diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 2212 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2212 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c deleted file mode 100644 index 559db7216c..0000000000 --- a/third_party/boringssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2212 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - -#include <openssl/ssl.h> - -#include <assert.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/buf.h> -#include <openssl/bytestring.h> -#include <openssl/dh.h> -#include <openssl/ec_key.h> -#include <openssl/ecdsa.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/md5.h> -#include <openssl/mem.h> -#include <openssl/obj.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/x509.h> -#include <openssl/x509v3.h> - -#include "internal.h" -#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" - - -int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { - BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - int ret = -1; - int new_state, state, skip = 0; - - assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); - assert(!s->server); - assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)); - - ERR_clear_error(); - ERR_clear_system_error(); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) { - cb = s->info_callback; - } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - } - - s->in_handshake++; - - for (;;) { - state = s->state; - - switch (s->state) { - case SSL_ST_CONNECT: - if (cb != NULL) { - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); - } - - if (s->init_buf == NULL) { - buf = BUF_MEM_new(); - if (buf == NULL || - !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - s->init_buf = buf; - buf = NULL; - } - - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ - - if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(s)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: - s->shutdown = 0; - ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ - if (s->bbio != s->wbio) { - s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); - } - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - if (s->hit) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - /* receive renewed session ticket */ - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: - if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; - } - } else { - skip = 1; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT: - ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: - ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: - ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain - * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - } - - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C: - ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: - ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, - SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; - if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; - } - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - - s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s) || - !s->enc_method->change_cipher_state( - s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: - ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B: - ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: - ret = - ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, - s->enc_method->client_finished_label, - s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; - - if (s->hit) { - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; - } else { - /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then - * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that - * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those - * hashes. */ - ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && - ssl3_can_false_start(s) && - /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state - * machine). */ - !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; - } else { - /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } else { - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; - } - } - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: - /* At this point, the next message must be entirely behind a - * ChangeCipherSpec. */ - if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: - ret = - ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) { - goto end; - } - - if (s->hit) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - } else { - s->state = SSL_ST_OK; - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: - s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: - /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; - } - s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 1; - - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - ret = 1; - goto end; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf = NULL; - - /* Remove write buffering now. */ - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - - const int is_initial_handshake = !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete; - - s->init_num = 0; - s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 0; - s->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; - - if (is_initial_handshake) { - /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); - } - - ret = 1; - /* s->server=0; */ - - if (cb != NULL) { - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - } - - goto end; - - default: - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { - if (cb != NULL && s->state != state) { - new_state = s->state; - s->state = state; - cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); - s->state = new_state; - } - } - skip = 0; - } - -end: - s->in_handshake--; - BUF_MEM_free(buf); - if (cb != NULL) { - cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); - } - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s) { - uint8_t *buf, *p, *d; - int i; - unsigned long l; - - buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { - if (!s->s3->have_version) { - uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_client_version(s); - /* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */ - if (max_version == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - goto err; - } - s->version = max_version; - s->client_version = max_version; - } - - /* If the configured session was created at a version higher than our - * maximum version, drop it. */ - if (s->session && - (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable || - (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version > s->version) || - (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version < s->version))) { - SSL_set_session(s, NULL); - } - - /* else use the pre-loaded session */ - p = s->s3->client_random; - - /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't - * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ - if ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !s->d1->send_cookie) && - !ssl_fill_hello_random(p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), - 0 /* client */)) { - goto err; - } - - /* Do the message type and length last. Note: the final argument to - * ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext below depends on the size of this prefix. */ - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from an SSLv2/v3 - * compatible client hello). The client_version field is the maximum - * version we permit and it is also used in RSA encrypted premaster - * secrets. Some servers can choke if we initially report a higher version - * then renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This didn't - * happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it but it can with TLS 1.1 - * or later if the server only supports 1.0. - * - * Possible scenario with previous logic: - * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 - * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 - * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. - * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. - * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now - * know that is maximum server supports. - * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret - * containing version 1.0. - * - * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the maximum version - * we support in client hello and then rely on the checking of version to - * ensure the servers isn't being inconsistent: for example initially - * negotiating with TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by - * using client_version in client hello and not resetting it to the - * negotiated version. */ - *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* Session ID */ - if (s->s3->initial_handshake_complete || s->session == NULL) { - /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ - i = 0; - } else { - i = s->session->session_id_length; - } - *(p++) = i; - if (i != 0) { - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); - p += i; - } - - /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; - memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - p += s->d1->cookie_len; - } - - /* Ciphers supported */ - i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]); - if (i == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); - goto err; - } - s2n(i, p); - p += i; - - /* COMPRESSION */ - *(p++) = 1; - *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ - - /* TLS extensions*/ - p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - p - buf); - if (p == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - l = p - d; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { - goto err; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); - -err: - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - CERT *ct = s->cert; - int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok; - long n; - CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; - uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; - uint8_t compression_method; - uint32_t mask_ssl; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, - 20000, /* ?? */ - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); - if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && - ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { - /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert - * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and - * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial - * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. - * - * See https://crbug.com/446505. */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); - } - return n; - } - - CBS_init(&server_hello, s->init_msg, n); - - if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) || - !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || - !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || - CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || - !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || - !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - assert(s->s3->have_version == s->s3->initial_handshake_complete); - if (!s->s3->have_version) { - if (!ssl3_is_version_enabled(s, server_version)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); - s->version = server_version; - /* Mark the version as fixed so the record-layer version is not clamped - * to TLS 1.0. */ - s->s3->have_version = 1; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->version = server_version; - s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version); - assert(s->enc_method != NULL); - /* At this point, the connection's version is known and s->version is - * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ - s->s3->have_version = 1; - } else if (server_version != s->version) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - - /* Copy over the server random. */ - memcpy(s->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - - assert(s->session == NULL || s->session->session_id_length > 0); - if (!s->s3->initial_handshake_complete && s->session != NULL && - CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id, - s->session->session_id_length)) { - if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || - memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { - /* actually a client application bug */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, - SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); - goto f_err; - } - s->hit = 1; - } else { - /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to - * fill out. */ - s->hit = 0; - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { - goto f_err; - } - /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ - s->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); - memcpy(s->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id)); - } - - c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); - if (c == NULL) { - /* unknown cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - /* ct->mask_ssl was computed from client capabilities. Now - * that the final version is known, compute a new mask_ssl. */ - if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) { - mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - } else { - mask_ssl = 0; - } - /* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if - * the server selected it, it's an error. */ - if ((c->algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) || - (c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) || - (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) { - /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->hit) { - if (s->session->cipher != c) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - - /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ - if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(s)) { - goto f_err; - } - - /* If doing a full handshake with TLS 1.2, the server may request a client - * certificate which requires hashing the handshake transcript under a - * different hash. Otherwise, the handshake buffer may be released. */ - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || s->hit) { - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); - } - - /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ - if (compression_method != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - - /* TLS extensions */ - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &server_hello)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ - if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->hit && - s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret != s->session->extended_master_secret) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - if (s->session->extended_master_secret) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); - } else { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); - } - goto f_err; - } - - return 1; - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - return -1; -} - -/* ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher returns one if |leaf| is a suitable server - * certificate type for |cipher|. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes an error - * on the error queue. */ -static int ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher(X509 *leaf, - const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { - int ret = 0; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); - if (pkey == NULL) { - goto err; - } - - /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ - int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); - assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); - if (pkey->type != expected_type) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto err; - } - - /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key usages - * be checked in other cases as well? */ - if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { - /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ - X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); - if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && - !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); - goto err; - } - } - - ret = 1; - -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { - int al, ok, ret = -1; - unsigned long n; - X509 *x = NULL; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - CBS cbs, certificate_list; - const uint8_t *data; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, (long)s->max_cert_list, - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); - - sk = sk_X509_new_null(); - if (sk == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) || - CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0 || - CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { - CBS certificate; - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - data = CBS_data(&certificate); - x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate)); - if (x == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; - } - if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x = NULL; - } - - X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); - if (!ssl3_check_certificate_for_cipher(leaf, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; - } - - /* NOTE: Unlike the server half, the client's copy of |cert_chain| includes - * the leaf. */ - sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->cert_chain, X509_free); - s->session->cert_chain = sk; - sk = NULL; - - X509_free(s->session->peer); - s->session->peer = X509_up_ref(leaf); - - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - - ret = 1; - - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } - -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - X509_free(x); - sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - int al, ok; - long n, alg_k, alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - RSA *rsa = NULL; - DH *dh = NULL; - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - CBS server_key_exchange, server_key_exchange_orig, parameter; - - /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as - * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { - if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return -1; - } - - /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange may be omitted to send no - * identity hint. */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) { - /* TODO(davidben): This should be reset in one place with the rest of the - * handshake state. */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint); - s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint = NULL; - } - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return 1; - } - - /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ - CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n); - server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - - if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { - CBS psk_identity_hint; - - /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, - &psk_identity_hint)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in - * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK - * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. - * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. - * - * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than - * a specific identity. */ - if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || - CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Save the identity hint as a C string. */ - if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; - - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || - CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || - CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || - CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - dh = DH_new(); - if (dh == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL)) == NULL || - (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL)) == NULL || - (dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Ys), CBS_len(&dh_Ys), NULL)) == - NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - - s->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(dh); - if (s->session->key_exchange_info < 1024) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); - goto err; - } - DH_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp); - s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp = dh; - dh = NULL; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { - uint16_t curve_id; - int curve_nid = 0; - const EC_GROUP *group; - CBS point; - - /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH public - * key. Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an - * invalid curve. */ - if (!tls1_check_curve(s, &server_key_exchange, &curve_id)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); - goto f_err; - } - - curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id); - if (curve_nid == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); - s->session->key_exchange_info = curve_id; - if (ecdh == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); - - /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || - ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, CBS_data(&point), - CBS_len(&point), bn_ctx)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); - goto f_err; - } - EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); - EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp); - s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; - ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - - /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while - * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive - * a CBS containing just the parameter. */ - CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); - - /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ - if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (pkey == NULL) { - goto err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &server_key_exchange, pkey)) { - goto f_err; - } - } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - md = EVP_md5_sha1(); - } else { - md = EVP_sha1(); - } - - /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ - CBS signature; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) || - !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || - !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || - !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter), - CBS_len(¶meter)) || - !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), - CBS_len(&signature))) { - /* bad signature */ - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } else { - /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ - assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); - - if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - } - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return 1; - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - RSA_free(rsa); - DH_free(dh); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - EC_KEY_free(ecdh); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return -1; -} - -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { - return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); -} - -int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { - int ok, ret = 0; - unsigned long n; - X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; - CBS cbs; - CBS certificate_types; - CBS certificate_authorities; - const uint8_t *data; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing - * client auth. */ - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); - return 1; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto err; - } - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); - - ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); - if (ca_sk == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the certificate types */ - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, - &s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - CBS supported_signature_algorithms; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || - !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - /* get the CA RDNs */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - - while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) { - CBS distinguished_name; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities, - &distinguished_name)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); - - xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); - if (xn == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBS_skip(&distinguished_name, data - CBS_data(&distinguished_name))) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (CBS_len(&distinguished_name) != 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - - if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - - /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); - s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; - ca_sk = NULL; - - ret = 1; - -err: - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { - int ok, al; - long n; - CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message( - s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, - SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - if (s->hit) { - /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are - * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the - * existing session. */ - uint8_t *bytes; - size_t bytes_len; - if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &bytes, &bytes_len)) { - goto err; - } - SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bytes, bytes_len); - OPENSSL_free(bytes); - if (new_session == NULL) { - /* This should never happen. */ - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); - s->session = new_session; - } - - CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, s->init_msg, n); - - if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, - &s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || - CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, - &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use - * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in - * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ - if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), s->session->session_id, - &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { - goto err; - } - - return 1; - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { - int ok, al; - long n; - CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; - uint8_t status_type; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message( - s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, - -1, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { - /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change - * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return 1; - } - - CBS_init(&certificate_status, s->init_msg, n); - if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || - status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || - !