diff options
author | Julien Boeuf <jboeuf@google.com> | 2016-05-02 14:56:30 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Julien Boeuf <jboeuf@google.com> | 2016-05-04 15:51:28 -0700 |
commit | 8ca294e417217e1577609052f18df84be437c03c (patch) | |
tree | 072f4f6cb238ee0e1a333179c2b938e00cda24d7 /src/core/lib/security/transport | |
parent | 099b7562695d854897ff4b56fb306597e78d4f48 (diff) |
Refactoring the core security code.
As opposed to a flat directory, we now have the following structure:
- security
-context
- credentials
- composite
- fake
- google_default
- iam
- jwt
- oauth2
- plugin
- ssl
- transport
- util
We have not refactored the test code yet but this PR is already large
enough...
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/lib/security/transport')
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/auth_filters.h | 42 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/client_auth_filter.c | 336 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.c | 336 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.h | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.c | 384 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.h | 49 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.c | 838 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.h | 266 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/lib/security/transport/server_auth_filter.c | 264 |
9 files changed, 2566 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/auth_filters.h b/src/core/lib/security/transport/auth_filters.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f688d4ed21 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/auth_filters.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifndef GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_AUTH_FILTERS_H +#define GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_AUTH_FILTERS_H + +#include "src/core/lib/channel/channel_stack.h" + +extern const grpc_channel_filter grpc_client_auth_filter; +extern const grpc_channel_filter grpc_server_auth_filter; + +#endif /* GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_AUTH_FILTERS_H */ diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/client_auth_filter.c b/src/core/lib/security/transport/client_auth_filter.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3cbcb4433 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/client_auth_filter.c @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/auth_filters.h" + +#include <string.h> + +#include <grpc/support/alloc.h> +#include <grpc/support/log.h> +#include <grpc/support/string_util.h> + +#include "src/core/lib/channel/channel_stack.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/context/security_context.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/credentials/credentials.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.h" +#include "src/core/lib/support/string.h" +#include "src/core/lib/surface/call.h" +#include "src/core/lib/transport/static_metadata.h" + +#define MAX_CREDENTIALS_METADATA_COUNT 4 + +/* We can have a per-call credentials. */ +typedef struct { + grpc_call_credentials *creds; + grpc_mdstr *host; + grpc_mdstr *method; + /* pollset bound to this call; if we need to make external + network requests, they should be done under this pollset + so that work can progress when this call wants work to + progress */ + grpc_pollset *pollset; + grpc_transport_stream_op op; + uint8_t security_context_set; + grpc_linked_mdelem md_links[MAX_CREDENTIALS_METADATA_COUNT]; + grpc_auth_metadata_context auth_md_context; +} call_data; + +/* We can have a per-channel credentials. */ +typedef struct { + grpc_channel_security_connector *security_connector; + grpc_auth_context *auth_context; +} channel_data; + +static void reset_auth_metadata_context( + grpc_auth_metadata_context *auth_md_context) { + if (auth_md_context->service_url != NULL) { + gpr_free((char *)auth_md_context->service_url); + auth_md_context->service_url = NULL; + } + if (auth_md_context->method_name != NULL) { + gpr_free((char *)auth_md_context->method_name); + auth_md_context->method_name = NULL; + } + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_UNREF( + (grpc_auth_context *)auth_md_context->channel_auth_context, + "grpc_auth_metadata_context"); + auth_md_context->channel_auth_context = NULL; +} + +static void bubble_up_error(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_status_code status, const char *error_msg) { + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Client side authentication failure: %s", error_msg); + grpc_transport_stream_op_add_cancellation(&calld->op, status); + grpc_call_next_op(exec_ctx, elem, &calld->op); +} + +static void on_credentials_metadata(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *user_data, + grpc_credentials_md *md_elems, + size_t num_md, + grpc_credentials_status status) { + grpc_call_element *elem = (grpc_call_element *)user_data; + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + grpc_transport_stream_op *op = &calld->op; + grpc_metadata_batch *mdb; + size_t i; + reset_auth_metadata_context(&calld->auth_md_context); + if (status != GRPC_CREDENTIALS_OK) { + bubble_up_error(exec_ctx, elem, GRPC_STATUS_UNAUTHENTICATED, + "Credentials failed to get metadata."); + return; + } + GPR_ASSERT(num_md <= MAX_CREDENTIALS_METADATA_COUNT); + GPR_ASSERT(op->send_initial_metadata != NULL); + mdb = op->send_initial_metadata; + for (i = 0; i < num_md; i++) { + grpc_metadata_batch_add_tail( + mdb, &calld->md_links[i], + grpc_mdelem_from_slices(gpr_slice_ref(md_elems[i].key), + gpr_slice_ref(md_elems[i].value))); + } + grpc_call_next_op(exec_ctx, elem, op); +} + +void build_auth_metadata_context(grpc_security_connector *sc, + grpc_auth_context *auth_context, + call_data *calld) { + char *service = gpr_strdup(grpc_mdstr_as_c_string(calld->method)); + char *last_slash = strrchr(service, '/'); + char *method_name = NULL; + char *service_url = NULL; + reset_auth_metadata_context(&calld->auth_md_context); + if (last_slash == NULL) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "No '/' found in fully qualified method name"); + service[0] = '\0'; + } else if (last_slash == service) { + /* No service part in fully qualified method name: will just be "/". */ + service[1] = '\0'; + } else { + *last_slash = '\0'; + method_name = gpr_strdup(last_slash + 1); + } + if (method_name == NULL) method_name = gpr_strdup(""); + gpr_asprintf(&service_url, "%s://%s%s", + sc->url_scheme == NULL ? "" : sc->url_scheme, + grpc_mdstr_as_c_string(calld->host), service); + calld->auth_md_context.service_url = service_url; + calld->auth_md_context.method_name = method_name; + calld->auth_md_context.channel_auth_context = + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_REF(auth_context, "grpc_auth_metadata_context"); + gpr_free(service); +} + +static void send_security_metadata(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_transport_stream_op *op) { + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + grpc_client_security_context *ctx = + (grpc_client_security_context *)op->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].value; + grpc_call_credentials *channel_call_creds = + chand->security_connector->request_metadata_creds; + int call_creds_has_md = (ctx != NULL) && (ctx->creds != NULL); + + if (channel_call_creds == NULL && !call_creds_has_md) { + /* Skip sending metadata altogether. */ + grpc_call_next_op(exec_ctx, elem, op); + return; + } + + if (channel_call_creds != NULL && call_creds_has_md) { + calld->creds = grpc_composite_call_credentials_create(channel_call_creds, + ctx->creds, NULL); + if (calld->creds == NULL) { + bubble_up_error(exec_ctx, elem, GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL, + "Incompatible credentials set on channel and call."); + return; + } + } else { + calld->creds = grpc_call_credentials_ref( + call_creds_has_md ? ctx->creds : channel_call_creds); + } + + build_auth_metadata_context(&chand->security_connector->base, + chand->auth_context, calld); + calld->op = *op; /* Copy op (originates from the caller's stack). */ + GPR_ASSERT(calld->pollset); + grpc_call_credentials_get_request_metadata( + exec_ctx, calld->creds, calld->pollset, calld->auth_md_context, + on_credentials_metadata, elem); +} + +static void on_host_checked(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *user_data, + grpc_security_status status) { + grpc_call_element *elem = (grpc_call_element *)user_data; + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + + if (status == GRPC_SECURITY_OK) { + send_security_metadata(exec_ctx, elem, &calld->op); + } else { + char *error_msg; + gpr_asprintf(&error_msg, "Invalid host %s set in :authority metadata.", + grpc_mdstr_as_c_string(calld->host)); + bubble_up_error(exec_ctx, elem, GRPC_STATUS_INTERNAL, error_msg); + gpr_free(error_msg); + } +} + +/* Called either: + - in response to an API call (or similar) from above, to send something + - a network event (or similar) from below, to receive something + op contains type and call direction information, in addition to the data + that is being sent or received. */ +static void auth_start_transport_op(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_transport_stream_op *op) { + /* grab pointers to our data from the call element */ + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + grpc_linked_mdelem *l; + grpc_client_security_context *sec_ctx = NULL; + + if (calld->security_context_set == 0 && + op->cancel_with_status == GRPC_STATUS_OK) { + calld->security_context_set = 1; + GPR_ASSERT(op->context); + if (op->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].value == NULL) { + op->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].value = + grpc_client_security_context_create(); + op->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].destroy = + grpc_client_security_context_destroy; + } + sec_ctx = op->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].value; + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_UNREF(sec_ctx->auth_context, "client auth filter"); + sec_ctx->auth_context = + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_REF(chand->auth_context, "client_auth_filter"); + } + + if (op->send_initial_metadata != NULL) { + for (l = op->send_initial_metadata->list.head; l != NULL; l = l->next) { + grpc_mdelem *md = l->md; + /* Pointer comparison is OK for md_elems created from the same context. + */ + if (md->key == GRPC_MDSTR_AUTHORITY) { + if (calld->host != NULL) GRPC_MDSTR_UNREF(calld->host); + calld->host = GRPC_MDSTR_REF(md->value); + } else if (md->key == GRPC_MDSTR_PATH) { + if (calld->method != NULL) GRPC_MDSTR_UNREF(calld->method); + calld->method = GRPC_MDSTR_REF(md->value); + } + } + if (calld->host != NULL) { + const char *call_host = grpc_mdstr_as_c_string(calld->host); + calld->op = *op; /* Copy op (originates from the caller's stack). */ + grpc_channel_security_connector_check_call_host( + exec_ctx, chand->security_connector, call_host, chand->auth_context, + on_host_checked, elem); + return; /* early exit */ + } + } + + /* pass