From ef24392f8488cf3649c422eeab614a056d89d2d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joey Hess Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2017 00:28:15 -0400 Subject: updates --- doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'doc/devblog') diff --git a/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn b/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn index a5287ff7c..df7085602 100644 --- a/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn +++ b/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn @@ -11,9 +11,11 @@ Projects that store binary files in git, that might be worth $100k for an attacker to backdoor **should** be concerned by the SHA1 collisions. A good example of such a project is . + Using git-annex (with a suitable backend like SHA256) and signed commits -together is a good way to secure such repositories. +together is a good way to secure such repositories. -git-annex's SHA1 backend is already documented as only being -"for those who want a checksum but are not concerned about -security", so no changes needed here. +Update 12:25 am: However, there are some ways to embed SHA1-colliding data +in the names of git-annex keys. That makes git-annex with signed +commits be no more secure than git with signed commits. I am working +to fix git-annex to not use keys that have such problems. -- cgit v1.2.3