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || - CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || - CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &s->session->ocsp_response, - &s->session->ocsp_response_length)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - return 1; - -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { - int ok; - long n; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, - 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ - ssl_hash_message, &ok); - - if (!ok) { - return n; - } - - if (n > 0) { - /* should contain no data */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - return -1; - } - - return 1; -} - - -int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { - uint8_t *p; - int n = 0; - uint32_t alg_k; - uint32_t alg_a; - uint8_t *q; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; - const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; - uint8_t *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - unsigned int psk_len = 0; - uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; - uint8_t *pms = NULL; - size_t pms_len = 0; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { - char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; - size_t identity_len; - - if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); - goto err; - } - - memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); - psk_len = - s->psk_client_callback(s, s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, - sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk)); - if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } else if (psk_len == 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - identity_len = OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity)); - if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); - s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); - if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Write out psk_identity. */ - s2n(identity_len, p); - memcpy(p, identity, identity_len); - p += identity_len; - n = 2 + identity_len; - } - - /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - RSA *rsa; - size_t enc_pms_len; - - pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); - if (pms == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (pkey == NULL || - pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || - pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - goto err; - } - - s->session->key_exchange_info = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); - rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - - pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; - pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { - goto err; - } - - s->session->master_key_length = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; - - q = p; - /* In TLS and beyond, reserve space for the length prefix. */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { - p += 2; - n += 2; - } - if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, p, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); - goto err; - } - n += enc_pms_len; - - /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ - if (!ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s->ctx, p, enc_pms_len, pms, - pms_len)) { - goto err; - } - - /* Fill in the length prefix. */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { - s2n(enc_pms_len, q); - } - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; - int dh_len; - size_t pub_len; - - if (s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.peer_dh_tmp; - - /* generate a new random key */ - dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr); - if (dh_clnt == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - - pms_len = DH_size(dh_clnt); - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); - if (pms == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - - dh_len = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); - if (dh_len <= 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - pms_len = dh_len; - - /* send off the data */ - pub_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); - s2n(pub_len, p); - BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); - n += 2 + pub_len; - - DH_free(dh_clnt); - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { - const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; - EC_KEY *tkey; - int field_size = 0, ecdh_len; - - if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - tkey = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecdh_tmp; - - srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); - if (srvr_group == NULL || srvr_ecpoint == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new(); - if (clnt_ecdh == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ - if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); - if (field_size <= 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - pms_len = (field_size + 7) / 8; - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); - if (pms == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pms_len, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); - if (ecdh_len <= 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - pms_len = ecdh_len; - - /* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory accordingly. */ - encoded_pt_len = - EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); - - encodedPoint = - (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(uint8_t)); - bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Encode the public key */ - encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct( - srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); - - *p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */ - /* Encoded point will be copied here */ - p += 1; - n += 1; - /* copy the point */ - memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len); - /* increment n to account for length field */ - n += encoded_pt_len; - - /* Free allocated memory */ - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - bn_ctx = NULL; - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - encodedPoint = NULL; - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - clnt_ecdh = NULL; - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); - srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as - * the pre-shared key. */ - pms_len = psk_len; - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); - if (pms == NULL) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - memset(pms, 0, pms_len); - } else { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared - * key. */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { - CBB cbb, child; - uint8_t *new_pms; - size_t new_pms_len; - - CBB_zero(&cbb); - if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || - !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) || - !