control down the stack */ + grpc_call_next_op(exec_ctx, elem, op); +} + +/* Constructor for call_data */ +static void init_call_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_call_element_args *args) { + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + memset(calld, 0, sizeof(*calld)); +} + +static void set_pollset(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_pollset *pollset) { + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + calld->pollset = pollset; +} + +/* Destructor for call_data */ +static void destroy_call_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call_element *elem, + void *ignored) { + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + grpc_call_credentials_unref(calld->creds); + if (calld->host != NULL) { + GRPC_MDSTR_UNREF(calld->host); + } + if (calld->method != NULL) { + GRPC_MDSTR_UNREF(calld->method); + } + reset_auth_metadata_context(&calld->auth_md_context); +} + +/* Constructor for channel_data */ +static void init_channel_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_element *elem, + grpc_channel_element_args *args) { + grpc_security_connector *sc = + grpc_find_security_connector_in_args(args->channel_args); + grpc_auth_context *auth_context = + grpc_find_auth_context_in_args(args->channel_args); + + /* grab pointers to our data from the channel element */ + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + + /* The first and the last filters tend to be implemented differently to + handle the case that there's no 'next' filter to call on the up or down + path */ + GPR_ASSERT(!args->is_last); + GPR_ASSERT(sc != NULL); + GPR_ASSERT(auth_context != NULL); + + /* initialize members */ + chand->security_connector = + (grpc_channel_security_connector *)GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REF( + sc, "client_auth_filter"); + chand->auth_context = + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_REF(auth_context, "client_auth_filter"); +} + +/* Destructor for channel data */ +static void destroy_channel_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_element *elem) { + /* grab pointers to our data from the channel element */ + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + grpc_channel_security_connector *sc = chand->security_connector; + if (sc != NULL) { + GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_UNREF(&sc->base, "client_auth_filter"); + } + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_UNREF(chand->auth_context, "client_auth_filter"); +} + +const grpc_channel_filter grpc_client_auth_filter = { + auth_start_transport_op, grpc_channel_next_op, sizeof(call_data), + init_call_elem, set_pollset, destroy_call_elem, + sizeof(channel_data), init_channel_elem, destroy_channel_elem, + grpc_call_next_get_peer, "client-auth"}; diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.c b/src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6561f4b47d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.c @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.h" + +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <grpc/support/alloc.h> +#include <grpc/support/log.h> +#include <grpc/support/slice_buffer.h> +#include "src/core/lib/security/context/security_context.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.h" + +#define GRPC_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE_BUFFER_SIZE 256 + +typedef struct { + grpc_security_connector *connector; + tsi_handshaker *handshaker; + bool is_client_side; + unsigned char *handshake_buffer; + size_t handshake_buffer_size; + grpc_endpoint *wrapped_endpoint; + grpc_endpoint *secure_endpoint; + gpr_slice_buffer left_overs; + gpr_slice_buffer incoming; + gpr_slice_buffer outgoing; + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb; + void *user_data; + grpc_closure on_handshake_data_sent_to_peer; + grpc_closure on_handshake_data_received_from_peer; + grpc_auth_context *auth_context; +} grpc_security_handshake; + +static void on_handshake_data_received_from_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + void *setup, bool success); + +static void on_handshake_data_sent_to_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *setup, + bool success); + +static void security_connector_remove_handshake(grpc_security_handshake *h) { + GPR_ASSERT(!h->is_client_side); + grpc_security_connector_handshake_list *node; + grpc_security_connector_handshake_list *tmp; + grpc_server_security_connector *sc = + (grpc_server_security_connector *)h->connector; + gpr_mu_lock(&sc->mu); + node = sc->handshaking_handshakes; + if (node && node->handshake == h) { + sc->handshaking_handshakes = node->next; + gpr_free(node); + gpr_mu_unlock(&sc->mu); + return; + } + while (node) { + if (node->next->handshake == h) { + tmp = node->next; + node->next = node->next->next; + gpr_free(tmp); + gpr_mu_unlock(&sc->mu); + return; + } + node = node->next; + } + gpr_mu_unlock(&sc->mu); +} + +static void security_handshake_done(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_security_handshake *h, + int is_success) { + if (!h->is_client_side) { + security_connector_remove_handshake(h); + } + if (is_success) { + h->cb(exec_ctx, h->user_data, GRPC_SECURITY_OK, h->secure_endpoint, + h->auth_context); + } else { + if (h->secure_endpoint != NULL) { + grpc_endpoint_shutdown(exec_ctx, h->secure_endpoint); + grpc_endpoint_destroy(exec_ctx, h->secure_endpoint); + } else { + grpc_endpoint_destroy(exec_ctx, h->wrapped_endpoint); + } + h->cb(exec_ctx, h->user_data, GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR, NULL, NULL); + } + if (h->handshaker != NULL) tsi_handshaker_destroy(h->handshaker); + if (h->handshake_buffer != NULL) gpr_free(h->handshake_buffer); + gpr_slice_buffer_destroy(&h->left_overs); + gpr_slice_buffer_destroy(&h->outgoing); + gpr_slice_buffer_destroy(&h->incoming); + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_UNREF(h->auth_context, "handshake"); + GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_UNREF(h->connector, "handshake"); + gpr_free(h); +} + +static void on_peer_checked(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *user_data, + grpc_security_status status, + grpc_auth_context *auth_context) { + grpc_security_handshake *h = user_data; + tsi_frame_protector *protector; + tsi_result result; + if (status != GRPC_SECURITY_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Error checking peer."); + security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 0); + return; + } + h->auth_context = GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_REF(auth_context, "handshake"); + result = + tsi_handshaker_create_frame_protector(h->handshaker, NULL, &protector); + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Frame protector creation failed with error %s.", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 0); + return; + } + h->secure_endpoint = + grpc_secure_endpoint_create(protector, h->wrapped_endpoint, + h->left_overs.slices, h->left_overs.count); + h->left_overs.count = 0; + h->left_overs.length = 0; + security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 1); + return; +} + +static void check_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_security_handshake *h) { + tsi_peer peer; + tsi_result result = tsi_handshaker_extract_peer(h->handshaker, &peer); + + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Peer extraction failed with error %s", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 0); + return; + } + grpc_security_connector_check_peer(exec_ctx, h->connector, peer, + on_peer_checked, h); +} + +static void send_handshake_bytes_to_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_security_handshake *h) { + size_t offset = 0; + tsi_result result = TSI_OK; + gpr_slice to_send; + + do { + size_t to_send_size = h->handshake_buffer_size - offset; + result = tsi_handshaker_get_bytes_to_send_to_peer( + h->handshaker, h->handshake_buffer + offset, &to_send_size); + offset += to_send_size; + if (result == TSI_INCOMPLETE_DATA) { + h->handshake_buffer_size *= 2; + h->handshake_buffer = + gpr_realloc(h->handshake_buffer, h->handshake_buffer_size); + } + } while (result == TSI_INCOMPLETE_DATA); + + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Handshake failed with error %s", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 0); + return; + } + + to_send = + gpr_slice_from_copied_buffer((const char *)h->handshake_buffer, offset); + gpr_slice_buffer_reset_and_unref(&h->outgoing); + gpr_slice_buffer_add(&h->outgoing, to_send); + /* TODO(klempner,jboeuf): This should probably use the client setup + deadline */ + grpc_endpoint_write(exec_ctx, h->wrapped_endpoint, &h->outgoing, + &h->on_handshake_data_sent_to_peer); +} + +static void on_handshake_data_received_from_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + void *handshake, + bool success) { + grpc_security_handshake *h = handshake; + size_t consumed_slice_size = 0; + tsi_result result = TSI_OK; + size_t i; + size_t num_left_overs; + int has_left_overs_in_current_slice = 0; + + if (!success) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Read failed."); + security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 0); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < h->incoming.count; i++) { + consumed_slice_size = GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(h->incoming.slices[i]); + result = tsi_handshaker_process_bytes_from_peer( + h->handshaker, GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(h->incoming.slices[i]), + &consumed_slice_size); + if (!tsi_handshaker_is_in_progress(h->handshaker)) break; + } + + if (tsi_handshaker_is_in_progress(h->handshaker)) { + /* We may need more data. */ + if (result == TSI_INCOMPLETE_DATA) { + grpc_endpoint_read(exec_ctx, h->wrapped_endpoint, &h->incoming, + &h->on_handshake_data_received_from_peer); + return; + } else { + send_handshake_bytes_to_peer(exec_ctx, h); + return; + } + } + + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Handshake failed with error %s", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 0); + return; + } + + /* Handshake is done and successful this point. */ + has_left_overs_in_current_slice = + (consumed_slice_size < GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(h->incoming.slices[i])); + num_left_overs = + (has_left_overs_in_current_slice ? 