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No changes from 6.20170228; a new version number was needed due to a problem with Hackage.
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Display it as a separate action, so it ends with a newline
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Just totally wrong logic, oops. Caught by test suite.
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* init: When annex.securehashesonly has been set with git-annex config,
copy that value to the annex.securehashesonly git config.
* config --set: As well as setting value in git-annex branch,
set local gitconfig. This is needed especially for
annex.securehashesonly, which is read only from local gitconfig and not
the git-annex branch.
doc/todo/sha1_collision_embedding_in_git-annex_keys.mdwn has the
rationalle for doing it this way. There's no perfect solution; this
seems to be the least-bad one.
This commit was supported by the NSF-funded DataLad project.
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This avoids sending all the data to a remote, only to have it reject it
because it has annex.securehashesonly set. It assumes that local and
remote will have the same annex.securehashesonly setting in most cases.
If a remote does not have that set, and local does, the remote won't get
some content it would otherwise accept.
Also avoids downloading data that will not be added to the local object
store due to annex.securehashesonly.
Note that, while encrypted special remotes use a GPGHMAC key variety,
which is not collisiton resistent, Transfers are not used for such
keys, so this check is avoided. Which is what we want, so encrypted
special remotes still work.
This commit was sponsored by Ewen McNeill.
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Added --securehash option to match files using a secure hash function, and
corresponding securehash preferred content expression.
This commit was sponsored by Ethan Aubin.
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collisions with git-annex
This commit was sponsored by andrea rota.
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Cryptographically secure hashes can be forced to be used in a repository,
by setting annex.securehashesonly. This does not prevent the git repository
from containing files with insecure hashes, but it does prevent the content
of such files from being pulled into .git/annex/objects from another
repository.
We want to make sure that at no point does git-annex accept content into
.git/annex/objects that is hashed with an insecure key. Here's how it
was done:
* .git/annex/objects/xx/yy/KEY/ is kept frozen, so nothing can be
written to it normally
* So every place that writes content must call, thawContent or modifyContent.
We can audit for these, and be sure we've considered all cases.
* The main functions are moveAnnex, and linkToAnnex; these were made to
check annex.securehashesonly, and are the main security boundary
for annex.securehashesonly.
* Most other calls to modifyContent deal with other files in the KEY
directory (inode cache etc). The other ones that mess with the content
are:
- Annex.Direct.toDirectGen, in which content already in the
annex directory is moved to the direct mode file, so not relevant.
- fix and lock, which don't add new content
- Command.ReKey.linkKey, which manually unlocks it to make a
copy.
* All other calls to thawContent appear safe.
Made moveAnnex return a Bool, so checked all callsites and made them
deal with a failure in appropriate ways.
linkToAnnex simply returns LinkAnnexFailed; all callsites already deal
with it failing in appropriate ways.
This commit was sponsored by Riku Voipio.
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Note that GPGHMAC keys are not cryptographically secure, because their
content has no relation to the name of the key. So, things that use this
function to avoid sending keys to a remote will need to special case in
support for those keys. If GPGHMAC keys were accepted as
cryptographically secure, symlinks using them could be committed to a
git repo, and their content would be accepted into the repo, with no
guarantee that two repos got the same content, which is what we're aiming
to prevent.
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Broken by recent changes to other targets
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Building with that library made git-annex not support SHA3; it's time for
that to always be supported in case SHA2 dominoes.
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Yesterday's SHA1 collision attack could be used to generate eg:
SHA256-sfoo--whatever.good
SHA256-sfoo--whatever.bad
Such that they collide. A repository with the good one could have the
bad one swapped in and signed commits would still verify.
I've already mitigated this.
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2f868db90c7ba16eee901b9b1472b1e1a889dd93 changed the Read instance for
Key.
I've checked all uses of that instance (by removing it and seeing what
breaks), and they're all limited to the webapp, except one.
That is GitAnnexDistribution's Read instance.
So, 2f868db90c7ba16eee901b9b1472b1e1a889dd93 would have broken upgrades
of git-annex from downloads.kitenet.net. Once the .info files there got
updated for a new release, old releases would have failed to parse them
and never upgraded.
To fix this, I found a way to make the .info files that contain
GitAnnexDistribution values be readable by the old version of git-annex.
This commit was sponsored by Ewen McNeill.
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This reverts commit d884cdfbed61fa451c54562711ab5a12f41a7f7a.
todo is not ready yet
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Where before the "name" of a key and a backend was a string, this makes
it a concrete data type.
This is groundwork for allowing some varieties of keys to be disabled
in file2key, so git-annex won't use them at all.
Benchmarks ran in my big repo:
old git-annex info:
real 0m3.338s
user 0m3.124s
sys 0m0.244s
new git-annex info:
real 0m3.216s
user 0m3.024s
sys 0m0.220s
new git-annex find:
real 0m7.138s
user 0m6.924s
sys 0m0.252s
old git-annex find:
real 0m7.433s
user 0m7.240s
sys 0m0.232s
Surprising result; I'd have expected it to be slower since it now parses
all the key varieties. But, the parser is very simple and perhaps
sharing KeyVarieties uses less memory or something like that.
This commit was supported by the NSF-funded DataLad project.
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Joey Hess
yarikoptic
dvicory
zpeters
michalrus
openmedi