diff options
author | Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> | 2018-07-13 15:50:50 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> | 2018-07-18 20:32:28 +0100 |
commit | cc315f5aa7fae04e16dda419859b2995992977cd (patch) | |
tree | 4c251b605214b9dd5de82443eb4dd5e12d409ece /util/fusermount.c | |
parent | 28bdae3d113ef479c1660a581ef720cdc33bf466 (diff) |
fusermount: bail out on transient config read failure
If an attacker wishes to use the default configuration instead of the
system's actual configuration, they can attempt to trigger a failure in
read_conf(). This only permits increasing mount_max if it is lower than the
default, so it's not particularly interesting. Still, this should probably
be prevented robustly; bail out if funny stuff happens when we're trying to
read the config.
Note that the classic attack trick of opening so many files that the
system-wide limit is reached won't work here - because fusermount only
drops the fsuid, not the euid, the process is running with euid=0 and
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so it bypasses the number-of-globally-open-files check in
get_empty_filp() (unless you're inside a user namespace).
Diffstat (limited to 'util/fusermount.c')
-rw-r--r-- | util/fusermount.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c index 143bd4a..4e0f51a 100644 --- a/util/fusermount.c +++ b/util/fusermount.c @@ -565,10 +565,19 @@ static void read_conf(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: reading %s: missing newline at end of file\n", progname, FUSE_CONF); } + if (ferror(fp)) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: reading %s: read failed\n", progname, FUSE_CONF); + exit(1); + } fclose(fp); } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + bool fatal = (errno != EACCES && errno != ELOOP && + errno != ENAMETOOLONG && errno != ENOTDIR && + errno != EOVERFLOW); fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to open %s: %s\n", progname, FUSE_CONF, strerror(errno)); + if (fatal) + exit(1); } } |