Require Import Crypto.Spec.ModularArithmetic. Require Import Coq.PArith.BinPosDef. Require Import Coq.ZArith.BinIntDef. Require Import Crypto.Spec.CompleteEdwardsCurve. Require Import Crypto.Spec.EdDSA. Require Crypto.Arithmetic.PrimeFieldTheorems. (* to know that Z mod p is a field *) Require Crypto.Curves.Edwards.AffineProofs. (* these 2 proofs can be generated using https://github.com/andres-erbsen/safecurves-primes *) Axiom prime_q : Znumtheory.prime (2^255-19). Global Existing Instance prime_q. Axiom prime_l : Znumtheory.prime (2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493). Global Existing Instance prime_l. Section Ed25519. Local Open Scope Z_scope. Definition q : BinPos.positive := 2^255 - 19. Definition Fq : Type := F q. Definition l : BinPos.positive := 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493. Definition Fl : Type := F l. Local Open Scope F_scope. Definition a : Fq := F.opp 1. Definition d : Fq := F.opp (F.of_Z _ 121665) / (F.of_Z _ 121666). Local Open Scope nat_scope. Definition b : nat := 256. Definition n : nat := b - 2. Definition c : nat := 3. Context {SHA512: forall n : nat, Word.word n -> Word.word 512}. Local Instance char_gt_e : @Ring.char_ge (@F q) eq F.zero F.one F.opp F.add F.sub F.mul (BinNat.N.succ_pos BinNat.N.two). Proof. eapply Hierarchy.char_ge_weaken; [apply (_:Ring.char_ge q)|Decidable.vm_decide]. Qed. Definition E : Type := E.point (F:=Fq) (Feq:=Logic.eq) (Fone:=F.one) (Fadd:=F.add) (Fmul:=F.mul) (a:=a) (d:=d). Local Obligation Tactic := Decidable.vm_decide. (* to prove that B is on curve *) Program Definition B : E := (F.of_Z q 15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202, F.of_Z q 4 / F.of_Z q 5). Local Infix "++" := Word.combine. Local Notation bit b := (Word.WS b Word.WO : Word.word 1). Definition Fencode {len} {m} : F m -> Word.word len := fun x : F m => (Word.NToWord _ (BinIntDef.Z.to_N (F.to_Z x))). Definition sign (x : F q) : bool := BinIntDef.Z.testbit (F.to_Z x) 0. Definition Eenc : E -> Word.word b := fun P => let '(x,y) := E.coordinates P in Fencode (len:=b-1) y ++ bit (sign x). Definition Senc : Fl -> Word.word b := Fencode (len:=b). Lemma nonzero_a : a <> 0%F. Proof using Type. Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. Qed. Lemma square_a : exists sqrt_a : Fq, (sqrt_a * sqrt_a)%F = a. Proof using Type. pose (@PrimeFieldTheorems.F.Decidable_square q _ ltac:(Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide) a); Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. Qed. Lemma nonsquare_d : forall x : Fq, (x * x)%F <> d. Proof using Type. pose (@PrimeFieldTheorems.F.Decidable_square q _ ltac:(Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide) d); Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. Qed. Let add := E.add(nonzero_a:=nonzero_a)(square_a:=square_a)(nonsquare_d:=nonsquare_d). Let zero := E.zero(nonzero_a:=nonzero_a)(d:=d). (* TODO: move scalarmult_ref to Spec? *) Let mul := ScalarMult.scalarmult_ref(zero:=zero)(add:=add)(opp:=AffineProofs.E.opp(nonzero_a:=nonzero_a)). Definition ed25519 (l_order_B: (mul l B = zero)%E) : EdDSA (E:=E) (Eadd:=add) (Ezero:=zero) (ZEmul:=mul) (B:=B) (Eopp:=Crypto.Curves.Edwards.AffineProofs.E.opp(nonzero_a:=nonzero_a)) (* TODO: move defn *) (Eeq:=E.eq) (* TODO: move defn *) (l:=l) (b:=b) (n:=n) (c:=c) (Eenc:=Eenc) (Senc:=Senc) (H:=SHA512). Proof using Type. split; try exact _. Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. Crypto.Util.Decidable.vm_decide. exact l_order_B. Qed. End Ed25519.