i believe you meant -o here, not -e. -e is escape character, while -o is to change options.

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn b/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn
index cdae02391..056d049e6 100644
--- a/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn
+++ b/doc/bugs/dashed_ssh_hostname_security_hole.mdwn
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@ git-annex was vulnerable to the same class of security hole as
 git's CVE-2017-1000117. In several cases, git-annex parses a repository
 url, and uses it to generate a ssh command, with the hostname to ssh to
 coming from the url. If the hostname it parses is something like
-"-eProxyCommand=evil", this could result in arbitrary local code execution
+"-oProxyCommand=evil", this could result in arbitrary local code execution
 via ssh.
 
 I have not bothered to try to exploit the problem, and some details of URL
 parsing may prevent the exploit working in some cases.
 
 Exploiting this would involve the attacker tricking the victim into adding
-a remote something like "ssh://-eProxyCommand=evil/blah".
+a remote something like "ssh://-oProxyCommand=evil/blah".
 
 One possible avenue for an attacker that avoids exposing the URL to the
 user is to use initremote with a ssh remote, so embedding the URL in the