diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c | 2986 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2986 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c deleted file mode 100644 index f30e8eb7c5..0000000000 --- a/third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2986 +0,0 @@ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ - -#include <openssl/ssl.h> - -#include <assert.h> -#include <limits.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include <openssl/bytestring.h> -#include <openssl/digest.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#include <openssl/mem.h> -#include <openssl/obj.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> - -#include "internal.h" - - -static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); -static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); - -const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { - tls1_prf, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - tls1_export_keying_material, - 0, -}; - -const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { - tls1_prf, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - tls1_export_keying_material, - SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, -}; - -const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { - tls1_prf, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - tls1_export_keying_material, - SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF - |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, -}; - -static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) { - uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1); - uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2); - if (u1 < u2) { - return -1; - } else if (u1 > u2) { - return 1; - } else { - return 0; - } -} - -/* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be - * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. - * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those - * out. */ -static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) { - CBS extensions = *cbs; - size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; - uint16_t *extension_types = NULL; - int ret = 0; - - /* First pass: count the extensions. */ - while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) { - uint16_t type; - CBS extension; - - if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { - goto done; - } - - num_extensions++; - } - - if (num_extensions == 0) { - return 1; - } - - extension_types = - (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions); - if (extension_types == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto done; - } - - /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ - extensions = *cbs; - for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { - CBS extension; - - if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { - /* This should not happen. */ - goto done; - } - } - assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0); - - /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ - qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t); - for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { - if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) { - goto done; - } - } - - ret = 1; - -done: - OPENSSL_free(extension_types); - return ret; -} - -char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) { - CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions; - - CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len); - - if (/* Skip client version. */ - !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2) || - /* Skip client nonce. */ - !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32) || - /* Extract session_id. */ - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) { - return 0; - } - - ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id); - ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id); - - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl)) { - CBS cookie; - - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) { - return 0; - } - } - - /* Extract cipher_suites. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) || - CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0) { - return 0; - } - ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites); - ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites); - - /* Extract compression_methods. */ - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) || - CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) { - return 0; - } - ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods); - ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods); - - /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any - * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */ - if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) { - ctx->extensions = NULL; - ctx->extensions_len = 0; - return 1; - } - - /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) || - !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) || - CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) { - return 0; - } - ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions); - ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions); - - return 1; -} - -char SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get( - const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type, - const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) { - CBS extensions; - - CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len); - - while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { - uint16_t type; - CBS extension; - - /* Decode the next extension. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { - return 0; - } - - if (type == extension_type) { - *out_data = CBS_data(&extension); - *out_len = CBS_len(&extension); - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -struct tls_curve { - uint16_t curve_id; - int nid; - const char curve_name[8]; -}; - -/* ECC curves from RFC4492. */ -static const struct tls_curve tls_curves[] = { - {21, NID_secp224r1, "P-224"}, - {23, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "P-256"}, - {24, NID_secp384r1, "P-384"}, - {25, NID_secp521r1, "P-521"}, -}; - -static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = { - 23, /* X9_62_prime256v1 */ - 24, /* secp384r1 */ -#if defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM) - 25, /* secp521r1 */ -#endif -}; - -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id) { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) { - if (curve_id == tls_curves[i].curve_id) { - return tls_curves[i].nid; - } - } - return NID_undef; -} - -int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(uint16_t *out_curve_id, int nid) { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) { - if (nid == tls_curves[i].nid) { - *out_curve_id = tls_curves[i].curve_id; - return 1; - } - } - return 0; -} - -const char* tls1_ec_curve_id2name(uint16_t curve_id) { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) { - if (curve_id == tls_curves[i].curve_id) { - return tls_curves[i].curve_name; - } - } - return NULL; -} - -/* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the - * list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero, return the - * peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */ -static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_peer_curves, - const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, - size_t *out_curve_ids_len) { - if (get_peer_curves) { - /* Only clients send a curve list, so this function is only called - * on the server. */ - assert(s->server); - *out_curve_ids = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist; - *out_curve_ids_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length; - return; - } - - *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; - if (!*out_curve_ids) { - *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default; - *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]); - } -} - -int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) { - uint8_t curve_type; - uint16_t curve_id; - const uint16_t *curves; - size_t curves_len, i; - - /* Only support named curves. */ - if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) || - curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || - !