1 files changed, 0 insertions, 173 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox/secretbox.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox/secretbox.go
deleted file mode 100644
index a98d1bd..0000000
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox/secretbox.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-/*
-Package secretbox encrypts and authenticates small messages.
-
-Secretbox uses XSalsa20 and Poly1305 to encrypt and authenticate messages with
-secret-key cryptography. The length of messages is not hidden.
-
-It is the caller's responsibility to ensure the uniqueness of nonces—for
-example, by using nonce 1 for the first message, nonce 2 for the second
-message, etc. Nonces are long enough that randomly generated nonces have
-negligible risk of collision.
-
-Messages should be small because:
-
-1. The whole message needs to be held in memory to be processed.
-
-2. Using large messages pressures implementations on small machines to decrypt
-and process plaintext before authenticating it. This is very dangerous, and
-this API does not allow it, but a protocol that uses excessive message sizes
-might present some implementations with no other choice.
-
-3. Fixed overheads will be sufficiently amortised by messages as small as 8KB.
-
-4. Performance may be improved by working with messages that fit into data caches.
-
-Thus large amounts of data should be chunked so that each message is small.
-(Each message still needs a unique nonce.) If in doubt, 16KB is a reasonable
-chunk size.
-
-This package is interoperable with NaCl: https://nacl.cr.yp.to/secretbox.html.
-*/
-package secretbox // import "golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox"
-
-import (
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle"
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/salsa20/salsa"
-)
-
-// Overhead is the number of bytes of overhead when boxing a message.
-const Overhead = poly1305.TagSize
-
-// setup produces a sub-key and Salsa20 counter given a nonce and key.
-func setup(subKey *[32]byte, counter *[16]byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) {
-	// We use XSalsa20 for encryption so first we need to generate a
-	// key and nonce with HSalsa20.
-	var hNonce [16]byte
-	copy(hNonce[:], nonce[:])
-	salsa.HSalsa20(subKey, &hNonce, key, &salsa.Sigma)
-
-	// The final 8 bytes of the original nonce form the new nonce.
-	copy(counter[:], nonce[16:])
-}
-
-// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
-// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
-// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
-// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
-func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
-	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
-		head = in[:total]
-	} else {
-		head = make([]byte, total)
-		copy(head, in)
-	}
-	tail = head[len(in):]
-	return
-}
-
-// Seal appends an encrypted and authenticated copy of message to out, which
-// must not overlap message. The key and nonce pair must be unique for each
-// distinct message and the output will be Overhead bytes longer than message.
-func Seal(out, message []byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) []byte {
-	var subKey [32]byte
-	var counter [16]byte
-	setup(&subKey, &counter, nonce, key)
-
-	// The Poly1305 key is generated by encrypting 32 bytes of zeros. Since
-	// Salsa20 works with 64-byte blocks, we also generate 32 bytes of
-	// keystream as a side effect.
-	var firstBlock [64]byte
-	salsa.XORKeyStream(firstBlock[:], firstBlock[:], &counter, &subKey)
-
-	var poly1305Key [32]byte
-	copy(poly1305Key[:], firstBlock[:])
-
-	ret, out := sliceForAppend(out, len(message)+poly1305.TagSize)
-	if subtle.AnyOverlap(out, message) {
-		panic("nacl: invalid buffer overlap")
-	}
-
-	// We XOR up to 32 bytes of message with the keystream generated from
-	// the first block.
-	firstMessageBlock := message
-	if len(firstMessageBlock) > 32 {
-		firstMessageBlock = firstMessageBlock[:32]
-	}
-
-	tagOut := out
-	out = out[poly1305.TagSize:]
-	for i, x := range firstMessageBlock {
-		out[i] = firstBlock[32+i] ^ x
-	}
-	message = message[len(firstMessageBlock):]
-	ciphertext := out
-	out = out[len(firstMessageBlock):]
-
-	// Now encrypt the rest.
-	counter[8] = 1
-	salsa.XORKeyStream(out, message, &counter, &subKey)
-
-	var tag [poly1305.TagSize]byte
-	poly1305.Sum(&tag, ciphertext, &poly1305Key)
-	copy(tagOut, tag[:])
-
-	return ret
-}
-
-// Open authenticates and decrypts a box produced by Seal and appends the
-// message to out, which must not overlap box. The output will be Overhead
-// bytes smaller than box.
-func Open(out, box []byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) ([]byte, bool) {
-	if len(box) < Overhead {
-		return nil, false
-	}
-
-	var subKey [32]byte
-	var counter [16]byte
-	setup(&subKey, &counter, nonce, key)
-
-	// The Poly1305 key is generated by encrypting 32 bytes of zeros. Since
-	// Salsa20 works with 64-byte blocks, we also generate 32 bytes of
-	// keystream as a side effect.
-	var firstBlock [64]byte
-	salsa.XORKeyStream(firstBlock[:], firstBlock[:], &counter, &subKey)
-
-	var poly1305Key [32]byte
-	copy(poly1305Key[:], firstBlock[:])
-	var tag [poly1305.TagSize]byte
-	copy(tag[:], box)
-
-	if !poly1305.Verify(&tag, box[poly1305.TagSize:], &poly1305Key) {
-		return nil, false
-	}
-
-	ret, out := sliceForAppend(out, len(box)-Overhead)
-	if subtle.AnyOverlap(out, box) {
-		panic("nacl: invalid buffer overlap")
-	}
-
-	// We XOR up to 32 bytes of box with the keystream generated from
-	// the first block.
-	box = box[Overhead:]
-	firstMessageBlock := box
-	if len(firstMessageBlock) > 32 {
-		firstMessageBlock = firstMessageBlock[:32]
-	}
-	for i, x := range firstMessageBlock {
-		out[i] = firstBlock[32+i] ^ x
-	}
-
-	box = box[len(firstMessageBlock):]
-	out = out[len(firstMessageBlock):]
-
-	// Now decrypt the rest.
-	counter[8] = 1
-	salsa.XORKeyStream(out, box, &counter, &subKey)
-
-	return ret, true
-}