_len || !wNAF || !val_sub) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points */ + num_val = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { + size_t bits; + + bits = i < num ? BN_num_bits(scalars[i]) : BN_num_bits(scalar); + wsize[i] = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); + num_val += (size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1); + wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; /* make sure we always have a pivot */ + wNAF[i] = + compute_wNAF((i < num ? scalars[i] : scalar), wsize[i], &wNAF_len[i]); + if (wNAF[i] == NULL) { + goto err; + } + if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) { + max_len = wNAF_len[i]; + } + } + + if (numblocks) { + /* we go here iff scalar != NULL */ + + if (pre_comp == NULL) { + if (num_scalar != 1) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* we have already generated a wNAF for 'scalar' */ + } else { + signed char *tmp_wNAF = NULL; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + + if (num_scalar != 0) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* use the window size for which we have precomputation */ + wsize[num] = pre_comp->w; + tmp_wNAF = compute_wNAF(scalar, wsize[num], &tmp_len); + if (!tmp_wNAF) { + goto err; + } + + if (tmp_len <= max_len) { + /* One of the other wNAFs is at least as long + * as the wNAF belonging to the generator, + * so wNAF splitting will not buy us anything. */ + + numblocks = 1; /* don't use wNAF splitting */ + totalnum = num + numblocks; + wNAF[num] = tmp_wNAF; + wNAF[num + 1] = NULL; + wNAF_len[num] = tmp_len; + /* pre_comp->points starts with the points that we need here: */ + val_sub[num] = pre_comp->points; + } else { + /* don't include tmp_wNAF directly into wNAF array + * - use wNAF splitting and include the blocks */ + + signed char *pp; + EC_POINT **tmp_points; + + if (tmp_len < numblocks * blocksize) { + /* possibly we can do with fewer blocks than estimated */ + numblocks = (tmp_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; + if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); + goto err; + } + totalnum = num + numblocks; + } + + /* split wNAF in 'numblocks' parts */ + pp = tmp_wNAF; + tmp_points = pre_comp->points; + + for (i = num; i < totalnum; i++) { + if (i < totalnum - 1) { + wNAF_len[i] = blocksize; + if (tmp_len < blocksize) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); + goto err; + } + tmp_len -= blocksize; + } else { + /* last block gets whatever is left + * (this could be more or less than 'blocksize'!) */ + wNAF_len[i] = tmp_len; + } + + wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; + wNAF[i] = OPENSSL_malloc(wNAF_len[i]); + if (wNAF[i] == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); + goto err; + } + memcpy(wNAF[i], pp, wNAF_len[i]); + if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) { + max_len = wNAF_len[i]; + } + + if (*tmp_points == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); + goto err; + } + val_sub[i] = tmp_points; + tmp_points += pre_points_per_block; + pp += blocksize; + } + OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF); + } + } + } + + /* All points we precompute now go into a single array 'val'. + * 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, + * or to a subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation. + */ + val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof val[0]); + if (val == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + val[num_val] = NULL; /* pivot element */ + + /* allocate points for precomputation */ + v = val; + for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { + val_sub[i] = v; + for (j = 0; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { + *v = EC_POINT_new(group); + if (*v == NULL) { + goto err; + } + v++; + } + } + if (!(v == val + num_val)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group))) { + goto err; + } + + /* prepare precomputed values: + * val_sub[i][0] := points[i] + * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i] + * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i] + * ... + */ + for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) { + if (i < num) { + if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i])) { + goto err; + } + } else if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], generator)) { + goto err; + } + + if (wsize[i] > 1) { + if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp, val_sub[i][0], ctx)) { + goto err; + } + for (j = 1; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) { + if (!EC_POINT_add(group, val_sub[i][j], val_sub[i][j - 1], tmp, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + } + } + +#if 1 /* optional; EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size assumes we do this step */ + if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx)) { + goto err; + } +#endif + + r_is_at_infinity = 1; + + for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) { + if (!r_is_at_infinity && !EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + for (i = 0; i < totalnum; i++) { + if (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) { + int digit = wNAF[i][k]; + int is_neg; + + if (digit) { + is_neg = digit < 0; + + if (is_neg) { + digit = -digit; + } + + if (is_neg != r_is_inverted) { + if (!r_is_at_infinity && !EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted; + } + + /* digit > 0 */ + + if (r_is_at_infinity) { + if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1])) { + goto err; + } + r_is_at_infinity = 0; + } else { + if (!EC_POINT_add(group, r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1], ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + } + } + } + } + + if (r_is_at_infinity) { + if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) { + goto err; + } + } else if (r_is_inverted && !EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + EC_POINT_free(tmp); + OPENSSL_free(wsize); + OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len); + if (wNAF != NULL) { + signed char **w; + + for (w = wNAF; *w != NULL; w++) { + OPENSSL_free(*w); + } + + OPENSSL_free(wNAF); + } + if (val != NULL) { + for (v = val; *v != NULL; v++) { + EC_POINT_clear_free(*v); + } + + OPENSSL_free(val); + } + OPENSSL_free(val_sub); + return ret; +} + + +/* ec_wNAF_precompute_mult() + * creates an EC_PRE_COMP object with preprecomputed multiples of the generator + * for use with wNAF splitting as implemented in ec_wNAF_mul(). + * + * 'pre_comp->points' is an array of multiples of the generator + * of the following form: + * points[0] = generator; + * points[1] = 3 * generator; + * ... + * points[2^(w-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)-1) * generator; + * points[2^(w-1)] = 2^blocksize * generator; + * points[2^(w-1)+1] = 3 * 2^blocksize * generator; + * ... + * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-2)) * + *generator + * points[2^(w-1)*(numblocks-1)] = 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * + *generator + * ... + * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks-1] = (2^(w-1)) * 2^(blocksize*(numblocks-1)) * + *generator + * points[2^(w-1)*numblocks] = NULL + */ +int ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { + const EC_POINT *generator; + EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL, *base = NULL, **var; + BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *order; + size_t i, bits, w, pre_points_per_block, blocksize, numblocks, num; + EC_POINT **points = NULL; + EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp; + int ret = 0; + + /* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */ + ec_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp); + group->pre_comp = NULL; + + generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group); + if (generator == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); + return 0; + } + + pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_new(); + if (pre_comp == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + goto err; + } + } + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (order == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + if (BN_is_zero(order)) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER); + goto err; + } + + bits = BN_num_bits(order); + /* The following parameters mean we precompute (approximately) + * one point per bit. + * + * TBD: The combination 8, 4 is perfect for 160 bits; for other + * bit lengths, other parameter combinations might provide better + * efficiency. + */ + blocksize = 8; + w = 4; + if (EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits) > w) { + /* let's not make the window too small ... */ + w = EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits); + } + + numblocks = (bits + blocksize - 1) / + blocksize; /* max. number of blocks to use for wNAF splitting */ + + pre_points_per_block = (size_t)1 << (w - 1); + num = pre_points_per_block * + numblocks; /* number of points to compute and store */ + + points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_POINT *) * (num + 1)); + if (!points) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + var = points; + var[num] = NULL; /* pivot */ + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + if ((var[i] = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + if (!(tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) || !(base = EC_POINT_new(group))) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_copy(base, generator)) { + goto err; + } + + /* do the precomputation */ + for (i = 0; i < numblocks; i++) { + size_t j; + + if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp_point, base, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_copy(*var++, base)) { + goto err; + } + + for (j = 1; j < pre_points_per_block; j++, var++) { + /* calculate odd multiples of the current base point */ + if (!EC_POINT_add(group, *var, tmp_point, *(var - 1), ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + + if (i < numblocks - 1) { + /* get the next base (multiply current one by 2^blocksize) */ + size_t k; + + if (blocksize <= 2) { + OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, tmp_point, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + for (k = 2; k < blocksize; k++) { + if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, base, base, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + } + } + } + + if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx)) { + goto err; + } + + pre_comp->blocksize = blocksize; + pre_comp->numblocks = numblocks; + pre_comp->w = w; + pre_comp->points = points; + points = NULL; + pre_comp->num = num; + + group->pre_comp = pre_comp; + pre_comp = NULL; + + ret = 1; + +err: + if (ctx != NULL) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + } + BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); + ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp); + if (points) { + EC_POINT **p; + + for (p = points; *p != NULL; p++) { + EC_POINT_free(*p); + } + OPENSSL_free(points); + } + EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); + EC_POINT_free(base); + return ret; +} + + +int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group) { + return group->pre_comp != NULL; +} |