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) { - return 0; - } - - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len); - for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { - if (curve_id == curves[i]) { - *out_curve_id = curve_id; - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s) { - const uint16_t *curves, *peer_curves, *pref, *supp; - size_t curves_len, peer_curves_len, pref_len, supp_len, i, j; - - /* Can't do anything on client side */ - if (s->server == 0) { - return NID_undef; - } - - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0 /* local curves */, &curves, &curves_len); - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1 /* peer curves */, &peer_curves, &peer_curves_len); - - if (peer_curves_len == 0) { - /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this - * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492, - * section 4, paragraph 3. */ - return (curves_len == 0) ? NID_undef : tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curves[0]); - } - - if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) { - pref = curves; - pref_len = curves_len; - supp = peer_curves; - supp_len = peer_curves_len; - } else { - pref = peer_curves; - pref_len = peer_curves_len; - supp = curves; - supp_len = curves_len; - } - - for (i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < supp_len; j++) { - if (pref[i] == supp[j]) { - return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]); - } - } - } - - return NID_undef; -} - -int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len, - const int *curves, size_t ncurves) { - uint16_t *curve_ids; - size_t i; - - curve_ids = (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t)); - if (curve_ids == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) { - if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_ids[i], curves[i])) { - OPENSSL_free(curve_ids); - return 0; - } - } - - OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids); - *out_curve_ids = curve_ids; - *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves; - - return 1; -} - -/* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the - * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on - * success and zero on failure. */ -static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, - uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) { - int nid; - uint16_t id; - const EC_GROUP *grp; - - if (ec == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); - if (grp == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - /* Determine curve ID */ - nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); - if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&id, nid)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not supported. */ - *out_curve_id = id; - - if (out_comp_id) { - if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) { - return 0; - } - if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { - *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; - } else { - *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -/* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our - * and the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our - * preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */ -static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id) { - const uint16_t *curves; - size_t curves_len, i, get_peer_curves; - - /* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */ - for (get_peer_curves = 0; get_peer_curves <= 1; get_peer_curves++) { - if (get_peer_curves && !s->server) { - /* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a client, only - * check our list. */ - continue; - } - - tls1_get_curvelist(s, get_peer_curves, &curves, &curves_len); - if (get_peer_curves && curves_len == 0) { - /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this - * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492, - * section 4, paragraph 3. */ - continue; - } - for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { - if (curves[i] == curve_id) { - break; - } - } - - if (i == curves_len) { - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x) { - int ret = 0; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); - uint16_t curve_id; - uint8_t comp_id; - - if (!pkey || - pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC || - !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec) || - !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) || - comp_id != TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { - goto done; - } - - ret = 1; - -done: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return ret; -} - -int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s) { - if (s->cert->ecdh_nid != NID_undef) { - /* If the curve is preconfigured, ECDH is acceptable iff the peer supports - * the curve. */ - uint16_t curve_id; - return tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_id, s->cert->ecdh_nid) && - tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id); - } - - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) { - /* Assume the callback will provide an acceptable curve. */ - return 1; - } - - /* Otherwise, the curve gets selected automatically. ECDH is acceptable iff - * there is a shared curve. */ - return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef; -} - -/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this - * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */ - -#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, - -#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, - -#define tlsext_sigalg(md) tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) - -static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = { - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) -}; - -size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const uint8_t **psigs) { - *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; - return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); -} - -/* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of |cbs|. It - * checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported signature algorithms and, - * if so, writes the relevant digest into |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it - * returns 0 and writes an alert into |*out_alert|. */ -int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, SSL *s, - CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { - const uint8_t *sent_sigs; - size_t sent_sigslen, i; - int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey->type); - uint8_t hash, signature; - - /* Should never happen */ - if (sigalg == -1) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) || - !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ - if (sigalg != signature) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - uint16_t curve_id; - uint8_t comp_id; - /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ - if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (s->server && (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) || - comp_id != TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ - sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); - for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { - if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1]) { - break; - } - } - - /* Allow fallback to SHA-1. */ - if (i == sent_sigslen && hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - - *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash); - if (*out_md == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't - * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike - * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global - * settings. */ -void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) { - CERT *c = s->cert; - const uint8_t *sigalgs; - size_t i, sigalgslen; - int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; - c->mask_a = 0; - c->mask_k = 0; - - /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ - if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) { - c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - } else { - c->mask_ssl = 0; - } - - /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA, - * DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */ - sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); - for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { - switch (sigalgs[1]) { - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: - have_rsa = 1; - break; - - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: - have_ecdsa = 1; - break; - } - } - - /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */ - if (!have_rsa) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; - } - if (!have_ecdsa) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; - } - - /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ - if (!s->psk_client_callback) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; - } -} - -/* tls_extension represents a TLS