| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
of numeric values.
Similarly (well, for free), support preferred content expressions like
metadata=field<number and metadata=field>number
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
This reverts commit d11b032bd86ebe69f1d08e382bd83370db8ea9b9.
This seems to have caused a memory leak.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Fixes a minor fd leak, never more than 1 in normal use,
which broke the test suite when I tried to write to
a file that was still open for a previous hashing.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
sideAction is for things not generally related to the current action being
performed. And, it adds a newline after the side action. This was not the
right thing to use for stuff like "checksum", where doing a checksum is
part of the git annex get process, and indeed we want it to display
"(checksum...) ok"
|
| |
|
|
| |
No behavior changes.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
using the cryptonite library.
While cryptohash has SHA3 support, it has not been updated for the final
version of the spec. Note that cryptonite has not been ported to all arches
that cryptohash builds on yet.
|
| |
|
|
| |
now moved to the bad directory, and the fsck proceeds. Before, the fsck immediately failed.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This way, if a system's sha1sum etc is broken, it will be tried if
git-annex was built to use it, but at least it will fall back to using
internal hashing when it fails.
A side benefit of this is that hashFile consistently throws an IOError if
the file is unable to be read. In particular, if the disk is failing with
IO errors, and external hash command is used, it used to throw a user error
with the error message from externalSHA. Now, the external hash command
will fail, that message will be printed as a warning, and it'll fall back
to the internal hash command. If the disk IO error is not intermittent, it
will re-occur, and so an IOError will be thrown.
Of course, this can mean it reads a file twice, but only in edge cases.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
generate URL keys.
This is especially useful because the caller doesn't need to generate valid
url keys, which involves some escaping of characters, and may involve
taking a md5sum of the url if it's too long.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
This will prevent backporting to wheezy, but it's time to simplify the
code.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Avoid using fileSize which maxes out at just 2 gb on Windows.
Instead, use hFileSize, which doesn't have a bounded size.
Fixes support for files > 2 gb on Windows.
Note that the InodeCache code only needs to compare a file size,
so it doesn't matter it the file size wraps. So it has been
left as-is. This was necessary both to avoid invalidating existing inode
caches, and because the code passed FileStatus around and would have become
more expensive if it called getFileSize.
This commit was sponsored by Christian Dietrich.
|
| |
|
|
| |
used for SHA256, so as to not break on systems like Windows that have very small maximum path length limits.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This fixes all instances of " \t" in the code base. Most common case
seems to be after a "where" line; probably vim copied the two space layout
of that line.
Done as a background task while listening to episode 2 of the Type Theory
podcast.
|
| |
|
|
| |
repository, rather than just the file's base name. Note that if you're relying on such things to keep files separate with WORM, you should really be using a better backend.
|
| |
|
|
| |
subdirectory in the key name.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This only performs some basic tests so far; no testing of chunking or
resuming. Also, the existing encryption type of the remote is used; it
would be good later to derive an encrypted and a non-encrypted version of
the remote and test them both.
This commit was sponsored by Joseph Liu.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Needed for resuming from chunks.
Url keys are considered not stable. I considered treating url keys with a
known size as stable, but just don't feel that is enough information.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Added new fields for chunk number, and chunk size. These will not appear
in normal keys ever, but will be used for chunked data stored on special
remotes.
This commit was sponsored by Jouni K Seppanen.
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
This is useful because it shows users which files it checksums, vs ones
that are not present, or don't use a hash backend, or --fast
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Note that the hash backends were made to stop printing a (checksum..)
message as part of this, since it showed up without a file when deciding
whether to act on a file. Should have probably removed that message a while
ago anyway, I suppose.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
FAT has a lot of characters it does not allow in filenames, like ? and *
It's probably the worst offender, but other filesystems also have
limitiations.
In 2011, I made keyFile escape : to handle FAT, but missed the other
characters. It also turns out that when I did that, I was also living
dangerously; any existing keys that contained a : had their object
location change. Oops.
So, adding new characters to escape to keyFile is out. Well, it would be
possible to make keyFile behave differently on a per-filesystem basis, but
this would be a real nightmare to get right. Consider that a rsync special
remote uses keyFile to determine the filenames to use, and we don't know
the underlying filesystem on the rsync server..
Instead, I have gone for a solution that is backwards compatable and
simple. Its only downside is that already generated URL and WORM keys
might not be able to be stored on FAT or some other filesystem that
dislikes a character used in the key. (In this case, the user can just
migrate the problem keys to a checksumming backend. If this became a big
problem, fsck could be made to detect these and suggest a migration.)
Going forward, new keys that are created will escape all characters that
are likely to cause problems. And if some filesystem comes along that's
even worse than FAT (seems unlikely, but here it is 2013, and people are
still using FAT!), additional characters can be added to the set that are
escaped without difficulty.
(Also, made WORM limit the part of the filename that is embedded in the key,
to deal with filesystem filename length limits. This could have already
been a problem, but is more likely now, since the escaping of the filename
can make it longer.)
This commit was sponsored by Ian Downes
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Mostly for the debian stable autobuilds, which have a too old version
to use the Crypto.Hash module.
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
SHA3 is still waiting for final standardization.
Although this is looking less likely given
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/joseph-lorenzo-hall/2409-nist-sha-3
In the meantime, cryptohash implements skein, and it's used by some of the
haskell ecosystem (for yesod sessions, IIRC), so this implementation is
likely to continue working. Also, I've talked with the cryprohash author
and he's a reasonable guy.
It makes sense to have an alternate high security hash, in case some
horrible attack is found against SHA2 tomorrow, or in case SHA3 comes out
and worst fears are realized.
