avoid the dashed ssh hostname class of security holes

Security fix: Disallow hostname starting with a dash, which would get
passed to ssh and be treated an option. This could be used by an attacker
who provides a crafted ssh url (for eg a git remote) to execute arbitrary
code via ssh -oProxyCommand.

No CVE has yet been assigned for this hole.
The same class of security hole recently affected git itself,
CVE-2017-1000117.

Method: Identified all places where ssh is run, by git grep '"ssh"'
Converted them all to use a SshHost, if they did not already, for
specifying the hostname.

SshHost was made a data type with a smart constructor, which rejects
hostnames starting with '-'.

Note that git-annex already contains extensive use of Utility.SafeCommand,
which fixes a similar class of problem where a filename starting with a
dash gets passed to a program which treats it as an option.

This commit was sponsored by Jochen Bartl on Patreon.

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/Git/Ssh.hs b/Git/Ssh.hs
index 206e72113..3c9b23905 100644
--- a/Git/Ssh.hs
+++ b/Git/Ssh.hs
@@ -5,10 +5,11 @@
  - Licensed under the GNU GPL version 3 or higher.
  -}
 
-module Git.Ssh where
+module Git.Ssh (module Git.Ssh, module Utility.SshHost) where
 
 import Common
 import Utility.Env
+import Utility.SshHost
 
 import Data.Char
 
@@ -21,9 +22,6 @@ gitSshCommandEnv = "GIT_SSH_COMMAND"
 gitSshEnvSet :: IO Bool
 gitSshEnvSet = anyM (isJust <$$> getEnv) [gitSshEnv, gitSshCommandEnv]
 
--- Either a hostname, or user@host
-type SshHost = String
-
 type SshPort = Integer
 
 -- Command to run on the remote host. It is run by the shell
@@ -59,8 +57,8 @@ gitSsh' host mp cmd extrasshparams = do
 
 	-- Git passes exactly these parameters to the ssh command.
 	gitps = map Param $ case mp of
-		Nothing -> [host, cmd]
-		Just p -> [host, "-p", show p, cmd]
+		Nothing -> [fromSshHost host, cmd]
+		Just p -> [fromSshHost host, "-p", show p, cmd]
 
 	-- Passing any extra parameters to the ssh command may
 	-- break some commands.