1 : 0) + h->incoming.count - i - 1; + if (num_left_overs == 0) { + check_peer(exec_ctx, h); + return; + } + + /* Put the leftovers in our buffer (ownership transfered). */ + if (has_left_overs_in_current_slice) { + gpr_slice_buffer_add( + &h->left_overs, + gpr_slice_split_tail(&h->incoming.slices[i], consumed_slice_size)); + gpr_slice_unref( + h->incoming.slices[i]); /* split_tail above increments refcount. */ + } + gpr_slice_buffer_addn( + &h->left_overs, &h->incoming.slices[i + 1], + num_left_overs - (size_t)has_left_overs_in_current_slice); + check_peer(exec_ctx, h); +} + +/* If handshake is NULL, the handshake is done. */ +static void on_handshake_data_sent_to_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + void *handshake, bool success) { + grpc_security_handshake *h = handshake; + + /* Make sure that write is OK. */ + if (!success) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Write failed."); + if (handshake != NULL) security_handshake_done(exec_ctx, h, 0); + return; + } + + /* We may be done. */ + if (tsi_handshaker_is_in_progress(h->handshaker)) { + /* TODO(klempner,jboeuf): This should probably use the client setup + deadline */ + grpc_endpoint_read(exec_ctx, h->wrapped_endpoint, &h->incoming, + &h->on_handshake_data_received_from_peer); + } else { + check_peer(exec_ctx, h); + } +} + +void grpc_do_security_handshake(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + tsi_handshaker *handshaker, + grpc_security_connector *connector, + bool is_client_side, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_security_connector_handshake_list *handshake_node; + grpc_security_handshake *h = gpr_malloc(sizeof(grpc_security_handshake)); + memset(h, 0, sizeof(grpc_security_handshake)); + h->handshaker = handshaker; + h->connector = GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REF(connector, "handshake"); + h->is_client_side = is_client_side; + h->handshake_buffer_size = GRPC_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE_BUFFER_SIZE; + h->handshake_buffer = gpr_malloc(h->handshake_buffer_size); + h->wrapped_endpoint = nonsecure_endpoint; + h->user_data = user_data; + h->cb = cb; + grpc_closure_init(&h->on_handshake_data_sent_to_peer, + on_handshake_data_sent_to_peer, h); + grpc_closure_init(&h->on_handshake_data_received_from_peer, + on_handshake_data_received_from_peer, h); + gpr_slice_buffer_init(&h->left_overs); + gpr_slice_buffer_init(&h->outgoing); + gpr_slice_buffer_init(&h->incoming); + if (!is_client_side) { + grpc_server_security_connector *server_connector = + (grpc_server_security_connector *)connector; + handshake_node = gpr_malloc(sizeof(grpc_security_connector_handshake_list)); + handshake_node->handshake = h; + gpr_mu_lock(&server_connector->mu); + handshake_node->next = server_connector->handshaking_handshakes; + server_connector->handshaking_handshakes = handshake_node; + gpr_mu_unlock(&server_connector->mu); + } + send_handshake_bytes_to_peer(exec_ctx, h); +} + +void grpc_security_handshake_shutdown(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + void *handshake) { + grpc_security_handshake *h = handshake; + grpc_endpoint_shutdown(exec_ctx, h->wrapped_endpoint); +} diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.h b/src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ed850b315 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifndef GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_HANDSHAKE_H +#define GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_HANDSHAKE_H + +#include "src/core/lib/iomgr/endpoint.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.h" + +/* Calls the callback upon completion. Takes owership of handshaker. */ +void grpc_do_security_handshake(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + tsi_handshaker *handshaker, + grpc_security_connector *connector, + bool is_client_side, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data); + +void grpc_security_handshake_shutdown(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *handshake); + +#endif /* GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_HANDSHAKE_H */ diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.c b/src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4438c8e559 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.c @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.h" +#include <grpc/support/alloc.h> +#include <grpc/support/log.h> +#include <grpc/support/slice.h> +#include <grpc/support/slice_buffer.h> +#include <grpc/support/sync.h> +#include "src/core/lib/debug/trace.h" +#include "src/core/lib/support/string.h" +#include "src/core/lib/tsi/transport_security_interface.h" + +#define STAGING_BUFFER_SIZE 8192 + +typedef struct { + grpc_endpoint base; + grpc_endpoint *wrapped_ep; + struct tsi_frame_protector *protector; + gpr_mu protector_mu; + /* saved upper level callbacks and user_data. */ + grpc_closure *read_cb; + grpc_closure *write_cb; + grpc_closure on_read; + gpr_slice_buffer *read_buffer; + gpr_slice_buffer source_buffer; + /* saved handshaker leftover data to unprotect. */ + gpr_slice_buffer leftover_bytes; + /* buffers for read and write */ + gpr_slice read_staging_buffer; + + gpr_slice write_staging_buffer; + gpr_slice_buffer output_buffer; + + gpr_refcount ref; +} secure_endpoint; + +int grpc_trace_secure_endpoint = 0; + +static void destroy(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, secure_endpoint *secure_ep) { + secure_endpoint *ep = secure_ep; + grpc_endpoint_destroy(exec_ctx, ep->wrapped_ep); + tsi_frame_protector_destroy(ep->protector); + gpr_slice_buffer_destroy(&ep->leftover_bytes); + gpr_slice_unref(ep->read_staging_buffer); + gpr_slice_unref(ep->write_staging_buffer); + gpr_slice_buffer_destroy(&ep->output_buffer); + gpr_slice_buffer_destroy(&ep->source_buffer); + gpr_mu_destroy(&ep->protector_mu); + gpr_free(ep); +} + +/*#define GRPC_SECURE_ENDPOINT_REFCOUNT_DEBUG*/ +#ifdef GRPC_SECURE_ENDPOINT_REFCOUNT_DEBUG +#define SECURE_ENDPOINT_UNREF(exec_ctx, ep, reason) \ + secure_endpoint_unref((exec_ctx), (ep), (reason), __FILE__, __LINE__) +#define SECURE_ENDPOINT_REF(ep, reason) \ + secure_endpoint_ref((ep), (reason), __FILE__, __LINE__) +static void secure_endpoint_unref(secure_endpoint *ep, + grpc_closure_list *closure_list, + const char *reason, const char *file, + int line) { + gpr_log(file, line, GPR_LOG_SEVERITY_DEBUG, "SECENDP unref %p : %s %d -> %d", + ep, reason, ep->ref.count, ep->ref.count - 1); + if (gpr_unref(&ep->ref)) { + destroy(exec_ctx, ep); + } +} + +static void secure_endpoint_ref(secure_endpoint *ep, const char *reason, + const char *file, int line) { + gpr_log(file, line, GPR_LOG_SEVERITY_DEBUG, "SECENDP ref %p : %s %d -> %d", + ep, reason, ep->ref.count, ep->ref.count + 1); + gpr_ref(&ep->ref); +} +#else +#define SECURE_ENDPOINT_UNREF(exec_ctx, ep, reason) \ + secure_endpoint_unref((exec_ctx), (ep)) +#define SECURE_ENDPOINT_REF(ep, reason) secure_endpoint_ref((ep)) +static void secure_endpoint_unref(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + secure_endpoint *ep) { + if (gpr_unref(&ep->ref)) { + destroy(exec_ctx, ep); + } +} + +static void secure_endpoint_ref(secure_endpoint *ep) { gpr_ref(&ep->ref); } +#endif + +static void flush_read_staging_buffer(secure_endpoint *ep, uint8_t **cur, + uint8_t **end) { + gpr_slice_buffer_add(ep->read_buffer, ep->read_staging_buffer); + ep->read_staging_buffer = gpr_slice_malloc(STAGING_BUFFER_SIZE); + *cur = GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->read_staging_buffer); + *end = GPR_SLICE_END_PTR(ep->read_staging_buffer); +} + +static void call_read_cb(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, secure_endpoint *ep, + bool success) { + if (grpc_trace_secure_endpoint) { + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < ep->read_buffer->count; i++) { + char *data = gpr_dump_slice(ep->read_buffer->slices[i], + GPR_DUMP_HEX | GPR_DUMP_ASCII); + gpr_log(GPR_DEBUG, "READ %p: %s", ep, data); + gpr_free(data); + } + } + ep->read_buffer = NULL; + grpc_exec_ctx_enqueue(exec_ctx, ep->read_cb, success, NULL); + SECURE_ENDPOINT_UNREF(exec_ctx, ep, "read"); +} + +static void on_read(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *user_data, bool success) { + unsigned i; + uint8_t keep_looping = 0; + tsi_result result = TSI_OK; + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)user_data; + uint8_t *cur = GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->read_staging_buffer); + uint8_t *end = GPR_SLICE_END_PTR(ep->read_staging_buffer); + + if (!success) { + gpr_slice_buffer_reset_and_unref(ep->read_buffer); + call_read_cb(exec_ctx, ep, 0); + return; + } + + /* TODO(yangg) check error, maybe bail out early */ + for (i = 0; i < ep->source_buffer.count; i++) { + gpr_slice encrypted = ep->source_buffer.slices[i]; + uint8_t *message_bytes = GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(encrypted); + size_t message_size = GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(encrypted); + + while (message_size > 0 || keep_looping) { + size_t unprotected_buffer_size_written = (size_t)(end - cur); + size_t processed_message_size = message_size; + gpr_mu_lock(&ep->protector_mu); + result = tsi_frame_protector_unprotect(ep->protector, message_bytes, + &processed_message_size, cur, + &unprotected_buffer_size_written); + gpr_mu_unlock(&ep->protector_mu); + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Decryption error: %s", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + break; + } + message_bytes += processed_message_size; + message_size -= processed_message_size; + cur += unprotected_buffer_size_written; + + if (cur == end) { + flush_read_staging_buffer(ep, &cur, &end); + /* Force to enter the loop again to extract buffered bytes in protector. + The bytes could be buffered because of running out of staging_buffer. + If this happens at the end of all slices, doing another unprotect + avoids leaving data in the protector. */ + keep_looping = 1; + } else if (unprotected_buffer_size_written > 0) { + keep_looping = 1; + } else { + keep_looping = 0; + } + } + if (result != TSI_OK) break; + } + + if (cur != GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->read_staging_buffer)) { + gpr_slice_buffer_add( + ep->read_buffer, + gpr_slice_split_head( + &ep->read_staging_buffer, + (size_t)(cur - GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->read_staging_buffer)))); + } + + /* TODO(yangg) experiment with moving this block after read_cb to see if it + helps latency */ + gpr_slice_buffer_reset_and_unref(&ep->source_buffer); + + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_slice_buffer_reset_and_unref(ep->read_buffer); + call_read_cb(exec_ctx, ep, 0); + return; + } + + call_read_cb(exec_ctx, ep, 1); +} + +static void endpoint_read(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_endpoint *secure_ep, + gpr_slice_buffer *slices, grpc_closure *cb) { + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)secure_ep; + ep->read_cb = cb; + ep->read_buffer = slices; + gpr_slice_buffer_reset_and_unref(ep->read_buffer); + + SECURE_ENDPOINT_REF(ep, "read"); + if (ep->leftover_bytes.count) { + gpr_slice_buffer_swap(&ep->leftover_bytes, &ep->source_buffer); + GPR_ASSERT(ep->leftover_bytes.count == 0); + on_read(exec_ctx, ep, 1); + return; + } + + grpc_endpoint_read(exec_ctx, ep->wrapped_ep, &ep->source_buffer, + &ep->on_read); +} + +static void flush_write_staging_buffer(secure_endpoint *ep, uint8_t **cur, + uint8_t **end) { + gpr_slice_buffer_add(&ep->output_buffer, ep->write_staging_buffer); + ep->write_staging_buffer = gpr_slice_malloc(STAGING_BUFFER_SIZE); + *cur = GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->write_staging_buffer); + *end = GPR_SLICE_END_PTR(ep->write_staging_buffer); +} + +static void endpoint_write(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_endpoint *secure_ep, + gpr_slice_buffer *slices, grpc_closure *cb) { + unsigned i; + tsi_result result = TSI_OK; + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)secure_ep; + uint8_t *cur = GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->write_staging_buffer); + uint8_t *end = GPR_SLICE_END_PTR(ep->write_staging_buffer); + + gpr_slice_buffer_reset_and_unref(&ep->output_buffer); + + if (grpc_trace_secure_endpoint) { + for (i = 0; i < slices->count; i++) { + char *data = + gpr_dump_slice(slices->slices[i], GPR_DUMP_HEX | GPR_DUMP_ASCII); + gpr_log(GPR_DEBUG, "WRITE %p: %s", ep, data); + gpr_free(data); + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < slices->count; i++) { + gpr_slice plain = slices->slices[i]; + uint8_t *message_bytes = GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(plain); + size_t message_size = GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(plain); + while (message_size > 0) { + size_t protected_buffer_size_to_send = (size_t)(end - cur); + size_t processed_message_size = message_size; + gpr_mu_lock(&ep->protector_mu); + result = tsi_frame_protector_protect(ep->protector, message_bytes, + &processed_message_size, cur, + &protected_buffer_size_to_send); + gpr_mu_unlock(&ep->protector_mu); + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Encryption error: %s", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + break; + } + message_bytes += processed_message_size; + message_size -= processed_message_size; + cur += protected_buffer_size_to_send; + + if (cur == end) { + flush_write_staging_buffer(ep, &cur, &end); + } + } + if (result != TSI_OK) break; + } + if (result == TSI_OK) { + size_t still_pending_size; + do { + size_t protected_buffer_size_to_send = (size_t)(end - cur); + gpr_mu_lock(&ep->protector_mu); + result = tsi_frame_protector_protect_flush(ep->protector, cur, + &protected_buffer_size_to_send, + &still_pending_size); + gpr_mu_unlock(&ep->protector_mu); + if (result != TSI_OK) break; + cur += protected_buffer_size_to_send; + if (cur == end) { + flush_write_staging_buffer(ep, &cur, &end); + } + } while (still_pending_size > 0); + if (cur != GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->write_staging_buffer)) { + gpr_slice_buffer_add( + &ep->output_buffer, + gpr_slice_split_head( + &ep->write_staging_buffer, + (size_t)(cur - GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(ep->write_staging_buffer)))); + } + } + + if (result != TSI_OK) { + /* TODO(yangg) do different things according to the error type? */ + gpr_slice_buffer_reset_and_unref(&ep->output_buffer); + grpc_exec_ctx_enqueue(exec_ctx, cb, false, NULL); + return; + } + + grpc_endpoint_write(exec_ctx, ep->wrapped_ep, &ep->output_buffer, cb); +} + +static void endpoint_shutdown(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_endpoint *secure_ep) { + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)secure_ep; + grpc_endpoint_shutdown(exec_ctx, ep->wrapped_ep); +} + +static void endpoint_destroy(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_endpoint *secure_ep) { + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)secure_ep; + SECURE_ENDPOINT_UNREF(exec_ctx, ep, "destroy"); +} + +static void endpoint_add_to_pollset(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_endpoint *secure_ep, + grpc_pollset *pollset) { + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)secure_ep; + grpc_endpoint_add_to_pollset(exec_ctx, ep->wrapped_ep, pollset); +} + +static void endpoint_add_to_pollset_set(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_endpoint *secure_ep, + grpc_pollset_set *pollset_set) { + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)secure_ep; + grpc_endpoint_add_to_pollset_set(exec_ctx, ep->wrapped_ep, pollset_set); +} + +static char *endpoint_get_peer(grpc_endpoint *secure_ep) { + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)secure_ep; + return grpc_endpoint_get_peer(ep->wrapped_ep); +} + +static const grpc_endpoint_vtable vtable = { + endpoint_read, endpoint_write, + endpoint_add_to_pollset, endpoint_add_to_pollset_set, + endpoint_shutdown, endpoint_destroy, + endpoint_get_peer}; + +grpc_endpoint *grpc_secure_endpoint_create( + struct tsi_frame_protector *protector, grpc_endpoint *transport, + gpr_slice *leftover_slices, size_t leftover_nslices) { + size_t i; + secure_endpoint *ep = (secure_endpoint *)gpr_malloc(sizeof(secure_endpoint)); + ep->base.vtable = &vtable; + ep->wrapped_ep = transport; + ep->protector = protector; + gpr_slice_buffer_init(&ep->leftover_bytes); + for (i = 0; i < leftover_nslices; i++) { + gpr_slice_buffer_add(&ep->leftover_bytes, + gpr_slice_ref(leftover_slices[i])); + } + ep->write_staging_buffer = gpr_slice_malloc(STAGING_BUFFER_SIZE); + ep->read_staging_buffer = gpr_slice_malloc(STAGING_BUFFER_SIZE); + gpr_slice_buffer_init(&ep->output_buffer); + gpr_slice_buffer_init(&ep->source_buffer); + ep->read_buffer = NULL; + grpc_closure_init(&ep->on_read, on_read, ep); + gpr_mu_init(&ep->protector_mu); + gpr_ref_init(&ep->ref, 1); + return &ep->base; +} diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.h b/src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d00075b769 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifndef GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_SECURE_ENDPOINT_H +#define GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_SECURE_ENDPOINT_H + +#include <grpc/support/slice.h> +#include "src/core/lib/iomgr/endpoint.h" + +struct tsi_frame_protector; + +extern int grpc_trace_secure_endpoint; + +/* Takes ownership of protector and to_wrap, and refs leftover_slices. */ +grpc_endpoint *grpc_secure_endpoint_create( + struct tsi_frame_protector *protector, grpc_endpoint *to_wrap, + gpr_slice *leftover_slices, size_t leftover_nslices); + +#endif /* GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_SECURE_ENDPOINT_H */ diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.c b/src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72173e7c9d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.c @@ -0,0 +1,838 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.h" + +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <grpc/support/alloc.h> +#include <grpc/support/host_port.h> +#include <grpc/support/log.h> +#include <grpc/support/slice_buffer.h> +#include <grpc/support/string_util.h> + +#include "src/core/ext/transport/chttp2/alpn/alpn.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/context/security_context.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/credentials/credentials.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/handshake.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/secure_endpoint.h" +#include "src/core/lib/support/env.h" +#include "src/core/lib/support/load_file.h" +#include "src/core/lib/support/string.h" +#include "src/core/lib/tsi/fake_transport_security.h" +#include "src/core/lib/tsi/ssl_transport_security.h" + +/* -- Constants. -- */ + +#ifndef INSTALL_PREFIX +static const char *installed_roots_path = "/usr/share/grpc/roots.pem"; +#else +static const char *installed_roots_path = + INSTALL_PREFIX "/share/grpc/roots.pem"; +#endif + +/* -- Overridden default roots. -- */ + +static grpc_ssl_roots_override_callback ssl_roots_override_cb = NULL; + +void grpc_set_ssl_roots_override_callback(grpc_ssl_roots_override_callback cb) { + ssl_roots_override_cb = cb; +} + +/* -- Cipher suites. -- */ + +/* Defines the cipher suites that we accept by default. All these cipher suites + are compliant with HTTP2. */ +#define GRPC_SSL_CIPHER_SUITES \ + "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-" \ + "SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" + +static gpr_once cipher_suites_once = GPR_ONCE_INIT; +static const char *cipher_suites = NULL; + +static void init_cipher_suites(void) { + char *overridden = gpr_getenv("GRPC_SSL_CIPHER_SUITES"); + cipher_suites = overridden != NULL ? overridden : GRPC_SSL_CIPHER_SUITES; +} + +static const char *ssl_cipher_suites(void) { + gpr_once_init(&cipher_suites_once, init_cipher_suites); + return cipher_suites; +} + +/* -- Common methods. -- */ + +/* Returns the first property with that name. */ +const tsi_peer_property *tsi_peer_get_property_by_name(const tsi_peer *peer, + const char *name) { + size_t i; + if (peer == NULL) return NULL; + for (i = 0; i < peer->property_count; i++) { + const tsi_peer_property *property = &peer->properties[i]; + if (name == NULL && property->name == NULL) { + return property; + } + if (name != NULL && property->name != NULL && + strcmp(property->name, name) == 0) { + return property; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +void grpc_server_security_connector_shutdown( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_server_security_connector *connector) { + grpc_security_connector_handshake_list *tmp; + gpr_mu_lock(&connector->mu); + while (connector->handshaking_handshakes) { + tmp = connector->handshaking_handshakes; + grpc_security_handshake_shutdown( + exec_ctx, connector->handshaking_handshakes->handshake); + connector->handshaking_handshakes = tmp->next; + gpr_free(tmp); + } + gpr_mu_unlock(&connector->mu); +} + +void grpc_channel_security_connector_do_handshake( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + if (sc == NULL || nonsecure_endpoint == NULL) { + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR, NULL, NULL); + } else { + sc->do_handshake(exec_ctx, sc, nonsecure_endpoint, cb, user_data); + } +} + +void grpc_server_security_connector_do_handshake( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_server_security_connector *sc, + grpc_tcp_server_acceptor *acceptor, grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, void *user_data) { + if (sc == NULL || nonsecure_endpoint == NULL) { + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR, NULL, NULL); + } else { + sc->do_handshake(exec_ctx, sc, acceptor, nonsecure_endpoint, cb, user_data); + } +} + +void grpc_security_connector_check_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_security_connector *sc, + tsi_peer peer, + grpc_security_peer_check_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + if (sc == NULL) { + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR, NULL); + tsi_peer_destruct(&peer); + } else { + sc->vtable->check_peer(exec_ctx, sc, peer, cb, user_data); + } +} + +void grpc_channel_security_connector_check_call_host( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + const char *host, grpc_auth_context *auth_context, + grpc_security_call_host_check_cb cb, void *user_data) { + if (sc == NULL || sc->check_call_host == NULL) { + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR); + } else { + sc->check_call_host(exec_ctx, sc, host, auth_context, cb, user_data); + } +} + +#ifdef GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REFCOUNT_DEBUG +grpc_security_connector *grpc_security_connector_ref( + grpc_security_connector *sc, const char *file, int line, + const char *reason) { + if (sc == NULL) return NULL; + gpr_log(file, line, GPR_LOG_SEVERITY_DEBUG, + "SECURITY_CONNECTOR:%p ref %d -> %d %s", sc, + (int)sc->refcount.count, (int)sc->refcount.count + 1, reason); +#else +grpc_security_connector *grpc_security_connector_ref( + grpc_security_connector *sc) { + if (sc == NULL) return NULL; +#endif + gpr_ref(&sc->refcount); + return sc; +} + +#ifdef GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REFCOUNT_DEBUG +void grpc_security_connector_unref(grpc_security_connector *sc, + const char *file, int line, + const char *reason) { + if (sc == NULL) return; + gpr_log(file, line, GPR_LOG_SEVERITY_DEBUG, + "SECURITY_CONNECTOR:%p unref %d -> %d %s", sc, + (int)sc->refcount.count, (int)sc->refcount.count - 1, reason); +#else +void grpc_security_connector_unref(grpc_security_connector *sc) { + if (sc == NULL) return; +#endif + if (gpr_unref(&sc->refcount)) sc->vtable->destroy(sc); +} + +static void connector_pointer_arg_destroy(void *p) { + GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_UNREF(p, "connector_pointer_arg"); +} + +static void *connector_pointer_arg_copy(void *p) { + return GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REF(p, "connector_pointer_arg"); +} + +static int connector_pointer_cmp(void *a, void *b) { return GPR_ICMP(a, b); } + +static const grpc_arg_pointer_vtable connector_pointer_vtable = { + connector_pointer_arg_copy, connector_pointer_arg_destroy, + connector_pointer_cmp}; + +grpc_arg grpc_security_connector_to_arg(grpc_security_connector *sc) { + grpc_arg result; + result.type = GRPC_ARG_POINTER; + result.key = GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_ARG; + result.value.pointer.vtable = &connector_pointer_vtable; + result.value.pointer.p = sc; + return result; +} + +grpc_security_connector *grpc_security_connector_from_arg(const grpc_arg *arg) { + if (strcmp(arg->key, GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_ARG)) return NULL; + if (arg->type != GRPC_ARG_POINTER) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Invalid type %d for arg %s", arg->type, + GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_ARG); + return NULL; + } + return arg->value.pointer.p; +} + +grpc_security_connector *grpc_find_security_connector_in_args( + const grpc_channel_args *args) { + size_t i; + if (args == NULL) return NULL; + for (i = 0; i < args->num_args; i++) { + grpc_security_connector *sc = + grpc_security_connector_from_arg(&args->args[i]); + if (sc != NULL) return sc; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* -- Fake implementation. -- */ + +static void fake_channel_destroy(grpc_security_connector *sc) { + grpc_channel_security_connector *c = (grpc_channel_security_connector *)sc; + grpc_call_credentials_unref(c->request_metadata_creds); + gpr_free(sc); +} + +static void fake_server_destroy(grpc_security_connector *sc) { + grpc_server_security_connector *c = (grpc_server_security_connector *)sc; + gpr_mu_destroy(&c->mu); + gpr_free(sc); +} + +static void fake_check_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_security_connector *sc, tsi_peer peer, + grpc_security_peer_check_cb cb, void *user_data) { + const char *prop_name; + grpc_security_status status = GRPC_SECURITY_OK; + grpc_auth_context *auth_context = NULL; + if (peer.property_count != 1) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Fake peers should only have 1 property."); + status = GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + goto end; + } + prop_name = peer.properties[0].name; + if (prop_name == NULL || + strcmp(prop_name, TSI_CERTIFICATE_TYPE_PEER_PROPERTY)) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Unexpected property in fake peer: %s.", + prop_name == NULL ? "<EMPTY>" : prop_name); + status = GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + goto end; + } + if (strncmp(peer.properties[0].value.data, TSI_FAKE_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, + peer.properties[0].value.length)) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Invalid value for cert type property."); + status = GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + goto end; + } + auth_context = grpc_auth_context_create(NULL); + grpc_auth_context_add_cstring_property( + auth_context, GRPC_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_TYPE_PROPERTY_NAME, + GRPC_FAKE_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_TYPE); + +end: + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, status, auth_context); + grpc_auth_context_unref(auth_context); + tsi_peer_destruct(&peer); +} + +static void fake_channel_check_call_host(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + const char *host, + grpc_auth_context *auth_context, + grpc_security_call_host_check_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, GRPC_SECURITY_OK); +} + +static void fake_channel_do_handshake(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_do_security_handshake(exec_ctx, tsi_create_fake_handshaker(1), &sc->base, + true, nonsecure_endpoint, cb, user_data); +} + +static void fake_server_do_handshake(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_server_security_connector *sc, + grpc_tcp_server_acceptor *acceptor, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_do_security_handshake(exec_ctx, tsi_create_fake_handshaker(0), &sc->base, + false, nonsecure_endpoint, cb, user_data); +} + +static grpc_security_connector_vtable fake_channel_vtable = { + fake_channel_destroy, fake_check_peer}; + +static grpc_security_connector_vtable fake_server_vtable = {fake_server_destroy, + fake_check_peer}; + +grpc_channel_security_connector *grpc_fake_channel_security_connector_create( + grpc_call_credentials *request_metadata_creds) { + grpc_channel_security_connector *c = gpr_malloc(sizeof(*c)); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + gpr_ref_init(&c->base.refcount, 1); + c->base.url_scheme = GRPC_FAKE_SECURITY_URL_SCHEME; + c->base.vtable = &fake_channel_vtable; + c->request_metadata_creds = grpc_call_credentials_ref(request_metadata_creds); + c->check_call_host = fake_channel_check_call_host; + c->do_handshake = fake_channel_do_handshake; + return c; +} + +grpc_server_security_connector *grpc_fake_server_security_connector_create( + void) { + grpc_server_security_connector *c = + gpr_malloc(sizeof(grpc_server_security_connector)); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + gpr_ref_init(&c->base.refcount, 1); + c->base.vtable = &fake_server_vtable; + c->base.url_scheme = GRPC_FAKE_SECURITY_URL_SCHEME; + c->do_handshake = fake_server_do_handshake; + gpr_mu_init(&c->mu); + return c; +} + +/* --- Ssl implementation. --- */ + +typedef struct { + grpc_channel_security_connector base; + tsi_ssl_handshaker_factory *handshaker_factory; + char *target_name; + char *overridden_target_name; +} grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector; + +typedef struct { + grpc_server_security_connector base; + tsi_ssl_handshaker_factory *handshaker_factory; +} grpc_ssl_server_security_connector; + +static void ssl_channel_destroy(grpc_security_connector *sc) { + grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *c = + (grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *)sc; + grpc_call_credentials_unref(c->base.request_metadata_creds); + if (c->handshaker_factory != NULL) { + tsi_ssl_handshaker_factory_destroy(c->handshaker_factory); + } + if (c->target_name != NULL) gpr_free(c->target_name); + if (c->overridden_target_name != NULL) gpr_free(c->overridden_target_name); + gpr_free(sc); +} + +static void ssl_server_destroy(grpc_security_connector *sc) { + grpc_ssl_server_security_connector *c = + (grpc_ssl_server_security_connector *)sc; + + if (c->handshaker_factory != NULL) { + tsi_ssl_handshaker_factory_destroy(c->handshaker_factory); + } + gpr_mu_destroy(&c->base.mu); + gpr_free(sc); +} + +static grpc_security_status ssl_create_handshaker( + tsi_ssl_handshaker_factory *handshaker_factory, bool is_client, + const char *peer_name, tsi_handshaker **handshaker) { + tsi_result result = TSI_OK; + if (handshaker_factory == NULL) return GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + result = tsi_ssl_handshaker_factory_create_handshaker( + handshaker_factory, is_client ? peer_name : NULL, handshaker); + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Handshaker creation failed with error %s.", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + return GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + } + return GRPC_SECURITY_OK; +} + +static void ssl_channel_do_handshake(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *c = + (grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *)sc; + tsi_handshaker *handshaker; + grpc_security_status status = ssl_create_handshaker( + c->handshaker_factory, true, + c->overridden_target_name != NULL ? c->overridden_target_name + : c->target_name, + &handshaker); + if (status != GRPC_SECURITY_OK) { + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, status, NULL, NULL); + } else { + grpc_do_security_handshake(exec_ctx, handshaker, &sc->base, true, + nonsecure_endpoint, cb, user_data); + } +} + +static void ssl_server_do_handshake(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_server_security_connector *sc, + grpc_tcp_server_acceptor *acceptor, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_ssl_server_security_connector *c = + (grpc_ssl_server_security_connector *)sc; + tsi_handshaker *handshaker; + grpc_security_status status = + ssl_create_handshaker(c->handshaker_factory, false, NULL, &handshaker); + if (status != GRPC_SECURITY_OK) { + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, status, NULL, NULL); + } else { + grpc_do_security_handshake(exec_ctx, handshaker, &sc->base, false, + nonsecure_endpoint, cb, user_data); + } +} + +static int ssl_host_matches_name(const tsi_peer *peer, const char *peer_name) { + char *allocated_name = NULL; + int r; + + if (strchr(peer_name, ':') != NULL) { + char *ignored_port; + gpr_split_host_port(peer_name, &allocated_name, &ignored_port); + gpr_free(ignored_port); + peer_name = allocated_name; + if (!peer_name) return 0; + } + r = tsi_ssl_peer_matches_name(peer, peer_name); + gpr_free(allocated_name); + return r; +} + +grpc_auth_context *tsi_ssl_peer_to_auth_context(const tsi_peer *peer) { + size_t i; + grpc_auth_context *ctx = NULL; + const char *peer_identity_property_name = NULL; + + /* The caller has checked the certificate type property. */ + GPR_ASSERT(peer->property_count >= 1); + ctx = grpc_auth_context_create(NULL); + grpc_auth_context_add_cstring_property( + ctx, GRPC_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_TYPE_PROPERTY_NAME, + GRPC_SSL_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_TYPE); + for (i = 0; i < peer->property_count; i++) { + const tsi_peer_property *prop = &peer->properties[i]; + if (prop->name == NULL) continue; + if (strcmp(prop->name, TSI_X509_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME_PEER_PROPERTY) == 0) { + /* If there is no subject alt name, have the CN as the identity. */ + if (peer_identity_property_name == NULL) { + peer_identity_property_name = GRPC_X509_CN_PROPERTY_NAME; + } + grpc_auth_context_add_property(ctx, GRPC_X509_CN_PROPERTY_NAME, + prop->value.data, prop->value.length); + } else