I'd also like to support using skein for HMAC. But no hurry there and
a new version of cryptohash has much nicer HMAC code, so I will probably
wait until I can use that version.
|
| |
|
|
| |
test suite still passes
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is a massive win on OSX, which doesn't have a sha256sum normally.
Only use external hash commands when the file is > 1 mb,
since cryptohash is quite close to them in speed.
SHA is still used to calculate HMACs. I don't quite understand
cryptohash's API for those.
Used the following benchmark to arrive at the 1 mb number.
1 mb file:
benchmarking sha256/internal
mean: 13.86696 ms, lb 13.83010 ms, ub 13.93453 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 249.3235 us, lb 162.0448 us, ub 458.1744 us, ci 0.950
found 5 outliers among 100 samples (5.0%)
4 (4.0%) high mild
1 (1.0%) high severe
variance introduced by outliers: 10.415%
variance is moderately inflated by outliers
benchmarking sha256/external
mean: 14.20670 ms, lb 14.17237 ms, ub 14.27004 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 230.5448 us, lb 150.7310 us, ub 427.6068 us, ci 0.950
found 3 outliers among 100 samples (3.0%)
2 (2.0%) high mild
1 (1.0%) high severe
2 mb file:
benchmarking sha256/internal
mean: 26.44270 ms, lb 26.23701 ms, ub 26.63414 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 1.012303 ms, lb 925.8921 us, ub 1.122267 ms, ci 0.950
variance introduced by outliers: 35.540%
variance is moderately inflated by outliers
benchmarking sha256/external
mean: 26.84521 ms, lb 26.77644 ms, ub 26.91433 ms, ci 0.950
std dev: 347.7867 us, lb 210.6283 us, ub 571.3351 us, ci 0.950
found 6 outliers among 100 samples (6.0%)
import Crypto.Hash
import Data.ByteString.Lazy as L
import Criterion.Main
import Common
testfile :: FilePath
testfile = "/run/shm/data" -- on ram disk
main = defaultMain
[ bgroup "sha256"
[ bench "internal" $ whnfIO internal
, bench "external" $ whnfIO external
]
]
sha256 :: L.ByteString -> Digest SHA256
sha256 = hashlazy
internal :: IO String
internal = show . sha256 <$> L.readFile testfile
external :: IO String
external = do
s <- readProcess "sha256sum" [testfile]
return $ fst $ separate (== ' ') s
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
maximum filename length limit.
Started with a problem when running addurl on a really long url,
because the whole url is munged into the filename. Ended up doing
a fairly extensive review for places where filenames could get too large,
although it's hard to say I'm not missed any..
Backend.Url had a 128 character limit, which is fine when the limit is 255,
but not if it's a lot shorter on some systems. So check the pathconf()
limit. Note that this could result in fromUrl creating different keys
for the same url, if run on systems with different limits. I don't see
this is likely to cause any problems. That can already happen when using
addurl --fast, or if the content of an url changes.
Both Command.AddUrl and Backend.Url assumed that urls don't contain a
lot of multi-byte unicode, and would fail to truncate an url that did
properly.
A few places use a filename as the template to make a temp file.
While that's nice in that the temp file name can be easily related back to
the original filename, it could lead to `git annex add` failing to add a
filename that was at or close to the maximum length.
Note that in Command.Add.lockdown, the template is still derived from the
filename, just with enough space left to turn it into a temp file.
This is an important optimisation, because the assistant may lock down
a bunch of files all at once, and using the same template for all of them
would cause openTempFile to iterate through the same set of names,
looking for an unused temp file. I'm not very happy with the relatedTemplate
hack, but it avoids that slowdown.
Backend.WORM does not limit the filename stored in the key.
I have not tried to change that; so git annex add will fail on really long
filenames when using the WORM backend. It seems better to preserve the
invariant that a WORM key always contains the complete filename, since
the filename is the only unique material in the key, other than mtime and
size. Since nobody has complained about add failing (I think I saw it
once?) on WORM, probably it's ok, or nobody but me uses it.
There may be compatability problems if using git annex addurl --fast
or the WORM backend on a system with the 255 limit and then trying to use
that repo in a system with a smaller limit. I have not tried to deal with
those.
This commit was sponsored by Alexander Brem. Thanks!
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Run the same code git-annex used to get the sha, including its sanity
checking. Much better than old grep. Should detect FreeBSD systems with
sha commands that output in stange format.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
appears to be a real sha.
This after fielding a bug where git-annex was built with a sha256 program
whose output checked out, but was then run with one that output lines
like:
SHA256 (file) = <sha here>
Which it then parsed as having a SHA256 of "SHA256"!
Now the output of the command is required to be of the right length,
and contain only the right characters.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
I think I've been looking for that function for some time.
Ie, I remember wanting to collapse Just Nothing to Nothing.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
* SHA*E backends: Exclude non-alphanumeric characters from extensions.
* migrate: Remove leading \ in SHA* checksums, and non-alphanumerics
from extensions of SHA*E keys.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Bugfix: Remove leading \ from checksums output by sha*sum commands,
when the filename contains \ or a newline. Closes: #696384
* fsck: Still accept checksums with a leading \ as valid, now that
above bug is fixed.
* migrate: Remove leading \ in checksums
|
| | |
|
| |
|
|
| |
files and reading from checksum commands.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The default backend used when adding files to the annex is changed from
SHA256 to SHA256E, to simplify interoperability with OSX, media players,
and various programs that needlessly look at symlink targets.
To get old behavior, add a .gitattributes containing: * annex.backend=SHA256
|
| |
|
|
| |
extensions, as added in 3.20120721.
|
| | |
|
Joey Hess
Joey Hess
Joey Hess