1 files changed, 180 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/core/tsi/alts/frame_protector/alts_counter_test.cc b/test/core/tsi/alts/frame_protector/alts_counter_test.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..49ff82108b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/core/tsi/alts/frame_protector/alts_counter_test.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 gRPC authors.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <grpc/support/alloc.h>
+#include <grpc/support/log.h>
+
+#include "src/core/tsi/alts/frame_protector/alts_counter.h"
+#include "test/core/tsi/alts/crypt/gsec_test_util.h"
+
+const size_t kSmallCounterSize = 4;
+const size_t kSmallOverflowSize = 1;
+const size_t kGcmCounterSize = 12;
+const size_t kGcmOverflowSize = 5;
+
+static bool do_bytes_represent_client(alts_counter* ctr, unsigned char* counter,
+                                      size_t size) {
+  return (ctr->counter[size - 1] & 0x80) == 0x80;
+}
+
+static void alts_counter_test_input_sanity_check(size_t counter_size,
+                                                 size_t overflow_size) {
+  alts_counter* ctr = nullptr;
+  char* error_details = nullptr;
+
+  /* Input sanity check on alts_counter_create(). */
+  /* Invalid counter size. */
+  grpc_status_code status =
+      alts_counter_create(true, 0, overflow_size, &ctr, &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(gsec_test_expect_compare_code_and_substr(
+      status, GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT, error_details,
+      "counter_size is invalid."));
+  gpr_free(error_details);
+
+  /* Invalid overflow size. */
+  status = alts_counter_create(true, counter_size, 0, &ctr, &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(gsec_test_expect_compare_code_and_substr(
+      status, GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT, error_details,
+      "overflow_size is invalid."));
+  gpr_free(error_details);
+
+  /* alts_counter is nullptr. */
+  status = alts_counter_create(true, counter_size, overflow_size, nullptr,
+                               &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(gsec_test_expect_compare_code_and_substr(
+      status, GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT, error_details,
+      "crypter_counter is nullptr."));
+  gpr_free(error_details);
+
+  status = alts_counter_create(true, counter_size, overflow_size, &ctr,
+                               &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(status == GRPC_STATUS_OK);
+
+  /* Input sanity check on alts_counter_increment(). */
+  /* crypter_counter is nullptr. */
+  bool is_overflow = false;
+  status = alts_counter_increment(nullptr, &is_overflow, &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(gsec_test_expect_compare_code_and_substr(
+      status, GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT, error_details,
+      "crypter_counter is nullptr."));
+  gpr_free(error_details);
+  /* is_overflow is nullptr. */
+  status = alts_counter_increment(ctr, nullptr, &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(gsec_test_expect_compare_code_and_substr(
+      status, GRPC_STATUS_INVALID_ARGUMENT, error_details,
+      "is_overflow is nullptr."));
+  gpr_free(error_details);
+  alts_counter_destroy(ctr);
+}
+
+static void alts_counter_test_overflow_full_range(bool is_client,
+                                                  size_t counter_size,
+                                                  size_t overflow_size) {
+  alts_counter* ctr = nullptr;
+  char* error_details = nullptr;
+  grpc_status_code status = alts_counter_create(
+      is_client, counter_size, overflow_size, &ctr, &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(status == GRPC_STATUS_OK);
+  unsigned char* expected =
+      static_cast<unsigned char*>(gpr_zalloc(counter_size));
+  if (is_client) {
+    expected[counter_size - 1] = 0x80;
+  }
+  /* Do a single iteration to ensure the counter is initialized as expected. */
+  GPR_ASSERT(do_bytes_represent_client(ctr, alts_counter_get_counter(ctr),
+                                       counter_size) == is_client);
+  GPR_ASSERT(memcmp(alts_counter_get_counter(ctr), expected, counter_size) ==
+             0);
+  bool is_overflow = false;
+  GPR_ASSERT(alts_counter_increment(ctr, &is_overflow, &error_details) ==
+             GRPC_STATUS_OK);
+  GPR_ASSERT(!is_overflow);
+  /**
+   * The counter can return 2^{overflow_size * 8} counters. The
+   * high-order bit is fixed to the client/server. The last call will yield a
+   * useable counter, but overflow the counter object.
+   */
+  int iterations = 1 << (overflow_size * 8);
+  int ind = 1;
+  for (ind = 1; ind < iterations - 1; ind++) {
+    GPR_ASSERT(do_bytes_represent_client(ctr, alts_counter_get_counter(ctr),
+                                         counter_size) == is_client);
+    GPR_ASSERT(alts_counter_increment(ctr, &is_overflow, &error_details) ==
+               GRPC_STATUS_OK);
+    GPR_ASSERT(!is_overflow);
+  }
+  GPR_ASSERT(do_bytes_represent_client(ctr, alts_counter_get_counter(ctr),
+                                       counter_size) == is_client);
+  GPR_ASSERT(alts_counter_increment(ctr, &is_overflow, &error_details) ==
+             GRPC_STATUS_FAILED_PRECONDITION);
+  GPR_ASSERT(is_overflow);
+  gpr_free(expected);
+  alts_counter_destroy(ctr);
+}
+
+/* Set the counter manually and make sure it overflows as expected. */
+static void alts_counter_test_overflow_single_increment(bool is_client,
+                                                        size_t counter_size,
+                                                        size_t overflow_size) {
+  alts_counter* ctr = nullptr;
+  char* error_details = nullptr;
+  grpc_status_code status = alts_counter_create(
+      is_client, counter_size, overflow_size, &ctr, &error_details);
+  GPR_ASSERT(status == GRPC_STATUS_OK);
+  unsigned char* expected =
+      static_cast<unsigned char*>(gpr_zalloc(counter_size));
+  memset(expected, 0xFF, overflow_size);
+  expected[0] = 0xFE;
+
+  if (is_client) {
+    expected[counter_size - 1] = 0x80;
+  }
+  memcpy(ctr->counter, expected, counter_size);
+  GPR_ASSERT(do_bytes_represent_client(ctr, alts_counter_get_counter(ctr),
+                                       counter_size) == is_client);
+  GPR_ASSERT(memcmp(expected, alts_counter_get_counter(ctr), counter_size) ==
+             0);
+  bool is_overflow = false;
+  GPR_ASSERT(alts_counter_increment(ctr, &is_overflow, &error_details) ==
+             GRPC_STATUS_OK);
+  GPR_ASSERT(!is_overflow);
+  GPR_ASSERT(do_bytes_represent_client(ctr, alts_counter_get_counter(ctr),
+                                       counter_size) == is_client);
+  expected[0] = static_cast<unsigned char>(expected[0] + 1);
+  GPR_ASSERT(memcmp(expected, alts_counter_get_counter(ctr), counter_size) ==
+             0);
+  GPR_ASSERT(alts_counter_increment(ctr, &is_overflow, &error_details) ==
+             GRPC_STATUS_FAILED_PRECONDITION);
+  GPR_ASSERT(is_overflow);
+  gpr_free(expected);
+  alts_counter_destroy(ctr);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+  alts_counter_test_input_sanity_check(kGcmCounterSize, kGcmOverflowSize);
+  alts_counter_test_overflow_full_range(true, kSmallCounterSize,
+                                        kSmallOverflowSize);
+  alts_counter_test_overflow_full_range(false, kSmallCounterSize,
+                                        kSmallOverflowSize);
+  alts_counter_test_overflow_single_increment(true, kGcmCounterSize,
+                                              kGcmOverflowSize);
+  alts_counter_test_overflow_single_increment(false, kGcmCounterSize,
+                                              kGcmOverflowSize);
+
+  return 0;
+}