if (strcmp(prop->name, + TSI_X509_SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME_PEER_PROPERTY) == 0) { + peer_identity_property_name = GRPC_X509_SAN_PROPERTY_NAME; + grpc_auth_context_add_property(ctx, GRPC_X509_SAN_PROPERTY_NAME, + prop->value.data, prop->value.length); + } else if (strcmp(prop->name, TSI_X509_PEM_CERT_PROPERTY) == 0) { + grpc_auth_context_add_property(ctx, GRPC_X509_PEM_CERT_PROPERTY_NAME, + prop->value.data, prop->value.length); + } + } + if (peer_identity_property_name != NULL) { + GPR_ASSERT(grpc_auth_context_set_peer_identity_property_name( + ctx, peer_identity_property_name) == 1); + } + return ctx; +} + +static grpc_security_status ssl_check_peer(grpc_security_connector *sc, + const char *peer_name, + const tsi_peer *peer, + grpc_auth_context **auth_context) { + /* Check the ALPN. */ + const tsi_peer_property *p = + tsi_peer_get_property_by_name(peer, TSI_SSL_ALPN_SELECTED_PROTOCOL); + if (p == NULL) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Missing selected ALPN property."); + return GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + } + if (!grpc_chttp2_is_alpn_version_supported(p->value.data, p->value.length)) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Invalid ALPN value."); + return GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + } + + /* Check the peer name if specified. */ + if (peer_name != NULL && !ssl_host_matches_name(peer, peer_name)) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Peer name %s is not in peer certificate", peer_name); + return GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + } + *auth_context = tsi_ssl_peer_to_auth_context(peer); + return GRPC_SECURITY_OK; +} + +static void ssl_channel_check_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_security_connector *sc, tsi_peer peer, + grpc_security_peer_check_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *c = + (grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *)sc; + grpc_security_status status; + grpc_auth_context *auth_context = NULL; + status = ssl_check_peer(sc, c->overridden_target_name != NULL + ? c->overridden_target_name + : c->target_name, + &peer, &auth_context); + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, status, auth_context); + grpc_auth_context_unref(auth_context); + tsi_peer_destruct(&peer); +} + +static void ssl_server_check_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_security_connector *sc, tsi_peer peer, + grpc_security_peer_check_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_auth_context *auth_context = NULL; + grpc_security_status status = ssl_check_peer(sc, NULL, &peer, &auth_context); + tsi_peer_destruct(&peer); + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, status, auth_context); + grpc_auth_context_unref(auth_context); +} + +static void add_shallow_auth_property_to_peer(tsi_peer *peer, + const grpc_auth_property *prop, + const char *tsi_prop_name) { + tsi_peer_property *tsi_prop = &peer->properties[peer->property_count++]; + tsi_prop->name = (char *)tsi_prop_name; + tsi_prop->value.data = prop->value; + tsi_prop->value.length = prop->value_length; +} + +tsi_peer tsi_shallow_peer_from_ssl_auth_context( + const grpc_auth_context *auth_context) { + size_t max_num_props = 0; + grpc_auth_property_iterator it; + const grpc_auth_property *prop; + tsi_peer peer; + memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer)); + + it = grpc_auth_context_property_iterator(auth_context); + while (grpc_auth_property_iterator_next(&it) != NULL) max_num_props++; + + if (max_num_props > 0) { + peer.properties = gpr_malloc(max_num_props * sizeof(tsi_peer_property)); + it = grpc_auth_context_property_iterator(auth_context); + while ((prop = grpc_auth_property_iterator_next(&it)) != NULL) { + if (strcmp(prop->name, GRPC_X509_SAN_PROPERTY_NAME) == 0) { + add_shallow_auth_property_to_peer( + &peer, prop, TSI_X509_SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME_PEER_PROPERTY); + } else if (strcmp(prop->name, GRPC_X509_CN_PROPERTY_NAME) == 0) { + add_shallow_auth_property_to_peer( + &peer, prop, TSI_X509_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME_PEER_PROPERTY); + } else if (strcmp(prop->name, GRPC_X509_PEM_CERT_PROPERTY_NAME) == 0) { + add_shallow_auth_property_to_peer(&peer, prop, + TSI_X509_PEM_CERT_PROPERTY); + } + } + } + return peer; +} + +void tsi_shallow_peer_destruct(tsi_peer *peer) { + if (peer->properties != NULL) gpr_free(peer->properties); +} + +static void ssl_channel_check_call_host(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + const char *host, + grpc_auth_context *auth_context, + grpc_security_call_host_check_cb cb, + void *user_data) { + grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *c = + (grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *)sc; + grpc_security_status status = GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; + tsi_peer peer = tsi_shallow_peer_from_ssl_auth_context(auth_context); + if (ssl_host_matches_name(&peer, host)) status = GRPC_SECURITY_OK; + + /* If the target name was overridden, then the original target_name was + 'checked' transitively during the previous peer check at the end of the + handshake. */ + if (c->overridden_target_name != NULL && strcmp(host, c->target_name) == 0) { + status = GRPC_SECURITY_OK; + } + cb(exec_ctx, user_data, status); + tsi_shallow_peer_destruct(&peer); +} + +static grpc_security_connector_vtable ssl_channel_vtable = { + ssl_channel_destroy, ssl_channel_check_peer}; + +static grpc_security_connector_vtable ssl_server_vtable = { + ssl_server_destroy, ssl_server_check_peer}; + +static gpr_slice compute_default_pem_root_certs_once(void) { + gpr_slice result = gpr_empty_slice(); + + /* First try to load the roots from the environment. */ + char *default_root_certs_path = + gpr_getenv(GRPC_DEFAULT_SSL_ROOTS_FILE_PATH_ENV_VAR); + if (default_root_certs_path != NULL) { + result = gpr_load_file(default_root_certs_path, 0, NULL); + gpr_free(default_root_certs_path); + } + + /* Try overridden roots if needed. */ + grpc_ssl_roots_override_result ovrd_res = GRPC_SSL_ROOTS_OVERRIDE_FAIL; + if (GPR_SLICE_IS_EMPTY(result) && ssl_roots_override_cb != NULL) { + char *pem_root_certs = NULL; + ovrd_res = ssl_roots_override_cb(&pem_root_certs); + if (ovrd_res == GRPC_SSL_ROOTS_OVERRIDE_OK) { + GPR_ASSERT(pem_root_certs != NULL); + result = gpr_slice_new(pem_root_certs, strlen(pem_root_certs), gpr_free); + } + } + + /* Fall back to installed certs if needed. */ + if (GPR_SLICE_IS_EMPTY(result) && + ovrd_res != GRPC_SSL_ROOTS_OVERRIDE_FAIL_PERMANENTLY) { + result = gpr_load_file(installed_roots_path, 0, NULL); + } + return result; +} + +static gpr_slice default_pem_root_certs; + +static void init_default_pem_root_certs(void) { + default_pem_root_certs = compute_default_pem_root_certs_once(); +} + +gpr_slice grpc_get_default_ssl_roots_for_testing(void) { + return compute_default_pem_root_certs_once(); +} + +static tsi_client_certificate_request_type +get_tsi_client_certificate_request_type( + grpc_ssl_client_certificate_request_type grpc_request_type) { + switch (grpc_request_type) { + case GRPC_SSL_DONT_REQUEST_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + return TSI_DONT_REQUEST_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + + case GRPC_SSL_REQUEST_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_BUT_DONT_VERIFY: + return TSI_REQUEST_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_BUT_DONT_VERIFY; + + case GRPC_SSL_REQUEST_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_AND_VERIFY: + return TSI_REQUEST_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_AND_VERIFY; + + case GRPC_SSL_REQUEST_AND_REQUIRE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_BUT_DONT_VERIFY: + return TSI_REQUEST_AND_REQUIRE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_BUT_DONT_VERIFY; + + case GRPC_SSL_REQUEST_AND_REQUIRE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_AND_VERIFY: + return TSI_REQUEST_AND_REQUIRE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_AND_VERIFY; + + default: + // Is this a sane default + return TSI_DONT_REQUEST_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + } +} + +size_t grpc_get_default_ssl_roots(const unsigned char **pem_root_certs) { + /* TODO(jboeuf@google.com): Maybe revisit the approach which consists in + loading all the roots once for the lifetime of the process. */ + static gpr_once once = GPR_ONCE_INIT; + gpr_once_init(&once, init_default_pem_root_certs); + *pem_root_certs = GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(default_pem_root_certs); + return GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(default_pem_root_certs); +} + +grpc_security_status grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector_create( + grpc_call_credentials *request_metadata_creds, + const grpc_ssl_config *config, const char *target_name, + const char *overridden_target_name, grpc_channel_security_connector **sc) { + size_t num_alpn_protocols = grpc_chttp2_num_alpn_versions(); + const unsigned char **alpn_protocol_strings = + gpr_malloc(sizeof(const char *) * num_alpn_protocols); + unsigned char *alpn_protocol_string_lengths = + gpr_malloc(sizeof(unsigned char) * num_alpn_protocols); + tsi_result result = TSI_OK; + grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector *c; + size_t i; + const unsigned char *pem_root_certs; + size_t pem_root_certs_size; + char *port; + + for (i = 0; i < num_alpn_protocols; i++) { + alpn_protocol_strings[i] = + (const unsigned char *)grpc_chttp2_get_alpn_version_index(i); + alpn_protocol_string_lengths[i] = + (unsigned char)strlen(grpc_chttp2_get_alpn_version_index(i)); + } + + if (config == NULL || target_name == NULL) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "An ssl channel needs a config and a target name."); + goto error; + } + if (config->pem_root_certs == NULL) { + pem_root_certs_size = grpc_get_default_ssl_roots(&pem_root_certs); + if (pem_root_certs == NULL || pem_root_certs_size == 0) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Could not get default pem root certs."); + goto error; + } + } else { + pem_root_certs = config->pem_root_certs; + pem_root_certs_size = config->pem_root_certs_size; + } + + c = gpr_malloc(sizeof(grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector)); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector)); + + gpr_ref_init(&c->base.base.refcount, 1); + c->base.base.vtable = &ssl_channel_vtable; + c->base.base.url_scheme = GRPC_SSL_URL_SCHEME; + c->base.request_metadata_creds = + grpc_call_credentials_ref(request_metadata_creds); + c->base.check_call_host = ssl_channel_check_call_host; + c->base.do_handshake = ssl_channel_do_handshake; + gpr_split_host_port(target_name, &c->target_name, &port); + gpr_free(port); + if (overridden_target_name != NULL) { + c->overridden_target_name = gpr_strdup(overridden_target_name); + } + result = tsi_create_ssl_client_handshaker_factory( + config->pem_private_key, config->pem_private_key_size, + config->pem_cert_chain, config->pem_cert_chain_size, pem_root_certs, + pem_root_certs_size, ssl_cipher_suites(), alpn_protocol_strings, + alpn_protocol_string_lengths, (uint16_t)num_alpn_protocols, + &c->handshaker_factory); + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Handshaker factory creation failed with %s.", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + ssl_channel_destroy(&c->base.base); + *sc = NULL; + goto error; + } + *sc = &c->base; + gpr_free((void *)alpn_protocol_strings); + gpr_free(alpn_protocol_string_lengths); + return GRPC_SECURITY_OK; + +error: + gpr_free((void *)alpn_protocol_strings); + gpr_free(alpn_protocol_string_lengths); + return GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; +} + +grpc_security_status grpc_ssl_server_security_connector_create( + const grpc_ssl_server_config *config, grpc_server_security_connector **sc) { + size_t num_alpn_protocols = grpc_chttp2_num_alpn_versions(); + const unsigned char **alpn_protocol_strings = + gpr_malloc(sizeof(const char *) * num_alpn_protocols); + unsigned char *alpn_protocol_string_lengths = + gpr_malloc(sizeof(unsigned char) * num_alpn_protocols); + tsi_result result = TSI_OK; + grpc_ssl_server_security_connector *c; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_alpn_protocols; i++) { + alpn_protocol_strings[i] = + (const unsigned char *)grpc_chttp2_get_alpn_version_index(i); + alpn_protocol_string_lengths[i] = + (unsigned char)strlen(grpc_chttp2_get_alpn_version_index(i)); + } + + if (config == NULL || config->num_key_cert_pairs == 0) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "An SSL server needs a key and a cert."); + goto error; + } + c = gpr_malloc(sizeof(grpc_ssl_server_security_connector)); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(grpc_ssl_server_security_connector)); + + gpr_ref_init(&c->base.base.refcount, 1); + c->base.base.url_scheme = GRPC_SSL_URL_SCHEME; + c->base.base.vtable = &ssl_server_vtable; + result = tsi_create_ssl_server_handshaker_factory_ex( + (const unsigned char **)config->pem_private_keys, + config->pem_private_keys_sizes, + (const unsigned char **)config->pem_cert_chains, + config->pem_cert_chains_sizes, config->num_key_cert_pairs, + config->pem_root_certs, config->pem_root_certs_size, + get_tsi_client_certificate_request_type( + config->client_certificate_request), + ssl_cipher_suites(), alpn_protocol_strings, alpn_protocol_string_lengths, + (uint16_t)num_alpn_protocols, &c->handshaker_factory); + if (result != TSI_OK) { + gpr_log(GPR_ERROR, "Handshaker factory creation failed with %s.", + tsi_result_to_string(result)); + ssl_server_destroy(&c->base.base); + *sc = NULL; + goto error; + } + gpr_mu_init(&c->base.mu); + c->base.do_handshake = ssl_server_do_handshake; + *sc = &c->base; + gpr_free((void *)alpn_protocol_strings); + gpr_free(alpn_protocol_string_lengths); + return GRPC_SECURITY_OK; + +error: + gpr_free((void *)alpn_protocol_strings); + gpr_free(alpn_protocol_string_lengths); + return GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR; +} diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.h b/src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84e586deaa --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/security_connector.h @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifndef GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_H +#define GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_H + +#include <grpc/grpc_security.h> +#include "src/core/lib/iomgr/endpoint.h" +#include "src/core/lib/iomgr/tcp_server.h" +#include "src/core/lib/tsi/transport_security_interface.h" + +/* --- status enum. --- */ + +typedef enum { GRPC_SECURITY_OK = 0, GRPC_SECURITY_ERROR } grpc_security_status; + +/* --- URL schemes. --- */ + +#define GRPC_SSL_URL_SCHEME "https" +#define GRPC_FAKE_SECURITY_URL_SCHEME "http+fake_security" + +/* --- security_connector object. --- + + A security connector object represents away to configure the underlying + transport security mechanism and check the resulting trusted peer. */ + +typedef struct grpc_security_connector grpc_security_connector; + +#define GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_ARG "grpc.security_connector" + +typedef void (*grpc_security_peer_check_cb)(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + void *user_data, + grpc_security_status status, + grpc_auth_context *auth_context); + +/* Ownership of the secure_endpoint is transfered. */ +typedef void (*grpc_security_handshake_done_cb)( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *user_data, grpc_security_status status, + grpc_endpoint *secure_endpoint, grpc_auth_context *auth_context); + +typedef struct { + void (*destroy)(grpc_security_connector *sc); + void (*check_peer)(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_security_connector *sc, + tsi_peer peer, grpc_security_peer_check_cb cb, + void *user_data); +} grpc_security_connector_vtable; + +typedef struct grpc_security_connector_handshake_list { + void *handshake; + struct grpc_security_connector_handshake_list *next; +} grpc_security_connector_handshake_list; + +struct grpc_security_connector { + const grpc_security_connector_vtable *vtable; + gpr_refcount refcount; + const char *url_scheme; +}; + +/* Refcounting. */ +#ifdef GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REFCOUNT_DEBUG +#define GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REF(p, r) \ + grpc_security_connector_ref((p), __FILE__, __LINE__, (r)) +#define GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_UNREF(p, r) \ + grpc_security_connector_unref((p), __FILE__, __LINE__, (r)) +grpc_security_connector *grpc_security_connector_ref( + grpc_security_connector *policy, const char *file, int line, + const char *reason); +void grpc_security_connector_unref(grpc_security_connector *policy, + const char *file, int line, + const char *reason); +#else +#define GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_REF(p, r) grpc_security_connector_ref((p)) +#define GRPC_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_UNREF(p, r) grpc_security_connector_unref((p)) +grpc_security_connector *grpc_security_connector_ref( + grpc_security_connector *policy); +void grpc_security_connector_unref(grpc_security_connector *policy); +#endif + +/* Check the peer. Callee takes ownership of the peer object. + The callback will include the resulting auth_context. */ +void grpc_security_connector_check_peer(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_security_connector *sc, + tsi_peer peer, + grpc_security_peer_check_cb cb, + void *user_data); + +/* Util to encapsulate the connector in a channel arg. */ +grpc_arg grpc_security_connector_to_arg(grpc_security_connector *sc); + +/* Util to get the connector from a channel arg. */ +grpc_security_connector *grpc_security_connector_from_arg(const grpc_arg *arg); + +/* Util to find the connector from channel args. */ +grpc_security_connector *grpc_find_security_connector_in_args( + const grpc_channel_args *args); + +/* --- channel_security_connector object. --- + + A channel security connector object represents away to configure the + underlying transport security mechanism on the client side. */ + +typedef struct grpc_channel_security_connector grpc_channel_security_connector; + +typedef void (*grpc_security_call_host_check_cb)(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + void *user_data, + grpc_security_status status); + +struct grpc_channel_security_connector { + grpc_security_connector base; + grpc_call_credentials *request_metadata_creds; + void (*check_call_host)(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, const char *host, + grpc_auth_context *auth_context, + grpc_security_call_host_check_cb cb, void *user_data); + void (*do_handshake)(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, void *user_data); +}; + +/* Checks that the host that will be set for a call is acceptable. */ +void grpc_channel_security_connector_check_call_host( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_channel_security_connector *sc, + const char *host, grpc_auth_context *auth_context, + grpc_security_call_host_check_cb cb, void *user_data); + +/* Handshake. */ +void grpc_channel_security_connector_do_handshake( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_channel_security_connector *connector, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, + void *user_data); + +/* --- server_security_connector object. --- + + A server security connector object represents away to configure the + underlying transport security mechanism on the server side. */ + +typedef struct grpc_server_security_connector grpc_server_security_connector; + +struct grpc_server_security_connector { + grpc_security_connector base; + gpr_mu mu; + grpc_security_connector_handshake_list *handshaking_handshakes; + const grpc_channel_args *channel_args; + void (*do_handshake)(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_server_security_connector *sc, + grpc_tcp_server_acceptor *acceptor, + grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, void *user_data); +}; + +void grpc_server_security_connector_do_handshake( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_server_security_connector *sc, + grpc_tcp_server_acceptor *acceptor, grpc_endpoint *nonsecure_endpoint, + grpc_security_handshake_done_cb cb, void *user_data); + +void grpc_server_security_connector_shutdown( + grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_server_security_connector *connector); + +/* --- Creation security connectors. --- */ + +/* For TESTING ONLY! + Creates a fake connector that emulates real channel security. */ +grpc_channel_security_connector *grpc_fake_channel_security_connector_create( + grpc_call_credentials *request_metadata_creds); + +/* For TESTING ONLY! + Creates a fake connector that emulates real server security. */ +grpc_server_security_connector *grpc_fake_server_security_connector_create( + void); + +/* Config for ssl clients. */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char *pem_private_key; + size_t pem_private_key_size; + unsigned char *pem_cert_chain; + size_t pem_cert_chain_size; + unsigned char *pem_root_certs; + size_t pem_root_certs_size; +} grpc_ssl_config; + +/* Creates an SSL channel_security_connector. + - request_metadata_creds is the credentials object which metadata + will be sent with each request. This parameter can be NULL. + - config is the SSL config to be used for the SSL channel establishment. + - is_client should be 0 for a server or a non-0 value for a client. + - secure_peer_name is the secure peer name that should be checked in + grpc_channel_security_connector_check_peer. This parameter may be NULL in + which case the peer name will not be checked. Note that if this parameter + is not NULL, then, pem_root_certs should not be NULL either. + - sc is a pointer on the connector to be created. + This function returns GRPC_SECURITY_OK in case of success or a + specific error code otherwise. +*/ +grpc_security_status grpc_ssl_channel_security_connector_create( + grpc_call_credentials *request_metadata_creds, + const