From beee1c562bce149a7338d7516eaa9c08d97bd0e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joey Hess Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2017 19:06:06 -0400 Subject: add para --- doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn b/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn index df140be2f..a5287ff7c 100644 --- a/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn +++ b/doc/devblog/day_449__SHA1_break_day.mdwn @@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ very wealthy attackers. But we're well past the time when it seemed ok that git uses SHA1. If this gets improved into a chosen-prefix collision attack, git will start to be rather insecure. +Projects that store binary files in git, that might be worth $100k for an +attacker to backdoor **should** be concerned by the SHA1 collisions. +A good example of such a project is +. +Using git-annex (with a suitable backend like SHA256) and signed commits +together is a good way to secure such repositories. + git-annex's SHA1 backend is already documented as only being "for those who want a checksum but are not concerned about security", so no changes needed here. -- cgit v1.2.3