extension that is handled internally. The - * |init| function is called for each handshake, before any other functions of - * the extension. Then the add and parse callbacks are called as needed. - * - * The parse callbacks receive a |CBS| that contains the contents of the - * extension (i.e. not including the type and length bytes). If an extension is - * not received then the parse callbacks will be called with a NULL CBS so that - * they can do any processing needed to handle the absence of an extension. - * - * The add callbacks receive a |CBB| to which the extension can be appended but - * the function is responsible for appending the type and length bytes too. - * - * All callbacks return one for success and zero for error. If a parse function - * returns zero then a fatal alert with value |*out_alert| will be sent. If - * |*out_alert| isn't set, then a |decode_error| alert will be sent. */ -struct tls_extension { - uint16_t value; - void (*init)(SSL *ssl); - - int (*add_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out); - int (*parse_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents); - - int (*parse_clienthello)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents); - int (*add_serverhello)(SSL *ssl, CBB *out); -}; - - -/* Server name indication (SNI). - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3. */ - -static void ext_sni_init(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 0; -} - -static int ext_sni_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents, server_name_list, name; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &server_name_list) || - !CBB_add_u8(&server_name_list, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &name) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&name, (const uint8_t *)ssl->tlsext_hostname, - strlen(ssl->tlsext_hostname)) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sni_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - assert(ssl->tlsext_hostname != NULL); - - if (!ssl->hit) { - assert(ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL); - ssl->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(ssl->tlsext_hostname); - if (!ssl->session->tlsext_hostname) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sni_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - /* The servername extension is treated as follows: - * - * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. - * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, in - * which case an fatal alert is generated. - * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. - * - When a session is resumed, the servername callback is invoked in order - * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. - * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when - * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. - * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time - * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the - * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and - * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername - * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches - * the value of the Host: field. - * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the - * session, - * i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. - */ - - CBS server_name_list; - char have_seen_host_name = 0; - - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &server_name_list) || - CBS_len(&server_name_list) == 0 || - CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */ - while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) { - uint8_t name_type; - CBS host_name; - - if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Only host_name is supported. */ - if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { - continue; - } - - if (have_seen_host_name) { - /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain more than one name of the same - * name_type. */ - return 0; - } - - have_seen_host_name = 1; - - if (CBS_len(&host_name) == 0 || - CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || - CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - - if (!ssl->hit) { - assert(ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL); - if (ssl->session->tlsext_hostname) { - /* This should be impossible. */ - return 0; - } - - /* Copy the hostname as a string. */ - if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &ssl->session->tlsext_hostname)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 1; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl->hit || - !ssl->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni || - ssl->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* Renegotiation indication. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746 */ - -static int ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - CBB contents, prev_finished; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, - ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ri_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - /* No renegotiation extension received. - * - * Strictly speaking if we want to avoid an attack we should *always* see - * RI even on initial ServerHello because the client doesn't see any - * renegotiation during an attack. However this would mean we could not - * connect to any server which doesn't support RI. - * - * A lack of the extension is allowed if SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT is - * defined. */ - if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) { - return 1; - } - - *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - const size_t expected_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len + - ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len; - - /* Check for logic errors */ - assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len); - assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len); - - /* Parse out the extension contents. */ - CBS renegotiated_connection; - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - - /* Check that the extension matches. */ - if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != expected_len) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - return 0; - } - - const uint8_t *d = CBS_data(&renegotiated_connection); - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, - ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - return 0; - } - d += ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len; - - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, - ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - /* Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be - * called after the initial handshake. */ - assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); - - CBS fake_contents; - static const uint8_t kFakeExtension[] = {0}; - - if (contents == NULL) { - if (ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) { - /* The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a - * renegotiation extension. */ - CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeExtension, sizeof(kFakeExtension)); - contents = &fake_contents; - /* We require that the renegotiation extension is at index zero of - * kExtensions. */ - ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << 0); - } else { - return 1; - } - } - - CBS renegotiated_connection; - - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); - return 0; - } - - /* Check that the extension matches */ - if (!CBS_mem_equal(&renegotiated_connection, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, - ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - CBB contents, prev_finished; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, - ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, - ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* Extended Master Secret. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-05 */ - -static void ext_ems_init(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0; -} - -static int ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - return 1; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION || CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1; - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ems_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { - if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION || contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1; - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ems_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) { - return 1; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* Session tickets. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077 */ - -static int ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) { - return 1; - } - - const uint8_t *ticket_data = NULL; - int ticket_len = 0; - - /* Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still - * advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry - * over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers - * without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4. */ - if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && - ssl->session != NULL && - ssl->session->tlsext_tick != NULL) { - ticket_data = ssl->session->tlsext_tick; - ticket_len = ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen; - } - - CBB ticket; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &ticket) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, ticket_data, ticket_len) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - /* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set then no extension will have been sent and - * this function should never be called, even if the server tries to send the - * extension. */ - assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0); - - if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ticket_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) { - /* This function isn't used because the ticket extension from the client is - * handled in ssl_sess.c. */ - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - return 1; - } - - /* If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set, |tlsext_ticket_expected| should never be - * true. */ - assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0); - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* Signature Algorithms. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ - -static int ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl3_version_from_wire(ssl, ssl->client_version) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { - return 1; - } - - const uint8_t *sigalgs_data; - const size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_data); - - CBB contents, sigalgs; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&sigalgs, sigalgs_data, sigalgs_len) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sigalgs_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents != NULL) { - /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */ - *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION_SENT_BY_SERVER); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs); - ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; - ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0; - - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - CBS supported_signature_algorithms; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_signature_algorithms) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0 || - CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 || - !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sigalgs_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - /* Servers MUST NOT send this extension. */ - return 1; -} - - -/* OCSP Stapling. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 */ - -static void ext_ocsp_init(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0; -} - -static int ext_ocsp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) || - !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty responder ID list */) || - !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty request extensions */) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1; - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - uint8_t status_type; - if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type)) { - return 0; - } - - /* We cannot decide whether OCSP stapling will occur yet because the correct - * SSL_CTX might not have been selected. */ - ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested = status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ocsp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */ - if (ssl->hit || - !ssl->s3->tmp.ocsp_stapling_requested || - ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length == 0) { - return 1; - } - - ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1; - - return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) && - CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */); -} - - -/* Next protocol negotiation. - * - * https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/agl/technotes/blob/master/nextprotoneg.html */ - -static void ext_npn_init(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -} - -static int ext_npn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || - ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL || - SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - /* If any of these are false then we should never have sent the NPN - * extension in the ClientHello and thus this function should never have been - * called. */ - assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); - assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)); - assert(ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb != NULL); - - if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { - /* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */ - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN); - return 0; - } - - const uint8_t *const orig_contents = CBS_data(contents); - const size_t orig_len = CBS_len(contents); - - while (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - CBS proto; - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &proto) || - CBS_len(&proto) == 0) { - return 0; - } - } - - uint8_t *selected; - uint8_t selected_len; - if (ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb( - ssl, &selected, &selected_len, orig_contents, orig_len, - ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - OPENSSL_free(ssl->next_proto_negotiated); - ssl->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); - if (ssl->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - ssl->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents != NULL && CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (contents == NULL || - ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete || - /* If the ALPN extension is seen before NPN, ignore it. (If ALPN is seen - * afterwards, parsing the ALPN extension will clear - * |next_proto_neg_seen|. */ - ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL || - ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL || - SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - return 1; -} - -static int ext_npn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - /* |next_proto_neg_seen| might have been cleared when an ALPN extension was - * parsed. */ - if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { - return 1; - } - - const uint8_t *npa; - unsigned npa_len; - - if (ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb( - ssl, &npa, &npa_len, ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg) != - SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - return 1; - } - - CBB contents; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&contents, npa, npa_len) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* Signed certificate timestamps. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1 */ - -static int ext_sct_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) { - return 1; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sct_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - /* If this is false then we should never have sent the SCT extension in the - * ClientHello and thus this function should never have been called. */ - assert(ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled); - - if (CBS_len(contents) == 0) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */ - if (!ssl->hit && - !CBS_stow(contents, &ssl->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list, - &ssl->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_sct_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - return contents == NULL || CBS_len(contents) == 0; -} - -static int ext_sct_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - /* The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions. */ - if (ssl->hit || - ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length == 0) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents; - return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) && - CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) && - CBB_add_bytes(&contents, ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list, - ssl->ctx->signed_cert_timestamp_list_length) && - CBB_flush(out); -} - - -/* Application-level Protocol Negotiation. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301 */ - -static void ext_alpn_init(SSL *ssl) { - OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected); - ssl->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; -} - -static int ext_alpn_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL || - ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents, proto_list; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&proto_list, ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, - ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_alpn_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); - assert(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL); - - if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { - /* NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection. */ - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN); - return 0; - } - - /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have - * exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */ - CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0 || - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) || - /* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */ - CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0 || - CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &ssl->s3->alpn_selected, - &ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_alpn_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL || - ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { - return 1; - } - - /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ - ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - - CBS protocol_name_list; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0 || - CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) { - return 0; - } - - /* Validate the protocol list. */ - CBS protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list; - while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) { - CBS protocol_name; - - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name) || - /* Empty protocol names are forbidden. */ - CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0) { - return 0; - } - } - - const uint8_t *selected; - uint8_t selected_len; - if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb( - ssl, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), - CBS_len(&protocol_name_list), - ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg) == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->alpn_selected); - ssl->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); - if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_alpn_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents, proto_list, proto; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) || - !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&proto_list, &proto) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&proto, ssl->s3->alpn_selected, ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* Channel ID. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01 */ - -static void ext_channel_id_init(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; -} - -static int ext_channel_id_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled || - SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)); - assert(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled); - - if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; - return 1; -} - -static int ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL || - !ssl->tlsext_channel_id_enabled || - SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; - return 1; -} - -static int ext_channel_id_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { - return 1; - } - - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) || - !CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) extension. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764 */ - - -static void ext_srtp_init(SSL *ssl) { - ssl->srtp_profile = NULL; -} - -static int ext_srtp_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl); - if (profiles == NULL) { - return 1; - } - const size_t num_profiles = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); - if (num_profiles == 0) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents, profile_ids; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids)) { - return 0; - } - - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < num_profiles; i++) { - if (!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i)->id)) { - return 0; - } - } - - if (!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty use_mki value */) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_srtp_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - /* The extension consists of a u16-prefixed profile ID list containing a - * single uint16_t profile ID, then followed by a u8-prefixed srtp_mki field. - * - * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.1 */ - CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki; - uint16_t profile_id; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) || - !CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids, &profile_id) || - CBS_len(&profile_ids) != 0 || - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - return 0; - } - - if (CBS_len(&srtp_mki) != 0) { - /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one. */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - - STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl); - - /* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and presumably - * offered). */ - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles); i++) { - const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile = - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(profiles, i); - - if (profile->id == profile_id) { - ssl->srtp_profile = profile; - return 1; - } - } - - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; -} - -static int ext_srtp_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) || - CBS_len(&profile_ids) < 2 || - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); - return 0; - } - /* Discard the MKI value for now. */ - - const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *server_profiles = - SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl); - - /* Pick the server's most preferred profile. */ - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(server_profiles); i++) { - const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *server_profile = - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(server_profiles, i); - - CBS profile_ids_tmp; - CBS_init(&profile_ids_tmp, CBS_data(&profile_ids), CBS_len(&profile_ids)); - - while (CBS_len(&profile_ids_tmp) > 0) { - uint16_t profile_id; - if (!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids_tmp, &profile_id)) { - return 0; - } - - if (server_profile->id == profile_id) { - ssl->srtp_profile = server_profile; - return 1; - } - } - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_srtp_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (ssl->srtp_profile == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents, profile_ids; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids) || - !CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, ssl->srtp_profile->id) || - !CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty MKI */) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - -/* EC point formats. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */ - -static int ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(const SSL *ssl) { - if (ssl->version < TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { - return 0; - } - - const STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); - - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); - - const uint32_t alg_k = cipher->algorithm_mkey; - const uint32_t alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -static int ext_ec_point_add_extension(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - CBB contents, formats; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &formats) || - !CBB_add_u8(&formats, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) || - !CBB_flush(out)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ec_point_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out); -} - -static int ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - CBS ec_point_format_list; - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ec_point_format_list) || - CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - /* Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the uncompressed - * point format. */ - if (memchr(CBS_data(&ec_point_format_list), TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, - CBS_len(&ec_point_format_list)) == NULL) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - return ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(ssl, out_alert, contents); -} - -static int ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - const uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - const uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - const int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); - - if (!using_ecc) { - return 1; - } - - return ext_ec_point_add_extension(ssl, out); -} - - -/* EC supported curves. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2 */ - -static void ext_ec_curves_init(SSL *ssl) { - OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist); - ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; - ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; -} - -static int ext_ec_curves_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - if (!ssl_any_ec_cipher_suites_enabled(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - CBB contents, curves_bytes; - if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &curves_bytes)) { - return 0; - } - - const uint16_t *curves; - size_t curves_len; - tls1_get_curvelist(ssl, 0, &curves, &curves_len); - - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { - if (!CBB_add_u16(&curves_bytes, curves[i])) { - return 0; - } - } - - return CBB_flush(out); -} - -static int ext_ec_curves_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - /* This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers and is ignored. */ - return 1; -} - -static int ext_ec_curves_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, - CBS *contents) { - if (contents == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - CBS elliptic_curve_list; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &elliptic_curve_list) || - CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 || - (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 || - CBS_len(contents) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = - (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list)); - - if (ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - const size_t num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2; - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) { - if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list, - &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i])) { - goto err; - } - } - - assert(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0); - ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves; - - return 1; - -err: - OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist); - ssl->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; - *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; -} - -static int ext_ec_curves_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *out) { - /* Servers don't echo this extension. */ - return 1; -} - - -/* kExtensions contains all the supported extensions. */ -static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = { - { - /* The renegotiation extension must always be at index zero because the - * |received| and |sent| bitsets need to be tweaked when the "extension" is - * sent as an SCSV. */ - TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, - NULL, - ext_ri_add_clienthello, - ext_ri_parse_serverhello, - ext_ri_parse_clienthello, - ext_ri_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, - ext_sni_init, - ext_sni_add_clienthello, - ext_sni_parse_serverhello, - ext_sni_parse_clienthello, - ext_sni_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, - ext_ems_init, - ext_ems_add_clienthello, - ext_ems_parse_serverhello, - ext_ems_parse_clienthello, - ext_ems_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, - NULL, - ext_ticket_add_clienthello, - ext_ticket_parse_serverhello, - ext_ticket_parse_clienthello, - ext_ticket_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, - NULL, - ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello, - ext_sigalgs_parse_serverhello, - ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello, - ext_sigalgs_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, - ext_ocsp_init, - ext_ocsp_add_clienthello, - ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello, - ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello, - ext_ocsp_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, - ext_npn_init, - ext_npn_add_clienthello, - ext_npn_parse_serverhello, - ext_npn_parse_clienthello, - ext_npn_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, - NULL, - ext_sct_add_clienthello, - ext_sct_parse_serverhello, - ext_sct_parse_clienthello, - ext_sct_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, - ext_alpn_init, - ext_alpn_add_clienthello, - ext_alpn_parse_serverhello, - ext_alpn_parse_clienthello, - ext_alpn_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, - ext_channel_id_init, - ext_channel_id_add_clienthello, - ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello, - ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello, - ext_channel_id_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp, - ext_srtp_init, - ext_srtp_add_clienthello, - ext_srtp_parse_serverhello, - ext_srtp_parse_clienthello, - ext_srtp_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, - NULL, - ext_ec_point_add_clienthello, - ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello, - ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello, - ext_ec_point_add_serverhello, - }, - { - TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, - ext_ec_curves_init, - ext_ec_curves_add_clienthello, - ext_ec_curves_parse_serverhello, - ext_ec_curves_parse_clienthello, - ext_ec_curves_add_serverhello, - }, -}; - -#define kNumExtensions (sizeof(kExtensions) / sizeof(struct tls_extension)) - -OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <= - sizeof(((SSL *)NULL)->s3->tmp.extensions.sent) * 8, - too_many_extensions_for_sent_bitset); -OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(kNumExtensions <= - sizeof(((SSL *)NULL)->s3->tmp.extensions.received) * - 8, - too_many_extensions_for_received_bitset); - -static const struct tls_extension *tls_extension_find(uint32_t *out_index, - uint16_t value) { - unsigned i; - for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { - if (kExtensions[i].value == value) { - *out_index = i; - return &kExtensions[i]; - } - } - - return NULL; -} - -int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned extension_value) { - uint32_t index; - return extension_value == TLSEXT_TYPE_padding || - tls_extension_find(&index, extension_value) != NULL; -} - -/* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to - * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding - * is to be done. */ -uint8_t *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *const buf, - uint8_t *const limit, size_t header_len) { - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) { - return buf; - } - - CBB cbb, extensions; - CBB_zero(&cbb); - if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, limit - buf) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &extensions)) { - goto err; - } - - s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent = 0; - s->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.sent = 0; - - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { - if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) { - kExtensions[i].init(s); - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { - const size_t len_before = CBB_len(&extensions); - if (!kExtensions[i].add_clienthello(s, &extensions)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION); - ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); - goto err; - } - - if (CBB_len(&extensions) != len_before) { - s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << i); - } - } - - if (!custom_ext_add_clienthello(s, &extensions)) { - goto err; - } - - if (header_len > 0) { - header_len += CBB_len(&extensions); - if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) { - /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 - * - * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions - * it MUST always appear last. */ - size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len; - /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include least - * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application - * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */ - if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) { - padding_len -= 4; - } else { - padding_len = 1; - } - - uint8_t *padding_bytes; - if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) || - !