grpc_ssl_config *config, const char *target_name, + const char *overridden_target_name, grpc_channel_security_connector **sc); + +/* Gets the default ssl roots. */ +size_t grpc_get_default_ssl_roots(const unsigned char **pem_root_certs); + +/* Exposed for TESTING ONLY!. */ +gpr_slice grpc_get_default_ssl_roots_for_testing(void); + +/* Config for ssl servers. */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char **pem_private_keys; + size_t *pem_private_keys_sizes; + unsigned char **pem_cert_chains; + size_t *pem_cert_chains_sizes; + size_t num_key_cert_pairs; + unsigned char *pem_root_certs; + size_t pem_root_certs_size; + grpc_ssl_client_certificate_request_type client_certificate_request; +} grpc_ssl_server_config; + +/* Creates an SSL server_security_connector. + - config is the SSL config to be used for the SSL channel establishment. + - sc is a pointer on the connector to be created. + This function returns GRPC_SECURITY_OK in case of success or a + specific error code otherwise. +*/ +grpc_security_status grpc_ssl_server_security_connector_create( + const grpc_ssl_server_config *config, grpc_server_security_connector **sc); + +/* Util. */ +const tsi_peer_property *tsi_peer_get_property_by_name(const tsi_peer *peer, + const char *name); + +/* Exposed for testing only. */ +grpc_auth_context *tsi_ssl_peer_to_auth_context(const tsi_peer *peer); +tsi_peer tsi_shallow_peer_from_ssl_auth_context( + const grpc_auth_context *auth_context); +void tsi_shallow_peer_destruct(tsi_peer *peer); + +#endif /* GRPC_CORE_LIB_SECURITY_TRANSPORT_SECURITY_CONNECTOR_H */ diff --git a/src/core/lib/security/transport/server_auth_filter.c b/src/core/lib/security/transport/server_auth_filter.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..006a30f0c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/lib/security/transport/server_auth_filter.c @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright 2015, Google Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + * met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + * in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + * this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include <string.h> + +#include "src/core/lib/security/context/security_context.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/credentials/credentials.h" +#include "src/core/lib/security/transport/auth_filters.h" + +#include <grpc/support/alloc.h> +#include <grpc/support/log.h> + +typedef struct call_data { + grpc_metadata_batch *recv_initial_metadata; + /* Closure to call when finished with the auth_on_recv hook. */ + grpc_closure *on_done_recv; + /* Receive closures are chained: we inject this closure as the on_done_recv + up-call on transport_op, and remember to call our on_done_recv member after + handling it. */ + grpc_closure auth_on_recv; + grpc_transport_stream_op transport_op; + grpc_metadata_array md; + const grpc_metadata *consumed_md; + size_t num_consumed_md; + grpc_auth_context *auth_context; +} call_data; + +typedef struct channel_data { + grpc_auth_context *auth_context; + grpc_server_credentials *creds; +} channel_data; + +static grpc_metadata_array metadata_batch_to_md_array( + const grpc_metadata_batch *batch) { + grpc_linked_mdelem *l; + grpc_metadata_array result; + grpc_metadata_array_init(&result); + for (l = batch->list.head; l != NULL; l = l->next) { + grpc_metadata *usr_md = NULL; + grpc_mdelem *md = l->md; + grpc_mdstr *key = md->key; + grpc_mdstr *value = md->value; + if (result.count == result.capacity) { + result.capacity = GPR_MAX(result.capacity + 8, result.capacity * 2); + result.metadata = + gpr_realloc(result.metadata, result.capacity * sizeof(grpc_metadata)); + } + usr_md = &result.metadata[result.count++]; + usr_md->key = grpc_mdstr_as_c_string(key); + usr_md->value = grpc_mdstr_as_c_string(value); + usr_md->value_length = GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(value->slice); + } + return result; +} + +static grpc_mdelem *remove_consumed_md(void *user_data, grpc_mdelem *md) { + grpc_call_element *elem = user_data; + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < calld->num_consumed_md; i++) { + const grpc_metadata *consumed_md = &calld->consumed_md[i]; + /* Maybe we could do a pointer comparison but we do not have any guarantee + that the metadata processor used the same pointers for consumed_md in the + callback. */ + if (GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(md->key->slice) != strlen(consumed_md->key) || + GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(md->value->slice) != consumed_md->value_length) { + continue; + } + if (memcmp(GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(md->key->slice), consumed_md->key, + GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(md->key->slice)) == 0 && + memcmp(GPR_SLICE_START_PTR(md->value->slice), consumed_md->value, + GPR_SLICE_LENGTH(md->value->slice)) == 0) { + return NULL; /* Delete. */ + } + } + return md; +} + +/* called from application code */ +static void on_md_processing_done( + void *user_data, const grpc_metadata *consumed_md, size_t num_consumed_md, + const grpc_metadata *response_md, size_t num_response_md, + grpc_status_code status, const char *error_details) { + grpc_call_element *elem = user_data; + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + grpc_exec_ctx exec_ctx = GRPC_EXEC_CTX_INIT; + + /* TODO(jboeuf): Implement support for response_md. */ + if (response_md != NULL && num_response_md > 0) { + gpr_log(GPR_INFO, + "response_md in auth metadata processing not supported for now. " + "Ignoring..."); + } + + if (status == GRPC_STATUS_OK) { + calld->consumed_md = consumed_md; + calld->num_consumed_md = num_consumed_md; + grpc_metadata_batch_filter(calld->recv_initial_metadata, remove_consumed_md, + elem); + grpc_metadata_array_destroy(&calld->md); + calld->on_done_recv->cb(&exec_ctx, calld->on_done_recv->cb_arg, 1); + } else { + gpr_slice message; + grpc_transport_stream_op close_op; + memset(&close_op, 0, sizeof(close_op)); + grpc_metadata_array_destroy(&calld->md); + error_details = error_details != NULL + ? error_details + : "Authentication metadata processing failed."; + message = gpr_slice_from_copied_string(error_details); + calld->transport_op.send_initial_metadata = NULL; + if (calld->transport_op.send_message != NULL) { + grpc_byte_stream_destroy(&exec_ctx, calld->transport_op.send_message); + calld->transport_op.send_message = NULL; + } + calld->transport_op.send_trailing_metadata = NULL; + grpc_transport_stream_op_add_close(&close_op, status, &message); + grpc_call_next_op(&exec_ctx, elem, &close_op); + calld->on_done_recv->cb(&exec_ctx, calld->on_done_recv->cb_arg, 0); + } + + grpc_exec_ctx_finish(&exec_ctx); +} + +static void auth_on_recv(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, void *user_data, + bool success) { + grpc_call_element *elem = user_data; + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + if (success) { + if (chand->creds->processor.process != NULL) { + calld->md = metadata_batch_to_md_array(calld->recv_initial_metadata); + chand->creds->processor.process( + chand->creds->processor.state, calld->auth_context, + calld->md.metadata, calld->md.count, on_md_processing_done, elem); + return; + } + } + calld->on_done_recv->cb(exec_ctx, calld->on_done_recv->cb_arg, success); +} + +static void set_recv_ops_md_callbacks(grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_transport_stream_op *op) { + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + + if (op->recv_initial_metadata != NULL) { + /* substitute our callback for the higher callback */ + calld->recv_initial_metadata = op->recv_initial_metadata; + calld->on_done_recv = op->recv_initial_metadata_ready; + op->recv_initial_metadata_ready = &calld->auth_on_recv; + calld->transport_op = *op; + } +} + +/* Called either: + - in response to an API call (or similar) from above, to send something + - a network event (or similar) from below, to receive something + op contains type and call direction information, in addition to the data + that is being sent or received. */ +static void auth_start_transport_op(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_transport_stream_op *op) { + set_recv_ops_md_callbacks(elem, op); + grpc_call_next_op(exec_ctx, elem, op); +} + +/* Constructor for call_data */ +static void init_call_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_call_element_args *args) { + /* grab pointers to our data from the call element */ + call_data *calld = elem->call_data; + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + grpc_server_security_context *server_ctx = NULL; + + /* initialize members */ + memset(calld, 0, sizeof(*calld)); + grpc_closure_init(&calld->auth_on_recv, auth_on_recv, elem); + + if (args->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].value != NULL) { + args->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].destroy( + args->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].value); + } + + server_ctx = grpc_server_security_context_create(); + server_ctx->auth_context = grpc_auth_context_create(chand->auth_context); + calld->auth_context = server_ctx->auth_context; + + args->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].value = server_ctx; + args->context[GRPC_CONTEXT_SECURITY].destroy = + grpc_server_security_context_destroy; +} + +static void set_pollset(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call_element *elem, + grpc_pollset *pollset) {} + +/* Destructor for call_data */ +static void destroy_call_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, grpc_call_element *elem, + void *ignored) {} + +/* Constructor for channel_data */ +static void init_channel_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_element *elem, + grpc_channel_element_args *args) { + grpc_auth_context *auth_context = + grpc_find_auth_context_in_args(args->channel_args); + grpc_server_credentials *creds = + grpc_find_server_credentials_in_args(args->channel_args); + /* grab pointers to our data from the channel element */ + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + + GPR_ASSERT(!args->is_last); + GPR_ASSERT(auth_context != NULL); + GPR_ASSERT(creds != NULL); + + /* initialize members */ + chand->auth_context = + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_REF(auth_context, "server_auth_filter"); + chand->creds = grpc_server_credentials_ref(creds); +} + +/* Destructor for channel data */ +static void destroy_channel_elem(grpc_exec_ctx *exec_ctx, + grpc_channel_element *elem) { + /* grab pointers to our data from the channel element */ + channel_data *chand = elem->channel_data; + GRPC_AUTH_CONTEXT_UNREF(chand->auth_context, "server_auth_filter"); + grpc_server_credentials_unref(chand->creds); +} + +const grpc_channel_filter grpc_server_auth_filter = { + auth_start_transport_op, grpc_channel_next_op, sizeof(call_data), + init_call_elem, set_pollset, destroy_call_elem, + sizeof(channel_data), init_channel_elem, destroy_channel_elem, + grpc_call_next_get_peer, "server-auth"}; 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