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diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/cipher/e_rc4.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/cipher/e_rc4.c
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+++ b/third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/cipher/e_rc4.c
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+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/cpu.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rc4.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static int rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+ const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
+ RC4_KEY *rc4key = (RC4_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ RC4_set_key(rc4key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), key);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rc4_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len) {
+ RC4_KEY *rc4key = (RC4_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data;
+
+ RC4(rc4key, in_len, in, out);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER rc4 = {
+ NID_rc4, 1 /* block_size */, 16 /* key_size */,
+ 0 /* iv_len */, sizeof(RC4_KEY), EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+ NULL /* app_data */, rc4_init_key, rc4_cipher,
+ NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */, };
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void) { return &rc4; }
+
+
+struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx {
+ RC4_KEY rc4;
+ MD5_CTX head, tail, md;
+ size_t payload_length;
+ unsigned char tag_len;
+};
+
+
+static int
+aead_rc4_md5_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+ size_t tag_len) {
+ struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx;
+ size_t i;
+ uint8_t hmac_key[MD5_CBLOCK];
+
+ if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
+ tag_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (tag_len > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* The keys consists of |MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of HMAC(MD5) key followed
+ * by some number of bytes of RC4 key. */
+ if (key_len <= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc4_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx));
+ if (rc4_ctx == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memset(rc4_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx));
+
+ RC4_set_key(&rc4_ctx->rc4, key_len - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ key + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+ memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key));
+ memcpy(hmac_key, key, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) {
+ hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36;
+ }
+ MD5_Init(&rc4_ctx->head);
+ MD5_Update(&rc4_ctx->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) {
+ hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c;
+ }
+ MD5_Init(&rc4_ctx->tail);
+ MD5_Update(&rc4_ctx->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+
+ rc4_ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+ ctx->aead_state = rc4_ctx;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void aead_rc4_md5_tls_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
+ struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(rc4_ctx, sizeof(struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx));
+ OPENSSL_free(rc4_ctx);
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+#define STITCHED_CALL
+
+/* rc4_md5_enc is defined in rc4_md5-x86_64.pl */
+void rc4_md5_enc(RC4_KEY *key, const void *in0, void *out, MD5_CTX *ctx,
+ const void *inp, size_t blocks);
+#endif
+
+static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+ const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+ const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+ struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ MD5_CTX md;
+#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+ size_t rc4_off, md5_off, blocks;
+#else
+ const size_t rc4_off = 0;
+ const size_t md5_off = 0;
+#endif
+ uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ if (in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len < in_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (nonce_len != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (max_out_len < in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (nonce_len != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->head, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
+ /* The MAC's payload begins with the additional data. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.1 */
+ MD5_Update(&md, ad, ad_len);
+
+ /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
+ * length for legacy ciphers. */
+ uint8_t ad_extra[2];
+ ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8);
+ ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff);
+ MD5_Update(&md, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra));
+
+#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+ /* 32 is $MOD from rc4_md5-x86_64.pl. */
+ rc4_off = 32 - 1 - (rc4_ctx->rc4.x & (32 - 1));
+ md5_off = MD5_CBLOCK - md.num;
+ /* Ensure RC4 is behind MD5. */
+ if (rc4_off > md5_off) {
+ md5_off += MD5_CBLOCK;
+ }
+ assert(md5_off >= rc4_off);
+
+ if (in_len > md5_off && (blocks = (in_len - md5_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) &&
+ (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) {
+ /* Process the initial portions of the plaintext normally. */
+ MD5_Update(&md, in, md5_off);
+ RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, rc4_off, in, out);
+
+ /* Process the next |blocks| blocks of plaintext with stitched routines. */
+ rc4_md5_enc(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off, &md, in + md5_off,
+ blocks);
+ blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK;
+ rc4_off += blocks;
+ md5_off += blocks;
+ md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
+ md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
+ if (md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks) {
+ md.Nh++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc4_off = 0;
+ md5_off = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Finish computing the MAC. */
+ MD5_Update(&md, in + md5_off, in_len - md5_off);
+ MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+
+ memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->tail, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
+ MD5_Update(&md, digest, sizeof(digest));
+ if (rc4_ctx->tag_len == MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ MD5_Final(out + in_len, &md);
+ } else {
+ MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+ memcpy(out + in_len, digest, rc4_ctx->tag_len);
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypt the remainder of the plaintext and the MAC. */
+ RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in_len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off);
+ RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, out + in_len, out + in_len);
+
+ *out_len = in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+ const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+ const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+ struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ MD5_CTX md;
+ size_t plaintext_len;
+#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+ unsigned int l;
+ size_t rc4_off, md5_off, blocks;
+ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+#else
+ const size_t rc4_off = 0;
+ const size_t md5_off = 0;
+#endif
+ uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ if (in_len < rc4_ctx->tag_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ plaintext_len = in_len - rc4_ctx->tag_len;
+
+ if (nonce_len != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (max_out_len < in_len) {
+ /* This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it
+ * will always be removed on return. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->head, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
+ /* The MAC's payload begins with the additional data. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.1 */
+ MD5_Update(&md, ad, ad_len);
+
+ /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
+ * length for legacy ciphers. */
+ uint8_t ad_extra[2];
+ ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(plaintext_len >> 8);
+ ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(plaintext_len & 0xff);
+ MD5_Update(&md, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra));
+
+#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
+ rc4_off = 32 - 1 - (rc4_ctx->rc4.x & (32 - 1));
+ md5_off = MD5_CBLOCK - md.num;
+ /* Ensure MD5 is a full block behind RC4 so it has plaintext to operate on in
+ * both normal and stitched routines. */
+ if (md5_off > rc4_off) {
+ rc4_off += 2 * MD5_CBLOCK;
+ } else {
+ rc4_off += MD5_CBLOCK;
+ }
+
+ if (in_len > rc4_off && (blocks = (in_len - rc4_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) &&
+ (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) {
+ /* Decrypt the initial portion of the ciphertext and digest the plaintext
+ * normally. */
+ RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, rc4_off, in, out);
+ MD5_Update(&md, out, md5_off);
+
+ /* Decrypt and digest the next |blocks| blocks of ciphertext with the
+ * stitched routines. */
+ rc4_md5_enc(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off, &md, out + md5_off,
+ blocks);
+ blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK;
+ rc4_off += blocks;
+ md5_off += blocks;
+ l = (md.Nl + (blocks << 3)) & 0xffffffffU;
+ if (l < md.Nl) {
+ md.Nh++;
+ }
+ md.Nl = l;
+ md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
+ } else {
+ md5_off = 0;
+ rc4_off = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Process the remainder of the input. */
+ RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in_len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off);
+ MD5_Update(&md, out + md5_off, plaintext_len - md5_off);
+ MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+
+ /* Calculate HMAC and verify it */
+ memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->tail, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
+ MD5_Update(&md, digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + plaintext_len, digest, rc4_ctx->tag_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_len = plaintext_len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+ const RC4_KEY **out_key) {
+ struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ *out_key = &rc4_ctx->rc4;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_md5_tls = {
+ 16 + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* key len (RC4 + MD5) */
+ 0, /* nonce len */
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead */
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
+ aead_rc4_md5_tls_init,
+ NULL, /* init_with_direction */
+ aead_rc4_md5_tls_cleanup,
+ aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal,
+ aead_rc4_md5_tls_open,
+ aead_rc4_md5_tls_get_rc4_state,
+};
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls(void) { return &aead_rc4_md5_tls; }