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, padding_len) || - !CBB_add_space(&extensions, &padding_bytes, padding_len)) { - goto err; - } - - memset(padding_bytes, 0, padding_len); - } - } - - if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) { - goto err; - } - - uint8_t *ret = buf; - const size_t cbb_len = CBB_len(&cbb); - /* If only two bytes have been written then the extensions are actually empty - * and those two bytes are the zero length. In that case, we don't bother - * sending the extensions length. */ - if (cbb_len > 2) { - ret += cbb_len; - } - - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - return ret; - -err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; -} - -uint8_t *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *const buf, - uint8_t *const limit) { - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) { - return buf; - } - - CBB cbb, extensions; - CBB_zero(&cbb); - if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, limit - buf) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &extensions)) { - goto err; - } - - unsigned i; - for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { - if (!(s->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i))) { - /* Don't send extensions that were not received. */ - continue; - } - - if (!kExtensions[i].add_serverhello(s, &extensions)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION); - ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); - goto err; - } - } - - if (!custom_ext_add_serverhello(s, &extensions)) { - goto err; - } - - if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) { - goto err; - } - - uint8_t *ret = buf; - const size_t cbb_len = CBB_len(&cbb); - /* If only two bytes have been written then the extensions are actually empty - * and those two bytes are the zero length. In that case, we don't bother - * sending the extensions length. */ - if (cbb_len > 2) { - ret += cbb_len; - } - - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - return ret; - -err: - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; -} - -static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { - if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) { - kExtensions[i].init(s); - } - } - - s->s3->tmp.extensions.received = 0; - s->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.received = 0; - /* The renegotiation extension must always be at index zero because the - * |received| and |sent| bitsets need to be tweaked when the "extension" is - * sent as an SCSV. */ - assert(kExtensions[0].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate); - - /* There may be no extensions. */ - if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) { - /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */ - CBS extensions; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) || - !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { - uint16_t type; - CBS extension; - - /* Decode the next extension. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - unsigned ext_index; - const struct tls_extension *const ext = - tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type); - - if (ext == NULL) { - if (!custom_ext_parse_clienthello(s, out_alert, type, &extension)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); - return 0; - } - continue; - } - - s->s3->tmp.extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index); - uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - if (!ext->parse_clienthello(s, &alert, &extension)) { - *out_alert = alert; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); - ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type); - return 0; - } - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { - if (!(s->s3->tmp.extensions.received & (1u << i))) { - /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL - * parameter. */ - uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(s, &alert, NULL)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION); - ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); - *out_alert = alert; - return 0; - } - } - } - - return 1; -} - -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) { - int alert = -1; - if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); - return 0; - } - - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) { - uint32_t received = 0; - assert(kNumExtensions <= sizeof(received) * 8); - - if (CBS_len(cbs) != 0) { - /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */ - CBS extensions; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) || - !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - - while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { - uint16_t type; - CBS extension; - - /* Decode the next extension. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { - *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - unsigned ext_index; - const struct tls_extension *const ext = - tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type); - - if (ext == NULL) { - if (!custom_ext_parse_serverhello(s, out_alert, type, &extension)) { - return 0; - } - continue; - } - - if (!(s->s3->tmp.extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index))) { - /* If the extension was never sent then it is illegal. */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); - ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type); - *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - received |= (1u << ext_index); - - uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - if (!ext->parse_serverhello(s, &alert, &extension)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); - ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)type); - *out_alert = alert; - return 0; - } - } - } - - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) { - if (!(received & (1u << i))) { - /* Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL - * parameter. */ - uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - if (!kExtensions[i].parse_serverhello(s, &alert, NULL)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION); - ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value); - *out_alert = alert; - return 0; - } - } - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback( - s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - } - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->s3->tmp.should_ack_sni = 0; - return 1; - - default: - return 1; - } -} - -static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback( - s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - } - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - default: - return 1; - } -} - -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) { - int alert = -1; - if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) { - return 1; - } - - if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); - return 0; - } - - if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -int tls_process_ticket(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, - int *out_send_ticket, const uint8_t *ticket, - size_t ticket_len, const uint8_t *session_id, - size_t session_id_len) { - int ret = 1; /* Most errors are non-fatal. */ - SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; - uint8_t *plaintext = NULL; - - HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx; - HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher_ctx); - - *out_send_ticket = 0; - *out_session = NULL; - - if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { - goto done; - } - - if (ticket_len == 0) { - /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have one. */ - *out_send_ticket = 1; - goto done; - } - - /* Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV - * |tlsext_ticket_key_cb| may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but - * the maximum IV length should be well under the minimum size for the - * session material and HMAC. */ - if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { - goto done; - } - const uint8_t *iv = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN; - - if (ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) { - int cb_ret = ssl_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, (uint8_t*)ticket /* name */, - (uint8_t*)iv, &cipher_ctx, &hmac_ctx, - 0 /* decrypt */); - if (cb_ret < 0) { - ret = 0; - goto done; - } - if (cb_ret == 0) { - goto done; - } - if (cb_ret == 2) { - *out_send_ticket = 1; - } - } else { - /* Check the key name matches. */ - if (memcmp(ticket, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, - SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) { - goto done; - } - if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac_ctx, ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, - sizeof(ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), tlsext_tick_md(), - NULL) || - !