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || - !CBB_finish(&cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { - CBB_cleanup(&cbb); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); - OPENSSL_free(pms); - pms = new_pms; - pms_len = new_pms_len; - } - - /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the - * master secret. */ - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { - goto err; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; - - s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method->generate_master_secret( - s, s->session->master_key, pms, pms_len); - if (s->session->master_key_length == 0) { - goto err; - } - s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; - OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); - OPENSSL_free(pms); - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ - return s->method->do_write(s); - -err: - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); - if (pms) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); - OPENSSL_free(pms); - } - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *s) { - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A || - s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B) { - enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; - uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - size_t signature_length = 0; - unsigned long n = 0; - assert(ssl_has_private_key(s)); - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { - uint8_t *buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t digest_length; - - /* Write out the digest type if need be. */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s); - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, p, md)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - p += 2; - n += 2; - } - - /* Compute the digest. */ - const int pkey_type = ssl_private_key_type(s); - if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey_type)) { - return -1; - } - - /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); - - /* Sign the digest. */ - signature_length = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(s); - if (p + 2 + signature_length > buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - return -1; - } - - s->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; - sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(s, &p[2], &signature_length, - signature_length, md, digest, - digest_length); - } else { - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - /* The digest has already been selected and written. */ - p += 2; - n += 2; - } - signature_length = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(s); - s->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; - sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign_complete(s, &p[2], &signature_length, - signature_length); - } - - if (sign_result == ssl_private_key_retry) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; - return -1; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) { - return -1; - } - - s2n(signature_length, p); - n += signature_length + 2; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { - return -1; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C; - } - - return ssl_do_write(s); -} - -/* ssl3_has_client_certificate returns true if a client certificate is - * configured. */ -static int ssl3_has_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { - return ssl->cert && ssl->cert->x509 && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); -} - -int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { - X509 *x509 = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - int i; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { - /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ - if (s->cert->cert_cb) { - i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); - if (i < 0) { - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return -1; - } - if (i == 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - } - - if (ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - } - } - - /* We need to get a client cert */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { - /* If we get an error, we need to: - * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); - * We then get retried later */ - i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); - if (i < 0) { - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return -1; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - if (i == 1 && pkey != NULL && x509 != NULL) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) { - i = 0; - } - } else if (i == 1) { - i = 0; - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); - } - - X509_free(x509); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (i && !ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) { - i = 0; - } - if (i == 0) { - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); - return 1; - } else { - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; - /* There is no client certificate, so the handshake buffer may be - * released. */ - ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(s); - } - } - - /* Ok, we have a cert */ - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - } - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) { - /* Send an empty Certificate message. */ - uint8_t *p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - l2n3(0, p); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, 3)) { - return -1; - } - } else if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s)) { - return -1; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ - return ssl_do_write(s); -} - -int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) { - unsigned int len, padding_len; - uint8_t *d, *p; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) { - len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; - padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - *(p++) = len; - memcpy(p, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); - p += len; - *(p++) = padding_len; - memset(p, 0, padding_len); - p += padding_len; - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, p - d)) { - return -1; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; - } - - return ssl_do_write(s); -} - -int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s) { - uint8_t *d; - int ret = -1, public_key_len; - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; - uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL; - - if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A) { - return ssl_do_write(s); - } - - if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb) { - EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; - s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key); - if (key != NULL) { - s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key; - } - } - - if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private) { - s->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; - return -1; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - if (EVP_PKEY_id(s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != EVP_PKEY_EC) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - EC_KEY *ec_key = s->tlsext_channel_id_private->pkey.ec; - - d = ssl_handshake_start(s); - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d); - s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d); - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - - public_key_len = i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, NULL); - if (public_key_len <= 0) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY); - goto err; - } - - /* i2o_ECPublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a - * P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y - * field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */ - if (public_key_len != 65) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); - goto err; - } - public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len); - if (!public_key) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - derp = public_key; - i2o_ECPublicKey(ec_key, &derp); - - uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t digest_len; - if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(s, digest, &digest_len)) { - goto err; - } - - sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key); - if (sig == NULL) { - goto err; - } - - /* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */ - memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64); - d += 64; - if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(d, 32, sig->r) || - !BN_bn2bin_padded(d + 32, 32, sig->s)) { - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, - 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)) { - goto err; - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B; - - ret = ssl_do_write(s); - -err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - OPENSSL_free(public_key); - OPENSSL_free(der_sig); - ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); - - return ret; -} - -int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { - int i = 0; - if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) { - i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); - } - return i; -} - -int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *s) { - int ret = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->cert_chain); - if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && ret <= 0) { - int al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - } else { - ret = 1; - ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ - } - - return ret; -} |