| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Not yet used by git-annex, but this will allow faster transfers etc than
using individual ssh connections and rsync.
Not called git-annex-shell p2p, because git-annex p2p does something
else and I don't want two subcommands with the same name between the two
for sanity reasons.
This commit was sponsored by Øyvind Andersen Holm.
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This is a big scary change. I have convinced myself it should be safe. I
hope!
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service over tor.
This way we know that after enable-tor, the tor hidden service is fully
published and working, and so there should be no problems with it at
pairing time.
It has to start up its own temporary listener on the hidden service. It
would be nice to have it start the remotedaemon running, so that extra
step is not needed afterwards. But, there may already be a remotedaemon
running, in communication with the assistant and we don't want to start
another one. I thought about trying to HUP any running remotedaemon, but
Windows does not make it easy to do that. In any case, having the user
start the remotedaemon themselves lets them know it needs to be running
to serve the hidden service.
This commit was sponsored by Boyd Stephen Smith Jr. on Patreon.
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This reverts commit 6c089cff615bc44ca94cc4ca77dc69f281dd2ab8.
Commit contained incomplete work.
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The attacker could just send a very lot of data, with no \n and it would
all be buffered in memory until the kernel killed git-annex or perhaps OOM
killed some other more valuable process.
This is a low impact security hole, only affecting communication between
local git-annex and git-annex-shell on the remote system. (With either
able to be the attacker). Only those with the right ssh key can do it. And,
there are probably lots of ways to construct git repositories that make git
use a lot of memory in various ways, which would have similar impact as
this attack.
The fix in P2P/IO.hs would have been higher impact, if it had made it to a
released version, since it would have allowed DOSing the tor hidden
service without needing to authenticate.
(The LockContent and NotifyChanges instances may not be really
exploitable; since the line is read and ignored, it probably gets read
lazily and does not end up staying buffered in memory.)
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So we get some useful error messages when things fail.
This commit was sponsored by Peter Hogg on Patreon.
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The switch to hGetMetered subtly changed the laziness of how DATA was
read, and broke git protocol relaying. Fix by sending received data to
the git process's stdin immediately, which ensures that the lazy
bytestring is all read from the peer before going on to process the next
message from the peer.
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Display progress meter on send and receive from remote.
Added a new hGetMetered that can read an exact number of bytes (or
less), updating a meter as it goes.
This commit was sponsored by Andreas on Patreon.
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This commit was sponsored by Thom May on Patreon.
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It's possible, in direct or thin mode, that an object file gets
truncated or appended to as it's being sent. This would break the
protocol badly, so make sure never to send too many bytes, and to
close the protocol connection if too few bytes are available.
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This will allow a runner in the Annex monad.
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This commit was sponsored by Ethan Aubin.
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Joey Hess