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - ssl_ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) { - ret = 0; - goto done; - } - } - size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cipher_ctx); - - /* Check the MAC at the end of the ticket. */ - uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t mac_len = HMAC_size(&hmac_ctx); - if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len + 1 + mac_len) { - /* The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC. */ - goto done; - } - HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ticket, ticket_len - mac_len); - HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, NULL); - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket + (ticket_len - mac_len), mac_len) != 0) { - goto done; - } - - /* Decrypt the session data. */ - const uint8_t *ciphertext = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len; - size_t ciphertext_len = ticket_len - SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN - iv_len - - mac_len; - plaintext = OPENSSL_malloc(ciphertext_len); - if (plaintext == NULL) { - ret = 0; - goto done; - } - if (ciphertext_len >= INT_MAX) { - goto done; - } - int len1, len2; - if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cipher_ctx, plaintext, &len1, ciphertext, - (int)ciphertext_len) || - !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&cipher_ctx, plaintext + len1, &len2)) { - ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */ - goto done; - } - - /* Decode the session. */ - SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(plaintext, len1 + len2); - if (session == NULL) { - ERR_clear_error(); /* Don't leave an error on the queue. */ - goto done; - } - - /* Copy the client's session ID into the new session, to denote the ticket has - * been accepted. */ - memcpy(session->session_id, session_id, session_id_len); - session->session_id_length = session_id_len; - - *out_session = session; - -done: - OPENSSL_free(plaintext); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher_ctx); - return ret; -} - -/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ -typedef struct { - int nid; - int id; -} tls12_lookup; - -static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, - {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, - {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, - {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, - {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}}; - -static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}}; - -static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - if (table[i].nid == nid) { - return table[i].id; - } - } - - return -1; -} - -int tls12_get_sigid(int pkey_type) { - return tls12_find_id(pkey_type, tls12_sig, - sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); -} - -int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *p, const EVP_MD *md) { - int sig_id, md_id; - - if (!md) { - return 0; - } - - md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, - sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - if (md_id == -1) { - return 0; - } - - sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(ssl_private_key_type(ssl)); - if (sig_id == -1) { - return 0; - } - - p[0] = (uint8_t)md_id; - p[1] = (uint8_t)sig_id; - return 1; -} - -const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(uint8_t hash_alg) { - switch (hash_alg) { - case TLSEXT_hash_md5: - return EVP_md5(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: - return EVP_sha1(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: - return EVP_sha224(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: - return EVP_sha256(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: - return EVP_sha384(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: - return EVP_sha512(); - - default: - return NULL; - } -} - -/* tls12_get_pkey_type returns the EVP_PKEY type corresponding to TLS signature - * algorithm |sig_alg|. It returns -1 if the type is unknown. */ -static int tls12_get_pkey_type(uint8_t sig_alg) { - switch (sig_alg) { - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: - return EVP_PKEY_RSA; - - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: - return EVP_PKEY_EC; - - default: - return -1; - } -} - -OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS) == 2, - sizeof_tls_sigalgs_is_not_two); - -int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) { - /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(ssl)) { - return 1; - } - - CERT *const cert = ssl->cert; - OPENSSL_free(cert->peer_sigalgs); - cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; - cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0; - - size_t num_sigalgs = CBS_len(in_sigalgs); - - if (num_sigalgs % 2 != 0) { - return 0; - } - num_sigalgs /= 2; - - /* supported_signature_algorithms in the certificate request is - * allowed to be empty. */ - if (num_sigalgs == 0) { - return 1; - } - - /* This multiplication doesn't overflow because sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS) is two - * (statically asserted above) and we just divided |num_sigalgs| by two. */ - cert->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); - if (cert->peer_sigalgs == NULL) { - return 0; - } - cert->peer_sigalgslen = num_sigalgs; - - CBS sigalgs; - CBS_init(&sigalgs, CBS_data(in_sigalgs), CBS_len(in_sigalgs)); - - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) { - TLS_SIGALGS *const sigalg = &cert->peer_sigalgs[i]; - if (!CBS_get_u8(&sigalgs, &sigalg->rhash) || - !CBS_get_u8(&sigalgs, &sigalg->rsign)) { - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *ssl) { - CERT *cert = ssl->cert; - int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl); - size_t i, j; - - static const int kDefaultDigestList[] = {NID_sha256, NID_sha384, NID_sha512, - NID_sha224, NID_sha1}; - - const int *digest_nids = kDefaultDigestList; - size_t num_digest_nids = - sizeof(kDefaultDigestList) / sizeof(kDefaultDigestList[0]); - if (cert->digest_nids != NULL) { - digest_nids = cert->digest_nids; - num_digest_nids = cert->num_digest_nids; - } - - for (i = 0; i < num_digest_nids; i++) { - const int digest_nid = digest_nids[i]; - for (j = 0; j < cert->peer_sigalgslen; j++) { - const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(cert->peer_sigalgs[j].rhash); - if (md == NULL || - digest_nid != EVP_MD_type(md) || - tls12_get_pkey_type(cert->peer_sigalgs[j].rsign) != type) { - continue; - } - - return md; - } - } - - /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */ - return EVP_sha1(); -} - -int tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) { - int ret = 0; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { - goto err; - } - - static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature"; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic)); - - if (ssl->hit) { - static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption"; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic)); - if (ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, ssl->session->original_handshake_hash, - ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len); - } - - uint8_t handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - int handshake_hash_len = tls1_handshake_digest(ssl, handshake_hash, - sizeof(handshake_hash)); - if (handshake_hash_len < 0) { - goto err; - } - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, handshake_hash, (size_t)handshake_hash_len); - unsigned len_u; - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &len_u); - *out_len = len_u; - - ret = 1; - -err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return ret; -} - -/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake - * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */ -int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) { - int digest_len; - /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because the - * handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full - * handshake. */ - if (s->hit) { - return -1; - } - - digest_len = - tls1_handshake_digest(s, s->session->original_handshake_hash, - sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash)); - if (digest_len < 0) { - return -1; - } - - s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len; - - return 1; -} |