summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/doc/design/encryption.mdwn
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorGravatar Joey Hess <joey@kitenet.net>2011-04-03 15:51:24 -0400
committerGravatar Joey Hess <joey@kitenet.net>2011-04-03 15:51:24 -0400
commit261b1e6310885fcad3b50c8cd7240ccdc5ed54a9 (patch)
tree9d213eb14b92c7abf971fba36c2c3f81b4b8d37a /doc/design/encryption.mdwn
parent0d1f2023340dd30e81bc003144a37e0fe03c333b (diff)
update
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/design/encryption.mdwn')
-rw-r--r--doc/design/encryption.mdwn7
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/design/encryption.mdwn b/doc/design/encryption.mdwn
index 72a7ad286..0242aabeb 100644
--- a/doc/design/encryption.mdwn
+++ b/doc/design/encryption.mdwn
@@ -102,8 +102,11 @@ could have already decrypted the cipher and stored a copy.
If git-annex stores the decrypted symmetric cipher in memory, then there
is a risk that it could be intercepted from there by an attacker. Gpg
-amelorates these type of risks by using locked memory.
-
+amelorates these type of risks by using locked memory. For git-annex, note
+that an attacker with local machine access can tell at least all the
+filenames and metadata of files stored in the encrypted remote anyway,
+and can access whatever content is stored locally.
+
This design does not support obfuscating the size of files by chunking
them, as that would have added a lot of complexity, for dubious benefits.
If the untrusted party running the encrypted remote wants to know file sizes,